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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The advent of nuclear weapons since the end of World War II altered threat perceptions 
and the Weltanschauung of policy makers and laymen alike. And, while the nuclear 
‘taboo’ has matured over time, states have continued to pursue nuclear capability for its 
‘equalizing capability.’ The scholars of international relations offer three general 
motivations behind national pursuit of nuclear capability. First, national power, second, 
scientific advancement and technological prowess, and the third reason put forward for 
nuclearization is national prestige. Given reports of an Iranian nuclear program, it is 
important to assess policy prescriptions to help prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran and 
the Middle East. In order to conceptualize the evolving strategic environment in Middle 
East, this study focuses on its` comparison with South Asia. It has been posited that 
stability of détente – i.e. conflict normalization (CBMs, resolution of political differences 
and economic linkages) and non-aggressive nuclear policies and doctrines – is empirical 
evidence of the stability of a nuclear deterrence model. An unstable deterrence model is 
characterized by hegemony; spiraling arms races; alliances, and 
bandwagoning/balancing: efforts that could lead to a general war involving nuclear 
weapons. 
 
                      
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Die Entwicklung der Atomwaffen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg veränderte die 
Wahrnehmung der Gefahren und das Weltbild sowohl der politischen Akteure als auch 
der Öffentlichkeit. Während die Tabuisierung von Atomwaffen einer gewissen 
Reifezeit bedurfte, haben die Staaten an der Erweiterung ihres Atompotentials zum 
Zwecke der wechselseitigen Abschreckung weitergearbeitet. Wissenschaftler aus dem 
Bereich der internationalen Beziehungen haben drei grundsätzliche Motivationsmuster 
hinter dem Streben der Nationalstaaten nach dem Besitz von Atomwaffen 
ausgearbeitet. Erstens, als Beweis des eigenen Status als Supermacht. Zweitens, 
wissenschaftlicher und technologischer Forschritt. Als dritter Grund, der für den 
Erwerb von Atomwaffen angegeben wird, gilt das nationale Prestige. Angesichts etwa 
der Entwicklung des iranischen Atomprogramms ist es wichtig, die internationalen 
politischen Vorgaben zu analysieren, um die Verbreitung von Atomwaffen im Iran und 
Nahen Osten zu verhindern. Um die Entwicklung des strategischen Umfeldes im Nahen 
Osten zu vergleichen, konzentriert sich diese Arbeit auf die Unterschiede zwischen dem 
mittleren Osten und Südasien. Es wurde festgestellt, dass die Stabilität dieser 
Abschreckungsmaßnahmen – d.h. die Konfliktnormalisierung (vertrauensschaffende 
Maßnahmen (CBMs), die Lösung der politischen Divergenzen und der Aufbau 
wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen) sowie die friedliche Atompolitik und atomare Doktrin 
ein empirischer Beweis für die Stabilität des Models der atomaren Abschreckung und 
Abrüstung sind. Für ein instabiles Abschreckungssmodell sind wiederum Hegemonie, 
die Aufrüstungsspirale, Bündnis- und Gegengewichtspolitik: Dynamiken, die zu einem 
totalen Krieg mit dem Einsatz der Atomwaffen führen können.         
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  INTRODUCTION:  
 
   The advent of nuclear weapons since the end of World War II altered threat 
perceptions and the Weltanschauung of policy makers and laymen alike. And, while 
the nuclear ‘taboo’ has matured over time, states have continued to pursue nuclear 
capability for its ‘equalizing capability.’ The scholars of international relations offer 
three general motivations behind national pursuit of nuclear capability. First, national 
power, second, scientific advancement and technological prowess, and the third 
reason put forward for nuclearization is national prestige. Given reports of an Iranian 
nuclear program, it is important to assess policy prescriptions to help prevent nuclear 
proliferation in Iran and the Middle East. In order to conceptualize the evolving 
strategic environment in Middle East, this study focuses on the composite parts of 
détente and nuclear deterrence. It has been posited that stability of détente – i.e. 
conflict normalization (CBMs, resolution of political differences and economic 
linkages) and non-aggressive nuclear policies and doctrines – is empirical evidence of 
the stability of a nuclear deterrence model. An unstable deterrence model is 
characterized by hegemony; spiraling arms races; alliances, and 
bandwagoning/balancing: efforts that could lead to a general war involving nuclear 
weapons.         
    
   A major assumption based on the role of nuclear weapons is that of deterrence. 
The goal of deterrence is to prevent the outbreak of war by using nuclear weapons 
as a threat of force. Thus a society will not be offensive if their actions will be 
countered by a damaging action. The ‘second-strike capability’ of a country is also 
an actor in the theory of deterrence. It is unlikely that a country would retaliate at 
one nation-state’s threat of nuclear war if they were aware that their supply of 
nuclear warheads was insufficient in comparison to the adversary. It is irrational 
that a country would initiate attack if a second strike could wipe out a nation-state’s 
military and civilian strongholds. Kenneth Waltz, a leading theorist on this 
subject, is clear and confident in his position that nuclear weapons have been 
 2
given a bad name. His assured prediction sees a nation will be deterred from 
attacking even if it believes that there is only a possibility that its adversary will 
retaliate, therefore the probability of major war among nuclear states is zero. 
However, as Sagan has pointed out, the fact that nuclear adversaries were able to 
maintain the peace during the Cold War should not be a cause for complacency in 
the future in case of new nuclear powers.1 
   Nonetheless, Sagan has also cautioned against despair about the workability of 
nuclear deterrence in the future. He says it can lead to false utopianism about the 
elimination of war. So, while he proposes alteration in nuclear strategy, arms 
control and nuclear safety regimes as the realistic prospects for lessening the 
persistent risks of living in the nuclear age, this dissertation dwells upon the 
efficacious role of concrete progress on the ‘core’ or ‘flashpoint’ conflict i.e. 
movement from conflict management to normalization, as well as national 
formulation of defensive (as opposed to offensive) doctrines, as evidence of the 
stability of the deterrence model.  
    
   The Cold War adversaries maintained a two-track stability process within the 
framework of deterrence. One track involved the patient pursuit of the settlement of 
fundamental political differences. Simultaneously, negotiations were held to 
stabilize nuclear arms races and lower the risk of inadvertent or accidental triggers 
to nuclear war. Since the probability of Iran’s nuclear capability scuttling the 
peace process has been recognized in this work, it is surmised that if the Arab-
Israeli dispute is resolved prior to the overt nuclearization of Iran, it could prevent 
potential conflict escalation. Thus, early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute would 
                                                 
1 Sagan, Scott and Kenneth Waltz, The spread of nuclear weapons: A Debate Renewed, W.W. 
Norton, Aug 19, 2002. Following the debate in which Waltz advocates that ‘more would be better’ 
and Sagan argues in favor of ‘more would be worse’, Sagan gives four requirements for stable 
nuclear deterrence: prevention of preventive war during periods of transition when one side has a 
temporary advantage; the development of survivable second-strike forces; the avoidance of accidental 
nuclear war; and finally the ability to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists.  
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help keep the deterrence calculus more stable in the region. Even though deterrence 
during the Cold War, and also in South Asia, kept crises from blowing into full-scale 
conflicts on the one hand, and nudged the antagonistic parties toward seeking pacific 
settlement of disputes on the other, the volatility of the Palestinian dispute has proved 
to be a hard nut to crack. It is also true that during the Cold War, eye-ball to eye-ball 
confrontations like the Cuban missile crisis were prevented from escalating, and arms 
reduction treaties like SALT brought the two parties to the negotiating table. And in 
the case of South Asia, armed confrontations like Kargil, and the full-scale military 
stand-off on the Indo-Pakistan border in 2002 were contained, and both parties 
actively sought to resolve major conflicts like Kashmir. But from Kargil to Agra (i.e. 
President Musharraf’s 2001 visit to India for resolving the Kashmir dispute), Pakistan 
demonstrated its eagerness to reduce nuclear tension on the subcontinent by making 
the major concession of giving up its traditional stance on the Kashmir dispute (which 
enjoyed the moral and legal support of the Jan 5, 1949 UN resolution). In the case of 
the Middle East, major concessions cannot be sought from Iran on the Arab-Israeli 
issue because it is not a direct party to the dispute. However, Iran’s self-perceived 
role could remain a spoiler by using the Palestine card (with its status as the 
quintessential Islamic cause) for political one-upmanship in a Sunni-dominated 
region.2   
    
   The comparative study in this work between South Asia and the Middle East revolves 
around three areas. These are: the nuclear deterrence framework that currently exists 
in South Asia, and the likely national policy responses Iran’s nuclear program would 
evoke among its neighbors leading to the nuclear security framework that would 
concomitantly or consequently be put into place in the Middle East. The second area 
or factor is the role of, and the impact upon, the major or ‘core’ dispute in the region 
                                                 
2 Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, Yale 
University Press, Oct 1, 2007. He has argued that in the post-Cold War world, Iran worked against the 
peace process, fearing that it would be left isolated in the region, and Israel sought to prevent a US-
Iran dialogue because it feared that Washington would betray Israeli security interests if Iran and US 
were to communicate directly. 
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which has the potential to emerge as the ‘nuclear flashpoint’. Here it is surmised that 
for the workability of deterrence, conflict management and conflict resolution must 
go hand in hand with efforts to put into place a security and nuclear deterrence 
framework. And thirdly, the role of the extra-regional actor, the US in both cases, has 
been analyzed, in order to facilitate conflict resolution, and assist in the putting 
together of various elements of a security framework.  
   The concept of security has undergone a paradigmatic shift in the post-Cold War   
era. Even more has altered with respect to international security regimes and the 
security relations between states by the events of September 11, 2001. These 
changes have blurred the traditional distinctions between internal and external 
security. An effort would be made in this study to understand the implications of the 
juxtaposition of varying notions of security, and in the light of new realities, 
investigate the deterrence stability model that currently prevails in South Asia with 
a view to drawing lessons for the evolving strategic environment in the Middle East.  
   
   It would be instructive to understand the dynamics of the emerging nuclear standoff 
between Iran on the one hand, and Israel and the US, on the other. Although Iran 
claims that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes only, the international 
community, led by the US, is convinced that it intends to use the nuclear capability 
for military purposes. There are two fundamental contexts that need to be taken into 
consideration. First is the looming presence of the US doctrine of preemption. With 
the doctrine of preemption, the US successfully affected regime change in Iraq under 
the pretext of its possession of WMD. However, that policy faltered because of the 
non-existence of WMDs in Iraq, and is beset with difficulties the US subsequently 
faces in stabilizing the post-occupation Iraq. Given the Iraq example, most analysts 
counsel ruling out preemption in the case of Iran. The second context that needs to be 
considered is, the US policy toward the Middle East as a whole, and Iran, in 
particular. In this context, the role of the EU, and Russia, also merits importance.  
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   The US foreign policy during the Cold War was primarily predicated on the 
containment of the former USSR. Initially formulated by George Kennan early on in 
the conflict, the concept of containment centered on bringing countervailing pressures 
to bear against a revolutionary power’s external expansion until the structural 
contradictions within the system began to weaken it internally. Judging from the 
results, the policy was a success. However, it also created certain problems. Many 
authoritarian regimes world-wide were supported and strengthened by the US to 
bolster its policy of containment of the USSR. This was also the case in Middle East. 
This structural flaw in the containment edifice was acknowledged by the US policy 
makers while going into Iraq. It was declared that a new policy based on the 
democratic aspirations of the populace of the region would be formulated for the sake 
of future prosperity. However, that was followed by a policy of rigid containment of 
Iran, along the lines of the containment of former USSR. A policy of rigid 
containment of Iran is a policy of maintaining the status quo. On the one hand, it 
relies on the support of the Arab authoritarian regimes, which has fuelled extremism. 
On the other hand, it helps put off creative solutions to the Arab-Israeli dispute. A 
policy of rigid containment entails building walls around Iran that serve neither the 
US nor the region.  
 
   The most important US move in the interest of regional stability would be to drop the 
policy of preemption. Isolating Iran through threats of regime-change would only 
strengthen the radical factions amongst the ruling clergy. The fear of international 
economic or military punishment would propel Iran to speed up its nuclear program, 
as it is currently reported to be doing. The perception of weakness in the face of 
growing international threats would push the regime to acquire the ultimate weapons 
for absolute security. This sequence of fear, perceived weakness and the nuclear 
pursuit has already been played out in the case of North Korea in the recent past, and 
Pakistan before that, as well as in the cases of all the existing nuclear powers when 
they were in the process of building their respective nuclear capabilities. 
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   While engagement would also highlight the role of other actors like the EU, as 
interlocutors, it would not foreclose the possibility of deterrence. The legitimate 
security interests of the state of Israel, and other US allies in the region, require that 
deterrence of Iran, in the case of its nuclearization, would go hand in hand with 
engagement with Iran, for the peaceful resolution of disputes. It is only through 
deterrence, that the fear of Iran holding the region in a nuclear blackmail can be 
forestalled. In case of early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, a conducive 
regional environment would be created for Iranian role in the Lebanon, Iraq and Syria 
to be calibrated by negotiating legitimate political space for relevant respective 
national stakeholders within the framework of rational deterrence.   
 
   So, a policy of constructive engagement with Iran means that firstly, Iran can be 
possibly deterred from acquiring the nuclear capability it currently presumably seeks 
since the international community can ensure that it has a greater say in the internal 
political dynamics of Iran; and secondly, in case of its having acquired the capability, 
it can be drawn to the negotiating table for laying down a comprehensive regional 
security framework under the workable calculus of deterrence. Given the post-Cold 
War, and particularly post-9/11 international environment that is marked by the 
juxtaposition of internal and external security, and requires ‘comprehensive security’ 
at all levels, the current Iranian regime would have to rethink its nuclear stance and 
regional policy postures in consideration of threat perceptions of other state-actors. 
However, in formulating a policy for Iran, engagement, instead of isolation, would 
better serve the security interests of the stake-holders involved. 
 
   The issue of revisionism of the nuclearizing power is often cited as a hindrance to 
peace efforts. However, in South Asia, a region trapped in hegemonic-objective 
conflict where the major hegemon is locked in a ‘security complex’ with the 
nuclearizing power, this ‘conventional’ revisionism has transformed into 
‘nuclearized’ anxiety for resolution of the regional dispute. The notion of status quo 
and revisionist powers is taken from Morganthau’s definitional framework of types of 
states. According to him, a status quo power is one which aims to keep its power level 
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and shows no interest in changing the distribution of power. In contrast, a revisionist 
power aims at acquiring more power.3 In the case of South Asia, Pakistan as the 
revisionist power historically contested India’s claim over Kashmir. However, in the 
aftermath of nuclearization of the region it has been observed that Pakistan has been 
at pains to fundamentally alter its policy (the traditional Pakistani demand for 
plebiscite under right of self-determination of Kashmiris as per the UN resolution of 
Jan 5 1949 was put on the back-burner), and opened up to ‘out of the box’ solutions 
to the Kashmir dispute. In the case of Iran, it is often asserted that as a revolutionary 
state in the exuberant phase of its revolution, it would continue to be a destabilizing 
factor in the region in the quest to export its revolution. However, it needs to be 
considered that Iran’s revolutionary zeal should have been exhausted during the 
eight-year long war with Iraq, and its leaders must have learnt some lessons of 
realpolitik amidst the exigencies of statecraft. One clear example should be the 
consistent profession of Iraqi Shi’as of their identity as Arabs, rather than as Shi’as. 
Further, active engagement with Iran could also address its policy-makers’ obsession 
with Israel and the voices of moderates could be made to be heard and empowered.  
 
   One other major issue is the difficulty posed by nuclear proliferation to efforts for 
global disarmament. This is indeed a serious issue. Consequently, this work posits 
that rapprochement could lead to denuclearization and not vice versa. In the aftermath 
of the Second World War, the strategic balance between the two super powers was 
maintained through the complex and carefully constructed nuclear balance 
maintained by deterrence. Its central plank was mutually assured destruction or 
MAD. The idea was that a nuclear attack could be deterred by the perception that a 
second strike capability of the target state would cause unaffordable damage to the 
attacker. The theory of deterrence was credited for holding the peace between the two 
antagonistic super powers during the Cold War. However, it lost most of its allure at 
the systemic (global) level with the end of the Cold War in 1991. Nonetheless, its 
                                                 
3 See Morganthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 1985, p. 53 
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relevance at the sub-systemic (regional) level persists. This has been demonstrated 
with the nuclearization of South Asia in 1998. 
 
   The strategic paradigm in South Asia is characterized by the ‘security complex’ 
encompassing India and Pakistan.4 In 1998, the nuclear factor was added to the 
security complex, and a new strategic parity emerged on the Indo-Pakistan 
subcontinent. How far this new parity has been successful in maintaining peace is a 
hotly debated topic. It is noted that India and Pakistan would have to eventually 
break out of the zero-sum mode they have locked themselves in. While the nuclear 
potential cannot be denied after its emergence on the political horizon - what is once 
learnt cannot be unlearnt - a move toward cooperation by dispelling bad habits of 
domination, limited wars and selective strikes, would establish greater stability in 
the region. However, the absence of a full-scale war, despite compound crises, is also 
forwarded as an argument in favor of the continuing relevance of the theory of 
deterrence. Further, the mutual inter-locking of interests as demonstrated in concepts 
of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) or Mutually Assured Terror (MAT) has 
given impetus to notions like Mutually-Assured Cooperation (MAC) that point to the 
inevitability of joint peace-making efforts, for lack of other options, in the quest for 
security and stability.  
  
   This study dwells upon the centrality of détente in a deterrence model: The twin 
processes of dispute resolution and doctrinal transparency point to the authenticity of 
rapprochement, and consequently, to the stability of the nuclear deterrence model. 
That said, it would be a truism to say that the theory of deterrence is set to encounter 
challenging realities in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli peace process, and ‘security 
dilemmas’ of Arab states, could be the casualties of an unstable deterrence model. 
The Middle East is a complicated region by any standard. The strategic environment 
                                                 
4 For the concept of security complexes, see Buzon, Barry and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: 
The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2003. Also see Buzan, 
Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 
US, 1997. 
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in the Middle East is marked by multiple ‘security complexes’. There is the long-
standing Arab-Israeli dispute, the Persian-Arab divide, and also the role of the extra-
regional actors i.e. the US, EU and Russia.      
    
   A lot has been written on Iran in literature and in political treatises and analyses. 
Major writings by Nikkie Keddie, Hamid Algar, Syed Hossain Nasr, Syed Vali Nasr, 
Dilip Hiro, Bernard Lewis, and Ali Shariati help us understand Iran and its society. 
However, for the purposes of the current research the usefulness of some significant 
works needs to be acknowledged. Ray Takeyh’s Paradox and Power in the Islamic 
Republic, published by Times Books in 2006, looks critically at the US approach to 
Iran since the 1979 revolution. He criticizes the policies of successive administrations 
because decades of sanctions and containment have not significantly changed Iranian 
behavior. Takeyh places the nuclear issue within the broader context of Iran's 
relations with the West, and particularly with the US. Within that context, Takeyh 
asserts that Americans have grossly misunderstood the complex realities of Iranian 
political life. As opposed to the image frequently shown in America--a monolithic 
government controlled by clerical fanatics--Takeyh presents a more nuanced picture. 
Despite the recent electoral triumphs of conservative ideologues, Iran remains torn 
between those who seek secular pluralism and those who want rigid authoritarianism. 
The outcome is far from certain, but Takeyh insists the hostile tone of the Bush 
administration undermines reformers. Takeyh asserts that issues with Iran can be 
solved through dialogue, providing a counterpoint to those who consider 
confrontation and military conflict to be inevitable. He observes that the ‘chimera of 
regime change’ must be rejected, and that ‘it is rare... for a state that views nuclear 
weapons as fundamental to its security interests to dispense with such weapons under 
relentless threats.’ Takeyh urges America to look beyond President Ahmadinejad to 
Iranian state institutions such as the powerful Supreme National Security Council and 
Foreign Ministry, each of which distanced itself from Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel 
rhetoric. Takeyh also suggests areas in which Iran and the US might forge a ‘selective 
partnership’, including their shared need for a stable Iraq. 
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   For understanding the early US responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, Bush at War by Bob Woodward (Simon and Schuster, NY, 2002) is a useful 
read. Woodward focuses on the three months following 9/11, during which the US 
prepared for war in Afghanistan, took steps toward a preemptive strike against Iraq, 
intensified homeland defense, and began a global CIA covert war against terrorism. 
Woodward offers an up close and nearly day-by-day account of the decision-making 
processes and inner divisions. The narrative is based on tape-recorded interviews of 
over a hundred sources (some unnamed), including four hours of interviews with the 
president, along with notes from cabinet meetings and access to some classified 
reports. Woodward describes how CIA Director George Tenet prepared a 
paramilitary team to infiltrate Afghanistan to set the groundwork for invasion, and the 
cooperation between the defense department and the CIA that made the plan work 
resulting in Afghanistan’s successful occupation. And that some in the Cabinet like 
Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld appeared eager to attack 
Iraq.  
    
   In The Shi’a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, published by 
W.W. Norton in August 2006, Vali Nasr, professor of Middle East and South Asia 
politics at the US Naval Postgraduate School, analyzes the history and nature of the 
greatest division within the Muslim world. That divide is of the 1,400 year old split 
between Sunnis and Shi’as existing from practically the beginning of the faith, each 
sect viewing itself as the “original-orthodoxy.”  
 
   Though stressing that the Shi’as (like the Sunnis) are hardly monolithic, varying in 
degrees of piety and because of different cultural and economic backgrounds, Nasr 
listed a number of key characteristics of Shi’as worldwide. Though Shi’as are a 
minority of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims (comprising 130 to 195 million people or 
about 10 to 15 percent of the total Muslims in the world), they are as nearly numerous 
as the Sunnis in the Islamic heartland from Lebanon to Pakistan and around the 
Persian Gulf comprise 80 percent of the population.      
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   The Shi’a-Sunni split dates back to the succession crises after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Sunnis came to accept the notion that successor caliphs to the Prophet 
(perhaps individuals chosen by the community) need not possess exceptional spiritual 
qualities but merely be exemplary Muslims who could direct the religious and 
political affairs of the community and still later accepted future rulers so long as they 
maintained order, protected Islam, and left religious matters to the ulama (religious 
scholars). What became the Shi’as disagreed with this, feeling that the true leaders of 
the community should not be “ordinary mortals” but should instead be Muhammad's 
family - popularly known as the Ahl Al-Bayt or people of the household - as the blood 
of the Prophet ran in their veins along with the spiritual qualities invested in him by 
God. 
    
   Similarly, Sunnis and Shi’as differed widely on matters of religious interpretation. 
Sunnis came to believe that all believers were capable of understanding religious truth 
in a way and to a degree that made special intermediaries between God and man 
unneeded, while Shi’as came to feel that there were outer and inner, hidden truths in 
religion, and that without the right leadership the true meaning and intent of Islam 
would be lost. Shi’as believed that there was hidden and esoteric knowledge, 
inaccessible to the average believer without help. The Shi’as placed a great deal of 
emphasis on the history of the early rightful successors to the Prophet and on Shi’a 
saints and consequently also have a great love for visual imagery depicting these 
individuals and their struggles (most of which ended in martyrdom). This love of 
imagery grates on Sunni sensibilities, who often view it as “possible inducements to, 
if not outright expressions of, idol worship.” Related to this is the great Shi’a festival 
of mourning, remembrance, and atonement known as Ashoura, a religious festival 
and drama akin in many ways to Christian festivals such as Good Friday “Way of the 
Cross” processions. As Nasr put it, while Sunnism “is about the law” and the ‘thou 
shalts’ and ‘thou shalt nots’ of Islam, Shi’aism is about rituals, passion, and drama.” 
Sunnism and Shi’aism differ not so much because of divergent practices but because 
of the spirit of their interpretation of Islam.  
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   Shi’as, much like Christians, have a strong millenarian streak as well. They believe 
that the line of imams (descendents of Ali, son-in-law of Muhammad, first rightful 
successor to him) continued through the tenth century, when the Twelfth Imam, 
Muhammad al-Mahdi (the Guided One) was taken by God into a miraculous state of 
occultation in 939 AD. His return will be the "end of time and the advent of perfect 
divine justice." This messianic framework of belief (along with the martyrdom of the 
imams and of Shi’a saints) have been key influences on Shi’as and resonate in events 
today, such as Shi’a views of the Iranian revolution, the disappearance in Lebanon in 
1978 of the popular leader Imam Musa al-Sadr (some felt he had been miraculously 
occulted), and in the actions of Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq who named his militia the 
Mahdi Army (implying that his cause was that of the Twelfth Imam).  
 
   According to Vali Nasr, the key reality of the Middle East today is the Sunni-Shi’a 
conflict. The most important outcome of the war in Iraq, its “central legacy,” has been 
that Iraq has become the first Arab-majority country to be ruled by a democratically-
elected Shi’a majority, tipping the scales against the long Sunni domination of the 
Middle East. Though the Shi’a revival began with the Iranian revolution and 
Hezbollah gains in Lebanon against Israel, today it is about “protecting and 
entrenching” Shi’a gains in Iraq. Shi’a success there will lead to greater ties among 
Shi’as throughout the Middle East, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and increased Shi’a 
demands for a greater political role everywhere. This Shi’a revival rests on three 
pillars; the newly empowered Shi’a majority in Iraq, the rise of Iran as a major 
regional power, and the empowerment of Shi’a populations in Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Bahrain, and Afghanistan.  
 
   This revival will result in a huge Sunni backlash - as shown by the actions of such 
Sunni organizations as the Taliban and al-Qaeda - and if anything will strengthen 
anti-Americanism in the region, as the revival comes at a time of rising Sunni 
extremism. Anti-Shi’a feelings and actions by the extremists will hurt the US, as anti-
Shi’a feelings will solidify Sunni public opinion and expand the influence of groups 
such as al-Qaeda.  
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   Nasr does see hope though as well. Shi’as will be much more likely to work with the 
US, as both the US and the Shi’as share a common enemy (Sunni extremists) and 
greater democracy in the region (a stated US goal) will add to Shi’a empowerment 
throughout the region. The US has already been of great aid to the Shi’as, removing 
Saddam Hussein and empowering the Shi’a majority in Iraq (efforts at de-
Ba'thification in Iraq have really been de-Sunnification efforts) and taking down the 
“Sunni wall” around Iran, as for a time Iran was constrained by Sunni-dominated Iraq 
to the west and a Pakistan-Taliban-Saudi axis to the east in Afghanistan. 
 
   One of the least remarked upon aspects of the war in Iraq, at least in the American 
press, has been how conflict and instability in that country have shaken the delicate 
balance of power between Sunni and Shi’a throughout the wider region. Nasr argues 
that the Shi’a Crescent—stretching from Lebanon and Syria through the Gulf to Iraq 
and Iran, finally terminating in Pakistan and India—is gathering strength in the 
aftermath of Saddam's fall, cementing linkages that transcend political and linguistic 
borders and could lead to a new map of the Middle East. 
    
   For a crash course in the symbolism and practices of Shi’a Islam is The Martyrs of 
Karbala: Shi’i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran. Karman Scot Aghaie is an 
Assistant Professor of Islamic and Iranian history at the University of Texas at 
Austin. The book is an important primer for understanding the Shi’as (Iran is 
predominantly Shi’a, and forty percent of Iraq is Shi’a). In the book one learns about 
numerous important concepts like Moharram, Ahl-Al-Sunnah, and Ahl Al-Bayt that 
enhances situational awareness of the theater of operations. Moharram is the first 
month of the Islamic calendar and for Shi’a Muslims a more significantly religious 
month than for their Sunni counterparts. It brings with it the main difference between 
Shi’a and Sunni, for on the 10th of Moharram (also called Ashoora), Hussein, 
grandson of Prophet Mohammad fought a battle on the plains of Karbala (in Iraq) 
against Yazid (the second Umayyad ruler) for the fate of whether Muslims would be 
ruled by successors of the Prophet or through other means (tribal consensuses, 
tyranny, popular selection).  
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   Hussein, a member of the Ahl-Al-Bayt (Family of the House of the Prophet, grandson 
of the Prophet Muhammed, and son of the Prophet’s cousin Ali) was killed in battle 
in 680 AD. The book chronicles the Karbala syndrome and the series of rituals that 
would evolve to mourn the death of Prophet Muhammed’s grandson; these rituals 
would form the basis of what distinguishes Shi’a Muslims from Sunnis. By the 
sixteenth century, the time of the Safavid dynasty that ruled Persia, Shi’a Islam 
became the state religion and the ritualistic Rowzeh Khani, a ritual sermon recounting 
the events of Karbala, became a major body of literature. In the eighteenth century, 
during the Persian Qajar dynasty, the events of Karbala came complete with stage 
props and actors re-enacting the battle. One also learns how during the period actors 
playing the Shi’a nemesis Yazid and the actual murderer of Hussein, known as Shimr 
were dressed in European uniforms to make them more odious. This may explain the 
Iranian psychological connection of western military uniforms as being evil. 
   The book also goes into detail about the procession of mourners who rub their chests 
with mud and beat them as a symbol of death of loved one. Others may heighten their 
sorrow with flagellation with metal chains to the beat of drummer. This is not too far 
from the concept of redemption through pain that was prevalent in the Christian 
theosophy of the Middle Ages. A man sprays rose water on the mourners, 
symbolizing the Prophet’s love for perfumes and cleanliness. Standard-bearers carry a 
large float with standards (alamat) of the family of the Prophet who were at Karbala. 
It is the cavalry of Shi’a Islam and to be standard-bearer is a high honor in Shi’a 
communities that observe this ritual. Imagine a military convoy or jeep trying to drive 
through this procession; this is exactly what an Israeli army jeep did in Operation 
Peace for Galilee that stimulated months of riots and attacks on Israeli Defense Force 
units in Lebanon. The Israeli troops driving the jeep obviously did not understand the 
frenzy, passions and rituals that they were attempting to drive through. There are  
processions carrying symbols of the double-edged sword of Ali (Zul-feqar) carried by 
Hussein, his injured horse (Zhu-al-Jannah) and women carrying a crib of Ali Asghar, 
an infant killed in battle as well as processions carrying shovels symbolic of digging 
the graves.  
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   The procession ends with a man in chains on a camel, symbolizing Ali Zein Al-
Abdin, son of Hussein who was captured and taken prisoner. In understanding these 
words and symbols one ascertains the modern intentions of weapons systems and 
deployments by the Iranians, who tend to label operations based on the symbols of 
Karbala. Several battles in the Iran-Iraq War were labeled Operation Karbala I, II, III 
and so on. 
    
   Finally, a rethink on the preemption debate can be seen in Kenneth M. Pollack’s The 
Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America, published by Random 
House New York in 2004, in which he puts up a case for dropping the policy of 
preemption, and exercising caution in dealing with Iran. The former Clinton National 
Security Council staffer and long-time CIA analyst, now works at the Brookings 
Institution in Washington. Pollack’s first book, the best-selling The Threatening 
Storm, published in the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom worked as the moderate 
Democratic case for war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In The Persian Puzzle 
Pollack makes the opposite case for Iran. Over the past quarter-century, US-Iranian 
relations have been complicated. Pollack’s work underscores the schizophrenia of the 
US approach toward Iran—he calls it the American amnesia. As a result, according to 
Pollack, the strategic ambitions of the Iranian regime, and its relentless pursuit of a 
nuclear option, have become a “problem from hell.” He offers a “triple track” strategy 
envisioning rewards for cooperative policies and punishment for mischief, and pursuit 
of international cooperation for a new nuclear non-proliferation policy. 
 
   The major research questions that prompted this study were: 
 
     1. What effect would Iran’s nuclear program have on nuclear non-proliferation in 
the Middle East? 
 
     2. How would Iran’s nuclear program impact upon the Israeli-Arab peace process? 
 
   The hypothesis presented in this dissertation states that, 
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   “Iran’s nuclear program would increase risk of nuclear proliferation in the region, and 
bring the Arab-Israeli peace process under increased pressure.” 
 
   It is further surmised that, 
 
   “In order to achieve lasting peace in the region, the international community must 
find a permanent solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute.” 
 
    As the theoretical model for the research plan, it would be useful to consider the 
concept of deterrence. Initially put forward by Brodie5 among others and vigorously 
advocated by Waltz, while the ‘theory of rational deterrence’ has drawn considerable 
support, others regard it with skepticism.6 They underline the irrelevance of 
deterrence as a stable conflict prevention mechanism given its supposed inherent risk 
factors and drawbacks. Some critics of deterrence believe that a deterrence policy is 
normally associated with risks inherent in provocation and leading to misconception 
regarding immediate threat perception and assessment. In their view, it thus may lead 
to military escalation rather than political restraint, the ultimate objective aimed by 
the application of rational deterrence.  
 
   Historical evidence shows that deterrence has been widely practiced on various scales 
in regional conflicts where enduring rivalries have existed. The fact that deterrence is 
a global issue makes it critical to understand what it really means, although 
‘deterrence’ is a word that is far harder to define than to use.7 This is certainly the 
case for deterrence in the context of contemporary international relations, whether 
rivals pursue deterrence policies depending on their conventional or non-conventional 
                                                 
5 Brodie, Bernard, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946.  
6 For an elaborate review of the classical Rational Deterrence Theory, see Jervis, Robert, “Rational 
Deterrence: Theory and Evidence”, World Politics, Vol 41, no. 2, Jan. 1989, pp. 183-207 
7 Fakhr, Ahmed, in United Nations Study series, no 17, “Study on Deterrence; Its Implications for 
disarmament and the Arms Race, negotiated Arms Reductions and International Security and Other 
Related Matters”, New York 1987, p. 11. 
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military assets. Deterrence either conventional or non-conventional is perceived as 
the outcome of complex political, military and other cost-benefit calculations.  
 
   Deterrence may be defined as ‘the threat to use military force in a punishing mode or 
a denial-punishing mode in order to dissuade a challenger from undertaking a certain 
course of action involving the use of military force.8 Paul Huth defines a deterrence 
policy as ‘a policy that seeks to convince an adversary by the threat of military 
retaliation that the costs of resorting to the use of military force to achieve foreign 
policy objectives will outweigh the benefits.9 Deterrence is practiced by an actor to 
secure certain interests endangered by a rival during a certain crisis or through an 
extended period of time involving several crises in a protracted conflict. Analysts 
have divided deterrence-related interests into two categories. The first includes 
concrete and intrinsic interests concerning which a defender is unlikely to accept 
significant compromises because the interests relate to key national security priorities. 
The second category includes extrinsic interests, which relate more to the long-term 
practice of regional hegemony or international influence or power politics. 
 
   In order to assess the failure or success of a deterrence calculation, we need to carry 
out a measurement of the both the calculus of the challenger and the deterrer. The 
rational calculus builds on the evaluation of the three main components of a 
deterrence posture. These are; first; the military capability of the opponent; second, 
the demonstrated political will of the opponent reflecting the credibility of the 
deterring threat, and third, the interests at stake and for which the success or failure of 
a “single deterrence episode” is subject to examination. As has been stated above, 
Iran’s nuclear program signals Israel’s inability to maintain stability through her 
nuclear preponderance in the region. Secondly, the Arab-Israeli peace process risks 
being sabotaged in the new nuclear deterrence environment, unless that development 
                                                 
8 Evron, Yair, Israeli Nuclear Dilemma, Cornell University Press, New York, 1994, p. 36 
9 Huth, Paul, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War”, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 82, No. 2, June 1988, p. 424. 
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is taken up as an opportunity for confidence-building measures and conflict 
resolution.       
    
   This study acknowledges the primacy of the state in the understanding of 
international relations. The state-centric method amounts to focusing upon states as 
the basic actors who dominate and to larger extent determine the course of 
international politics. Today the state has extended i ts tentacles in such a way 
as to overshadow businessmen and bankers, labor organizations and sporting 
teams, religious institutions and political parties of standing as international actors 
independent of states.10 In view of such a pervasiveness of state machinery, we can 
assume that the civic life today is meaningless without it. So in order to study a 
social phenomenon, the question of inter-state relations becomes significant. The 
states have cooperated with one another in maintaining a structure of inter-state or 
international order in which they confirm one another’s domestic authority and 
preserve a framework of co-existence.11 
     
   The subject matter of international relations therefore, has been first and foremost 
relations between the states. States are usually considered as the basic units of 
analysis. At a global level, it is the state which represents individuals l iv ing  
within a certain territory, under an arrangement where one sovereign power 
speaks for the whole citizenry. Thus, if we want to study international relations, 
                                                 
10 It is only the state-centric conception of international system that recognizes state as the 
basic unit of analysis. The system theory on the other hand defines the presence of a global 
capitalist economy as the basic point of departure. Similarly, there are other conceptions of 
international system, which define various other entities as the basic units of analysis; Nations 
instead of states, MNCs, regional alliances like NATO and erstwhile Warsaw Pact, regional 
organizations like SAARC or EU. So the question of basic actors in international politics is 
complicated. Still most analysts of international politics start from the assumption that states are 
the basic actors whose pattern of interaction should be classified as the subject matter of 
international relations. 
 
11 Wendzel, Robert L., International Politics: Policy Makers and Policy Making, Toronto: John 
Willie and Sons, 1981, p. 4. 
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in a relatively correct perspective, the basic analytical construct having a 
corresponding empirical referent is state.12 In the 15th and 16th centuries feudal 
princes in Europe began to consolidate and enlarge their domains through conquest 
and marriage. Eventually, this process culminated in the establishment of unified, 
centralized states organized on a national basis and ruled by one sovereign, usually a 
monarch. These were the precursors of contemporary modern states.13 
    
   Although there is a variety of actors on the international scene i.e., multinational 
corporations, regional organizations, international statutory bodies, 
international voluntary associations such as International Red Crescent, ethnic 
groups and individuals such as the Palestinians and (late) Yasser Arafat in the pre-
Palestinian Authority era, there is a certain advantage in focusing on the 
performance of states, because they are the leading players, who dominate the 
action at the international level.14  
    
   The action at the international level that remains the preserve of the states 
includes: whether nuclear war occurs (unsurprisingly the specter of nuclear arms 
falling in the hands of non-state actors has raised international concern), 
meaningful arms agreement is achieved, productive steps are taken to eliminate 
world hunger, natural resources are constructively utilized etc. It will be the state 
functionaries the world over who continue to formulate and implement the policies, 
which will largely determine the world’s future.15  
   States then are the continuing entities among which formal relations and 
obligations subsist. Governments of the states are the agents which in fact 
make decisions, formulate polices and react to the decisions and policies of other 
                                                 
12 Reynolds, P.A., An Introduction to International Relations, 2nd ed., New York: Longman Inc., 
1982 p. 35. 
13 Wendzel, op. cit., p. 4. 
14 Reynolds, op. cit. p. 20. 
 
15 Calvert, Peter, The Foreign Policy of New States, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., p. VII of 
preface. 
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governments. Thus, when governments of states are engaged in taking decisions 
and formulating policies in response to the decisions and policies of other 
governments, the relations between them become neither inter-state nor inter-
governmental but international.16 
 
   The government is therefore, responsible mainly for functioning at two levels: one 
is to take action domestically i.e., to formulate a domestic policy for the citizens. 
The other is to take action vis-a-vis other governments i.e., to formulate a foreign 
policy. In the subsequent discussions, for the most part the later aspect of the 
government’s functioning will be highlighted. It would, therefore, be relevant to 
study what is meant by the foreign policy of state. 
 
   What is unique about the foreign policy is that it is the sole prerogative of the 
states. To formulate and execute foreign policy in effect is to prove oneself to be 
in charge of the state.17 As discussed earlier, states are the only sovereign 
entities in international politics, which at least in principle, make decisions without 
referring to an outside authority. Therefore it is only a state, which formulates a 
foreign policy, when engaged in a process of dealing with other states. The other 
actors in international arena: international and regional organizations, MNCs, 
international voluntary organizations and ethnic groups, have no such need to 
formulate a foreign policy. 
 
    What exactly is the nature of foreign policy and how is it made and executed, is a 
separate field of enquiry in international relations.18 In order to assess the nature and 
                                                 
16 The field of Foreign Policy Analysis specifically deals with the nature and formulation of 
foreign policy decision-making and suggests various theoretical assumptions to comprehensively 
study the foreign policy behavior of various states. 
 
17 Chittick, William O., The Analysis of Foreign Policy Outputs, Ohio: Bell and Howell Co., 1975, 
p. 5. 
18 Op.cit. Also see Dawisha, Adeed, ed., Islam in Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, 
1983, pp. 2, 3. 
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scope of foreign policy, we must differentiate between two fields of political science. 
One is domestic or national politics. The other is international politics. Domestic 
politics mainly deals with the relationship between the government and the people 
of a state. The international politics involves the interactions and inter-relationship 
between two or more states. 
 
   For analytical purposes the differentiation between domestic and foreign policy is 
possible. However, the two overlap in such a complicated manner that it is difficult 
to point out where domestic policy ends and where foreign policy begins. For 
example, where can we place Iran’s policy to acquire the nuclear technology? Iran 
claims that such a plant is necessary to overcome the domestic energy crisis and this 
policy should not be correlated with its foreign crisis actions vis-a-vis Israel. On the 
other hand Israel claims that Iran’s nuclear program is in fact geared towards 
manufacturing the atomic bomb. In Israel’s view, if Iran acquires uranium 
processing plant, it would definitely manufacture nuclear weapons, which would 
ultimately be used against Israel. Therefore the purported Iranian decision to meet 
domestic energy crisis could become a foreign policy decision, as it is seen as a 
threat to the security and military superiority of Israel. 
 
   The essential characteristic which distinguishes foreign policy from domestic 
policy is that foreign policy is intended to affect, and is limited mainly by, factors 
outside the national political system. 
 
   For the purposes of the present study, foreign policy can be defined as “the actions of 
a state towards the external environment and the conditions under which these 
actions are formulated”.19 The domestic conditions which influence foreign 
policy usually include such factors as the, “culture and religion of the society, 
                                                 
19 Holsti, K. J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 
1977, p. 29. 
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the geography of the country and its military and economic capability; and the 
role of pressure groups and public opinion”.20 
 
   Apart from the ideological orientations of the decision-makers and the other 
domestic factors, like military capability and public opinion, to mention a few, 
the presence of other states is also significant. The world system perspective 
emphasizes upon the international environment as its focus of analysis. From the 
world-system perspective, the analysis of the foreign policy of any country shall take 
into consideration its patterns of interaction with other states, because states do not 
operate in a vacuum. And other actors, and especially the other states, have a direct 
bearing on the foreign policy behavior, because the contemporary world is 
characterized as one system, having a collection of independent political entities 
viz. states, that interact with considerable frequency and according to regularized 
process that helps explains the behavior of the units comprising the system.21  
 
    Looking briefly at the level of analysis problem we find that while the traditional 
realist approach to the study of international relations emphasized the role of 
individual states more than their mutual relations, the world system perspective 
in international relations sought to change the focus of study. The world system 
perspective started with development and modernization studies in the 1960s. The 
modernization and the world system perspective studied the expansion of capitalism 
since 1450 AD and offered a distinct international history depicting a system based 
on capitalist market relations.22 The notion of a world capitalist system of 
production and exchange therefore changed the focus of study of social change 
and influenced studies of international relations. Prior to this the emphasis in the 
study of social change was on “isolated modernizing societies” as the major unit of 
                                                 
20 Dyer, Hugh C, and Leon Mangasarian, The Study of International Relations: The State of the 
Art, London: The Macmillan, 1989, p. 56. 
 
21 Yalvac, Faruk, “World System Studies and International Relations”, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Volume 9, #3, Winter 1980-81. p. 230. 
22 Ibid. 
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analysis.23 It was believed that each society had dynamics of its own, independent of 
its relations with others. The emphasis then shifted, chiefly due to the efforts of 
the dependency and world system schools, to the relations between the 
societies. According to the world system perspective, the world, as an entity itself 
has become “the primary unit of analysis”.24 Further, states are jealous guardians of 
their sovereignty and indulge in security dilemmas, alliances, and arms races in 
order to mitigate perceived threats to their security, therefore much cannot be 
expected from them for affecting progressive change.25 
 
   At the international level, governments project their country as a sovereign state 
and as an independent member of the community of nations. This role of the 
government will continue to be so, because the government of a state is the agency, 
which represents the people of that state, both domestically as well as 
internationally. The government is, therefore, an arrangement of powerful 
individuals (elite theory) and their role is to perform mainly two kinds of functions, 
one, to maintain domestic order and stability i.e., the domestic policy. The other is 
to respond to, or take actions vis-a-vis other governments which are also 
indulging in the same activity i.e., foreign policy. The two policies of governments 
cannot readily be differentiated into two exclusive categories. The two are grossly 
inter-woven affecting each other in many ways. While a foreign policy is being 
                                                 
23 Lieber, Robert J., Theory and World Politics, London: Allan and Unwin, 1973, p. 120. 
24 Chittick, William O., The Analysis of Foreign Policy Outputs, Ohio: Bell and Howell Co., 
1975, p. 22. 
 
25 Frankle, Joseph, The Making of Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 
56-62. On the security dilemma of the states...“In the game of international politics, the 
key point to remember is that each state in the state system is the guardian of its own security 
and independence. Each regards other states as potential enemies, who might threaten its 
fundamental interests. Consequently, states generally feel insecure and regard one another 
with a good deal of apprehension and distrust. The result is that all become very concerned 
with their strength and power.” Also see Spanier, John W., Games Nations Play, London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1972, pp. 9, 10. 
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formulated it is not insulated from domestic factors. Likewise, the domestic policy 
is also affected by the foreign policy of a government. The foreign policy is 
basically a calculus along two dimensions, one is national and the other is 
international. The domestic factors are those operating within the national political 
system. 
 
   There are four domestic variables which have a direct bearing upon the foreign 
policy formulation.26 First are the individual variables. It means the characteristics 
of those who are officially responsible for foreign policy making. It includes the 
state machinery in the form of foreign office and the political side of the 
government. Second are the governmental variables. It means different structures 
employed by a state to make foreign policy. Besides the permanent state machinery 
we have different forms of governments in various states. So, the foreign policy 
behavior of a state will be influenced by its form of government. The third are 
the role variables. It means the different functions performed by the decision makers 
of a government. The fourth are the societal variables. It means all non-
governmental aspects of a society which affect its foreign policy behavior. 
 
   In order to see clearly the impact of domestic structure on the foreign policy, a 
dichotomous view of the domestic structure along governmental and societal 
variables would be more relevant for the purposes of the present discussion. By 
societal variables is meant the culture, shared images and historical memory of a 
nation-state. It is in fact a collective state of mind - which emerges from the 
educational institutions, the media, literature and the fine arts about the identity of 
a country. A nation-state’s identity can be traced back in its history, its great men 
and women and popular battles for survival. Historical memories greatly affect the 
substance, direction, quality and intensity of foreign policy. The societal 
variables refer to “those nongovernmental” aspects of a society which influence 
its external behaviors. These are such attributes of a nation as its value 
                                                 
26 Rosenau, James N., International Relations: Theories and Evidence, ed. Michael P. Sullivan, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1976, p. 103. 
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orientation, unity, the degree of internal conflict and consensus on issues of vital 
national concern.27 The national consensus, on foreign policy issues is, it need be 
mentioned here, not absolute. The shifts in public perceptions and changes in regional 
and international environment can have a sufficient bearing upon popular 
preferences so as to alter the foreign policy orientation. The movement toward 
integration of Europe despite the inhibiting legacy of the two world wars is a case 
in point.28  
     
    As pointed out earlier, the states are considered as the basic units in the 
contemporary system, though there are other actors as well. Thus the component 
parts of contemporary international system can be further divided into those which 
are more functional, conspicuous, and significant and those that are less functional, 
diffused and relatively insignificant. States can be classified in the former 
category, while the rest of the actors can be included in the latter. The 
international system is established “for the same reason that any social or political 
system is created: actors enter into social relations and create social structures in 
order to advance particular sets of political, economic or other types of interests.”29 
On the other hand, a system of states or international system is formed when two or 
more states have sufficient contact between them and have sufficient impact on one 
another’s decisions. It causes them to behave as part of a whole and the behavior of 
each is the necessary element in the calculation of the other.30 Therefore, the notion 
of an international system, having states as the basic operational units, helps to 
understand the relationships or interactions among these units. The behavior of each 
state consequently depends upon the behavior of other states. In terms of 
                                                 
27 Lieber, Robert J., Theory and World Politics London: Allan and Unwin, 1973, p. 120. 
28 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, London: The 
Macmillan, 1978, p. 10. 
29 Spanier, John N., Games Nations Play, London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1972, p. 9. 
30 James, Alan, ed., The Basis of International Order, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 
34 
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gamesmanship, “every player’s move or strategy -- the set of moves he calculates he 
must make of win -- depends on the moves of every other player.”  
 
   Thus the international system is an overall pattern of regularized interactions and 
interplay among its component parts ranging from an individual citizen to the 
sovereign states. This pattern of interaction among the actors in the international 
system, especially the states, became visible soon after a worldwide network of 
international trade, banking and investment in the framework of international 
economy emerged for the first time from centers in Europe in the sixty years 
between 1850 and first world war. The globalization of economy and the coming 
into being of an international system affected the arbitrariness of the states. It was 
difficult now to ignore the responses and the reactions of other sovereign states, 
while formulating foreign policy. As discussed earlier, the foreign policy is a 
range of responses and actions directed mainly toward other states. The 
environment, i.e. presence of other sovereign states, from then on, became an 
integral part in the foreign policy formulation.  
 
   The traditional division of the universe into physical and social sectors is relevant 
for the discussion of international factors and the foreign policy formulation. In 
the physical sector the problems derive from nature, while in the social sector they 
arise from the wi l l  of other states or from the structure of international society. The 
social system of international environment is dominated by the state system: the 
states are the social groupings which must be considered relevant in the context 
of any real foreign policy issue.  
    
   The social sector of international environment, having a direct bearing on the 
foreign policy of a state may include such systemic variables as international law, 
international organizations, alliances, dependencies and inter-dependencies and the 
action and inaction of other states. For the concern of the states what is significant in 
the social sector of international environment, is the issue of survival in the wake 
of presence of hostile neighbors and other states. States are the most security-
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conscious actors, the actions and policies of other states are always interpreted with 
reference to one’s own security. The immediately neighboring states and the 
regional power arrangement have a direct bearing upon the foreign policy of a state. 
   The first factor having a direct influence on the foreign policy in the context of 
international social environment is the response toward the policies of other 
states, especially the hostile neighboring states.31 
 
   The second factor in the context of international social environment is the 
geographical location of a state having a political significance for policy 
formulation. These are the geo-political and geo-strategic factors. The foreign 
context suggests that since the physical location of a state with respect to other 
states does not change to bring about a change in the geopolitical situation, certain 
other developments, like the US action in Iraq ( in Iran’s case), can change the 
significance of the geo-strategic factors. The situational geo-strategic variables are 
then helpful either to describe the interaction between two or more states or to 
describe the more established pattern of relations among states. 
 
   Thus, geo-politics is one of the many significant international factors which 
influence the foreign policies of the countries involved, whether directly or indirectly. 
It can be assumed that the “specificity” of a “localized situation” in the overall 
context of geo-politics is very significant for analytical purposes. In addition to 
the permanent features of geo-politics, this  “specificity” has a direct bearing upon 
the course of foreign policy formulation. Therefore, regional conceptions of 
security as given by Barry Buzan, and the role of deterrence within the regional 
                                                 
31 As far as the environment and the foreign policy formulation are concerned, the 
international factors are only one facet of the overall environmental context of foreign 
policy. For details see, Rosenau, J.N., “External Environment as a Variable in Foreign Policy 
Analysis”, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, ed. J.N. Rosenau, London: Francis Printer, 
1980, pp. 319-338 and Harold and Margaret Sprout, “Environmental Factors in the study of 
International Politics”, International Politics and Foreign Policy: A reader in research and theory, 
ed. J.N. Rosenau, New York: The Free Press, 1969, pp. 41-46. 
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framework, bring in another layer of complexity within the international 
political system. The regional dynamics also help us observe the role of the 
extra-regional actor.  
 
   Buzan describes the regional security complex as a set of states with a 
significant and distinctive network of security relations that ensures that the 
members have a high level of interdependence on security: “a group of states 
whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their 
national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”. 
Buzan distinguishes between global level complexes (mainly the superpower 
conflict during the Cold War), regional security complexes (which consist of 
clusters of such complexes), and pre-complexes (in which states that have 
almost no external reach and impact co-exist). Thus the central element in a 
regional security complex is its security relationships and the element of inter-
dependence that concern security. Buzan also identifies these clusters by 
geography, such as the South Asian and South East Asian regional security 
complexes. The members of a regional security complex, in his view, are 
located within a specified area, though the borders can be fuzzy. Further, the 
conception is intended to emphasize that regional security may exist distinct 
from the global system and may stay out of its reach. Buzan’s is a system-
subsystem approach reflecting the cold war context within which it was 
developed. When created it presupposed the existence and penetration of the 
global security complex into the regional complexes, and sought to 
revive/appreciate dynamics of regional conflicts within this pattern. 
Superpower rivalry penetrating into a regional security complex was defined as 
an ‘overlay’, driven by global level conflicts and concerns behind superpower 
foreign policies.  
 
   We can compare a regional security complex with others to identify regions. In 
attempting the latter, analysts have most frequently cited the following criteria:  
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• Self-consciousness of members that they constitute a region, and 
perceptions by others that one exists. 
• Geographical proximity of members. 
• Evidence of some autonomy and distinctiveness from the global system, 
so that it ‘refracts;’ the influence of the global system.  
• Regular and intense interactions among members – notably 
interdependence.  
• A high level of political, economic and cultural affinities. 
 
   Buzan’s conception gives some weight to the first of these but emphasizes the 
second and the third. He notes that members usually perceive themselves, and 
are perceived by others, as being in particular security complex, but he allows 
for complexes to exist, or have consequences that members may not completely 
perceive or understand. With regards to the fourth criterion, the 
interdependence of significance pertains to security. States can have intense 
conflicts, with resulting high interdependence on security, yet have few other 
interactions. One thinks of divided Europe during the Cold War. While the 
fifth criterion might have some impact upon relations among a cluster of states, 
it is not central to the concept of a security complex. For instance, conflicts 
might arise because states are members of a regional security complex but lack 
cultural and other affinities. Thus regional security complexes involve some 
self-consciousness, intense security interactions, a geographical location of the 
members, and a relationship with the global system.  
 
  Thus according to Buzan a regional security complex, is a particular kind of 
geographical region, delimited by a specific pattern of security relationships. 
He distinguishes those relationships from the global system (itself a security 
complex) while allowing for the powerful ways the global system can impose 
itself. Further refinement of the concept might characterize a regional security 
complex in terms of its autonomy and distinctiveness from the global system. 
The Cold War produced so much ‘overlay’ that the utility of focusing on 
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regions eventually was dismissed, and Buzan insisted that this had been carried 
too far. The end of the Cold War has ushered in expectations that there will be 
far less penetration from the global system now. Some analysts take this to 
mean that new conflicts of a ‘regional’ sort are now emerging, others that we 
can now appreciate that the serious wars and insecurity of the last fifty years 
have been predominantly regional, with the Cold War just a thin ‘overlay’.32 
From either view, we can expect regional security complexes to be major 
arenas of conflict and security affairs. 
 
   However, it is not just that great powers are less poised to interfere with 
regional security developments, there were suggestions even before the end of 
the Cold War that the superpowers’ grip was slipping and that regional actors 
were eager for greater autonomy.33 The Cold War is seen as a conflict ‘within’ 
the global system, it should be seen as a considerable part ‘of’ the system. 
Without the conflict, the system would be reduced in and of itself. It grows or 
shrinks due to the security situation among its member states. When conflict 
and insecurity predominate, the system shapes nearly everyone’s security 
policies, and penetration of lower-level systems out of global-level security 
considerations become common. When the dynamics of the global system, 
seem, especially to great powers, crucial for security,  
 
- the major security issues become global level in nature. 
- Security issues even at lower levels are approached by great powers 
primarily with an eye to global-level concerns. 
                                                 
32 Brechner, M., and J. Wikenfeld, "International Crises and Global Instability: The Myth of the 
`Long Peace'." The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,. New York: HarperCollins, 
1991, pp. 85-104.  
33 Vayrynen, Raimo, “Economic and Military Position of the Regional Power Centers,” Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1979, 349-369. Also see Miller, L.H., Regional Organizations and 
Subordinate Systems in L.J. Cantori and S.L. Spiegel (eds.) The International Politics of Regions, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
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- Hence states in a regional security complex can anticipate (and even seek) 
penetration from the global system.  
 
   Without this situation, as after the Cold War, governments put much less 
emphasis on global considerations, using the global system and their perceived 
relationship to it much less a starting point for analysis, policy and action. 
States’ conceptualization of their interests and security, are therefore now more 
regional in character. Regional security complexes and regional conflicts have 
much greater salience. This could be reversed by renewed conflict between the 
major powers. If no superpower conflict drives superpower penetration into 
regional complexes, then overlay loses much of its relevance. With no 
increased influence of global-level management throughout the system, there is 
no alternative basis for overlay.  
 
   It is no longer suitable to talk about regional security complexes as embedded 
within a strong, penetrating global system. We can stop automatically 
identifying participation by a superpower or other great power in a regional 
security complex as an ‘overlay’. It most likely is driven now by 
considerations other than the construct of ‘overlay’ supposed. 
 
   We can also question defining the regional security complexes entirely 
geographically. If a geographically distant great power consistently plays a 
powerful role in a regional security complex, with no global system conflict 
and related incentives driving it to do so, and if this powerful role is unlikely 
to disappear, then the previous interpretation of what this participation means 
is no longer applicable. If the involvement is (a) central to the great powers’ 
foreign policy and (b) central to the dynamics of the regional security complex, 
then it cannot be considered ‘outside’. The system-subsystem framework no 
longer captures the rationale and nature of this participation. States playing 
such roles must be considered members of the regional security complexes 
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with which they are intimately engaged. This conception helps in 
understanding the role of the US in Middle East and South Asia.  
 
   The research in this study combines both the inductive and deductive research 
approaches. The analysis challenges, supports or modifies findings of earlier related 
works and presents a well supported assessment on the dimensions required to follow 
or adopt a nuclear deterrence oriented policy.  Besides the comparative approach used 
to compare the nuclear deterrence models currently in place in South Asia, and the 
one evolving in the Middle East, there is also a factual and descriptive coverage of the 
relevant aspects examined. This has been necessitated by the nature of the issue at 
hand and the need to derive the conceptual findings from solid facts and following a 
comprehensive description of various constituent elements of regions’ security and 
strategic setting.  
 
   The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part is comprised of a regional 
comparison of the nuclear deterrence apparatus currently in place in South Asia with 
the evolving nuclear scenario in the Middle East because of the purported nuclear 
program of Iran, while Israel is already an un-declared nuclear weapons’ state in the 
region. It deals with the strategic environment: the nature of security complex, 
nuclear parity, and the role of the extra-regional actor (the US in both cases). It has 
been concluded that although nuclear weapons provide strategic balance to South 
Asia, the modalities of a deterrence framework are still in the process of evolution. 
The Middle East is more difficult to evolve a stable framework which requires 
transparency, while regional security is marred by multiple complexes and enduring 
rivalries and distrust. In the second part, the role of the major or ‘core’ dispute in the 
region has been discussed, and how it would be impacted upon by nuclearization. 
These are disputes that have the potential to emerge as nuclear ‘flashpoints’ during 
crises. It is surmised that conflict management and conflict resolution must go hand in 
hand with non-proliferation for stable and workable deterrence models. In the third 
and last part we move on to the nuclear doctrines put forward by India and Pakistan in 
the region, and the nuclear postures that could be adopted by Arab states, Israel, and 
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Iran in the process of, and as a consequence of Iran’s nuclearization. Since nuclear 
doctrines or postures speak for the stability and efficacy of a nuclear deterrence 
framework, an effort has been made to analyze possible nuclear postures in order to 
bring some clarity to the understanding of regional deterrence stability models. 
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Part I 
 
STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR 
DETERRENCE 
 
THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE: 
     
   In this part rational deterrence has been analyzed as a workable construct in regions 
where states remain locked in security complexes. A regional comparison of the 
nuclear deterrence apparatus currently in place in South Asia has been conducted with 
the evolving nuclear scenario in the Middle East. A brief overview of the Cold War 
deterrence model has also been included. It is surmised that the institution of a 
workable deterrence model requires dialogue; and dispute management and resolution. 
This pattern was followed by the Cold War adversaries by initiating détente while 
deterrence was in place. In the case of South Asia the result so far has been mixed. The 
supporters of deterrence point to the avoidance of war during the period of overt 
nuclearization (since May 1998); on the other hand, the critics dispute this claim by 
pointing to the four compound crises: Brasstacks Crisis of 1986-1987, the Compound 
Crisis of 1990, the Kargil Conflict of 1999, and the Border Confrontation of 2001-
2002.34 The deterrence theorists assume that workable deterrence should follow the 
pattern of the process of confidence building measures that includes conflict 
management and conflict resolution. Another element for the deterrence to be stable is 
the institution of the nuclear security regime that involves transparency, 
communication and restraint. Further, the role of the extra-regional actor needs to be of 
a fair mediator and peace broker. These measures add the necessary element of 
predictability in a nuclear deterrence paradigm. 
                                                 
34 See Chari, P.R., Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: 
American Engagement in South Asia, Brookings Institution Press, 2007. 
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   Paul Bracken, in his book ‘Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the 
Second Nuclear Age,’ notes that we have indeed entered the Second Nuclear Age.35 
The First lasted from 1947 to 1991. But it was the period 1947-1967 that was the most 
dangerous. He argues that deterrence did work during this early stage, but it was 
marked by some very close calls - Berlin, Panmunjom, Taiwan, Beirut and Cuba. 
Ultimately, after the Cuban Missile Crisis both sides realized the magnitude of an 
error and began the steady process toward developing the restraining infrastructures 
that made the period from 1968 to 1991 so much more predictable.  
 
   The overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 might not hold the best-case 
scenario for the evolving nuclear stand-off in the Middle East, where Iran has a 
reported nuclear program, while Israel is already an un-declared nuclear-weapon state 
in the region. But there remain lessons to be learnt from the decade of South Asia’s 
experience in nuclear deterrence. Some of the lessons that South Asian 
commentators mention are outlined below: 
   It has been underscored that if Pakistan and India are determined to sustain a 
credible and stable nuclear deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, they will have to 
push for a strategic dialogue on the nuclear issue, including moves towards nuclear 
risk reduction.  
 
   There are two levels at which conditionalities have to be created if nuclear risk 
reduction is to become a feasible proposition. There is the political level and there is 
the technical level. At the political level, there would have to be moves towards 
resolution of the most sensitive issue—Kashmir — through dialogue between 
Pakistan, India and, at a later stage with the inclusion of the Kashmiris. 
 
   Further, until the conflict is resolved through dialogue—taking into consideration the 
realities on the ground in Indian Held Kashmir—the maintenance of an effective 
                                                 
35 Bracken, Paul, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear 
Age, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999. 
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cease-fire agreement along the Line of Control (LoC) becomes an essential 
condition. For this purpose, the LoC as prevailed at the end of the 1971 war and as 
agreed to at Simla, needs to be reaffirmed—which requires Indian evacuation of 
Siachin and all other territorial changes made beyond the LoC since 1972. Without the 
evacuation, there is no viable LoC that can be asserted. Without an enduring cease-
fire there will always be the risk of escalation of conflict. 
 
   Following from the above, in order to ensure the strict maintenance of a cease-fire and 
to prevent infiltration so as to establish trust on both sides, there must be an 
agreement to place international observers (UN or SAARC) on both sides of the LoC. 
    
   There must be a nuclear dialogue between India and Pakistan aiming to create a 
common strategic language. This is essential because otherwise, notions such as 
“minimal credible deterrence” make l i t t le  sense since the ‘minimal’ differs in each 
state’s perception. The same issue arises over the notion of deployment—how 
does each side define “deployment”? 
 
   There has to be an avoidance of military brinkmanship and dangerous military 
practices. This would include, restraint from military attacks across the LoC and 
threatening military maneuvers close to the border and LoC. In this context, while 
nuclear capability has made limited war a feasible notion for both Pakistan and 
India, to propagate such a war also reflects a dangerous brinkmanship, which must 
be resisted. 
 
   There should be strengthening of existing lines of communication between the two 
sides and enforcement of military, including nuclear, CBMs already in place. 
 
  The two states should strive to develop nuclear transparency and national 
technical means of verification. With regard to the latter, the US could provide 
technical know-how, which would allow both sides to develop their own national 
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technical means which become crucial for nuclear risk reduction in an environment 
where trust will remain minimal in the immediate future. 
 
   The two sides should secure nuclear systems against accidental war. Here again, the 
US could provide technical assistance especially since it is so concerned about this  
issue in this region. In fact, there is a need for the international community to de-
link nuclear proliferation issues from nuclear safety/security issues in the case of 
South Asia. 
 
   The two sides should institute a permanent nuclear strategic dialogue structure, 
which would strengthen trust between the two sides as well as deal with critical 
issues rapidly. 
 
   Apart from nuclear risk reduction, a strategic stability regime would require 
Pakistan and India to sustain a stable mutual nuclear deterrence—with all that 
involves. This, by definition, would requite both countries to come to some agreement 
over missile deployments and numbers. While, no one expects Pakistan to demand a 
missile-by-missile balance from India, given India’s claimed security concerns in 
relation to China and its power projection ambitions beyond South Asia. However, 
in the case of missiles that are Pakistan-specific, such as the Prithvi, India would 
probably be required to have an equitable equation with Pakistan. Also, if India 
seeks to opt for an even-spread amongst its nuclear triad of forces, then Pakistan 
would apparently seek to have an edge on land-based deployments in terms of 
numbers. 
 
   Within an overall nuclear strategic balance, both Pakistan and India would need to 
move towards mutual conventional force reductions, especially of offensive 
systems on the ground, which in the Indian case are Pakistan-specific because of 
the terrain in relation to Indian neighbors like China and Bangladesh. The Paris 
Treaty for Conventional Force Reductions in Europe can be one appropriate model 
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for Pakistan and India to examine - premised on the principle of mutual balanced 
reductions. 
    
   STRATEGIC STABILITY  
IN SOUTH ASIA: 
   
  The countries of South Asia – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka 
(Ceylon), Nepal, and Bhutan – form a distinct geographical entity. (The isolated 
republic of Maldives, a 550-mile chain of small islands in the Indian Ocean about 400 
miles west of Ceylon, gained its independence from the UK in 1965. It is located 
closer to South Asia than to any other area, but its 115,000 people have few links with 
any other country). The region is bounded by the Himalayas on the north, by the 
Indian Ocean and its offshoots – the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea – on the 
south, and by mountains and jungles on the east. Only in the northwest, where 
Afghanistan stands astride the junction of South Asia, the Middle East, and Central 
Asia, do the external geographic and political frontiers fail to coincide.  
   Though South Asia’s well-defined external borders provide one of the prerequisites 
for regional cohesion, the region is beset with numerous and conflicting security 
challenges resulting in intractable dilemmas between human security and military 
security. The ongoing conflicts often spill over ethnically and geographically 
contiguous, mostly porous, frontiers bringing states into conflict, fuelling ethnic 
and communal divides and kicking an arms race, on the one hand, and bringing 
greater misery to the people who have been the worst sufferer in conflict situations, 
on the other. 
 
   There are two principal dilemmas, besides others, that confront South Asian 
countries: One, the dilemma of military security and human security: If the countries 
of South Asia concentrate excessively on military security, they undermine human 
security in both relative and absolute terms in all its facets. And if they try to ‘strike 
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a balance’ between the two, which still remains biased against human security, 
they miss their inflated military objectives while keeping the human security at an 
abysmally low level. The dilemma of maintaining higher expenditure on military 
security at the cost of human security continues to exacerbate since nuclear 
deterrence and the arms race on the subcontinent, nuclear and missile race in 
particular, are escalatory in nature. Given so close a contiguous region, nuclear 
regimes, particularly if they are unsafe, leave no time to preempt even an accidental 
nuclear exchange or a false alarm. 
 
   Greater emphasis on military security has resulted in an increase of 44 percent in 
military expenditure in South Asia, which is relatively the highest in the world and 
is equal only to North Africa. It rose from 12 billion US dollars in 1993 to 17.3 
billion US dollars in 2002. As a consequence, and besides other reasons, human 
security continues to be undermined since 42 percent or 488 million people out of a 
population of 1.4 billion live on less than a dollar a day, making South Asia home to 
nearly half of the world’s poor. India, ranked eleventh among the big spenders on 
defense, followed by Russia, increased its defense expenditure from 8051 million 
US dollars in 1990 to 12882 million US dollars in 2003.  Pakistan’s defense 
spending rose from 2636 million US dollars in 1990 to 3176 million US dollars in 
2003, despite a worse period of fiscal crisis and sanctions. 
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Table 1.1 POVERTY PROFILE OF SOUTH ASIA  
 
                      Country     Earning $1 a day or less 
                     Pakistan                          33.3% 
                     Nepal                         53.4% 
                     Bangladesh                          59.5% 
                     India                         34.7%            
                    Sri Lanka                               4.8% 
 
Source: Human Development in South Asia 1999, The Mahbubul Haq 
Human Development Center, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999. 
 
                  
   As compared to their excessively wasteful and increasing military spending, the 
people suffer in innumerable ways as depicted by one of the lowest levels of human 
development indices, lagging behind even Sub-Saharan Africa on certain crucial human 
indicators. In India, 34.7 percent of the population lives below one US dollar a day, 
share of poorest 20 percent in national income/consumption stands at 8.1 percent, 
47 percent children are underweight for their age - one percent less than Afghanistan, 
number of under-nourished people declined by just one percent from 25 percent in 
1990/92 to 24 percent in 1998/2000, youth illiteracy rate persisted at 26.7 percent, t i l l  
1992, etc. On the other hand, in Pakistan, the people living below poverty-line 
increased from 18 percent in 1987 to 33 percent today, 38 percent children are 
underweight for their age, undernourished population decreased from 25 percent in 
1990/92 to 19 percent in 1998/2000 and youth illiteracy still stands at 38.4 percent. 
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Table 1.2 HUMAN DEPRIVATION PROFILE  
OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
        India      Pakistan
      Population below poverty line 1989-94         53%          12% 
      Population without access to health services (mn)         143          63 
      Population without access to safe water ( m n )          178          56 
      Population without access to sanitation ( m n )           66           98 
      Illiterate adults as percentage of total         48%           62% 
     GNP per capita 1996         370          500 
 
Source: Human Development in South Asia 1999, The Mahbubul Haq 
Human Development Center, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999. 
 
   To Pakistanis, who perceive South Asian security as a hegemonic-objective 
conflict, the Indian nuclear explosions in early May 1998 were seen a grave 
security challenge to Pakistan. For Pakistanis, the Indian nuclear tests altered the 
strategic balance. The hostile statements made by important Indian leaders following 
the tests verged on nuclear blackmail and underscored dangers in India’s latest 
bid to establish i ts  hegemony in the region. The Indian media also started 
questioning the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear capability. The Indian political 
analysts commented that by testing India had called Pakistan’s bluff. This was a 
dangerous assertion, which could lead, in Pakistan’s view, to miscalculation and 
misadventure against Pakistan. In the wake of the Indian tests, the Pakistani 
leadership undertook consultations especially with major powers. It was perceived 
that in the absence of a nuclear umbrella, they were alone to face a nuclear India. 
Therefore, Pakistan felt that it had become imperative to discard the policy of 
nuclear ambiguity to restore the strategic balance in South Asia, and consequently 
conducted nuclear test explosions on 28 and 30 May 1998. 
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   The policymakers in Pakistan emphasize the need to distinguish between the 
motivations of Pakistan and India  in conducting nuclear tests. They assert that since 
its independence and until the first nuclear tests by India in 1974, Pakistan did not 
seek the nuclear option for the non-nuclear weapons states. India started its nuclear 
program in the mid-1950s. It acquired dual-use technologies under the ‘Atoms for 
Peace’ non-proliferation program, which aimed to encourage the civil use of nuclear 
technologies in exchange for assurances that they would not be used for military 
purposes.  
 
   Under the ‘Atoms for Peace’ program, India acquired a Cirus 40 MWt heavy-water-
moderated research reactor from Canada and purchased from the US the heavy water 
required for its operation. In 1964, India commissioned a reprocessing facility at 
Trombay, which was used to separate out the plutonium produced by the Cirus 
research reactor. This plutonium was used in India’s first nuclear test on May 18, 1974, 
described by the Indian government as a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” This 
challenged the nuclear paradigm of the day, and betraying India’s own nuclear 
ambitions. Pakistan started moving toward a nuclear program in 1972, when 
India’s nuclear program was well-underway. For the next quarter of a century, 
Pakistan took initiatives to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons. These 
initiatives were pursued at multilateral and bilateral levels with India. Following the 
1998 nuclear tests Pakistan declared a unilateral moratorium on testing, and its 
desire to prevent a nuclear arms race in South Asia.  
 
   During the Foreign Secretaries’ level talks in October 1998, under the agenda item for 
Peace and Security, Pakistan offered a Strategic Restraint Regime to India. This was 
based on the concept of preventing a nuclear arms race by maintaining nuclear 
deterrence at the minimum levels and desisting from introducing new and more 
destabilizing systems in the region. India produced its Nuclear Doctrine that laid out 
the plans for a triad of nuclear capabilities, based on land, sea and air weapon 
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systems. It also noted 36the need for arms control (clause 8.4: nuclear arms control 
measures shall be sought as part of national security policy to reduce potential threats 
and to protect our own capability and its effectiveness); and CBMs (clause 8.5: in 
view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear 
risk reduction and confidence building measures shall be sought, negotiated and 
instituted) as the national security objective, along with eventual ‘global, verifiable 
and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.’     
 
   To Pakistanis, India’s tests and its nuclear ambitions were status-driven and impelled 
by its hegemonic ambitions, while Pakistan’s tests were a response to its security 
needs. Publicly Pakistan has declared that it will continue to develop its nuclear, 
missiles and related strategic capability to maintain the minimum credible deterrence 
against India. Speaking at the UN Security Council following approval of the 
Resolution on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Pakistan’s 
ambassador to the United Nations, Munir Akram, asserted that Pakistan would 
“not accept any demand for access, much less inspections, of our nuclear and 
strategic assets, materials and facilities.” Without naming India, the ambassador said 
that Pakistan had to take into account the reality that “our eastern neighbor” was 
embarked on major programs for nuclear weapons, missiles, anti-missiles and 
conventional arms acquisition and development.  
 
   While the 15-nation Security Council passed the binding resolution criminalizing 
the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by such private parties as terrorists 
and black market traders after its main sponsor, the United States accommodated the 
major concerns of Pakistan and other countries in the revised text. The ambassador 
told the council, 
 
                                                 
36 Aminul Karim, Mohd, Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear 
Doctrine, as quoted in Aminul Karim, Mohd, “Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan: A 
Comparative Analysis,” BIISS Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, January 2004, pp 1-37 
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   “We have proposed the creation of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia 
encompassing nuclear-weapons and confidence building measures; a conventional 
balance of arms and the resolution of underlying disputes. We hope to promote such a 
regime under the composite dialogue recently agreed by the two states. Pakistan had been 
obliged to acquire, develop nuclear weapons and related delivery systems to 
maintain credible minimum deterrence against external aggression, especially once 
similar capabilities had been developed and demonstrated by its eastern neighbor.” 
   The Pakistani ambassador to UN said that the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
needed to accommodate the reality of the existence of these weapons in South Asia,  
 
   “A recognition of this reality would enable Pakistan to cooperate more fully in 
promoting the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.” 
 
Table 1.3 MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN SOUTH ASIA 
 
    Countries      As %age  
      of  
      GDP 
   As %age of  
Central government 
    Expenditure           
    As %age  
   of education  
    and  
    health spending
  Bangladesh                0 .8                  17.2              80.4 
         India             0.1                  5.2              62.3 
        Nepal             0.9               4.9             25.0 
        Pakistan             0.3                27.8              48.7 
       Sri Lanka             0.1                  9.6              107.5 
 
 
   Source: Human Development in South Asia 1999, The Mahbubul Haq 
Human Development Center, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999. 
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  NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: COMPARISON OF  
COLD WAR AND SOUTH ASIAN MODELS 
 
   In the nuclear stalemate during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States 
never resorted to nuclear warfare during their bipolar stand-off. Certainly there are 
many glaringly obvious reasons which can be identified. Firstly there were the 
environmental risks associated with nuclear war. A consequence of this was the 
intensification of public opinion against the actual use of the nuclear option. The role 
of treaties in the Cold War and in the contemporary political situation is also an 
important contribution to the idea that countries are actively discouraged from 
entering nuclear war. Subsequently, this leads to the issue of deterrence in the 
treaties ratified. Roskin and Berry have illustrated further consequences of warfare 
that countries would be considered to avoid.  
 
   It would be useful to study whether the reasons that the USSR and the US conceived 
to not go to war apply in the twenty first century? And if nuclear warfare is more 
likely in a hegemonic system that prevails in the context of South Asia, rather than a 
bipolar system, especially in light of the new security dilemma post-9/11? Results of 
the dangerous consequences of nuclear warfare could precipitate into a nuclear winter. 
This is the extremity of possible circumstances, however, devastation is possible and 
this could bring about two waves of effects. Evidently from the only use of nuclear 
weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were over 100,000 civilian casualties. 
Kegley and Wittkopf ascertain that a nuclear war in the future, even if only a 
tiny fraction of warheads was used, would result in an expected freeze that would 
occur in the earth’s climate from the fallout of nuclear weapons use. This could result 
in the blocking out of sunlight and destroying plant and animal life that survived the 
original blast.37  
                                                 
37 See Kegley, C, and E. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 2001, p.513. 
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   Interest groups have highlighted, as mentioned previously, that radiation sickness 
could cause long-term sickness problems such as cancer, which would strain on all 
country’s health resources. The preponderant issue here is that it is unlikely a nation-
state, or perhaps even a nationalist terrorist group (like the IRA or Hamas; the 
religiously motivated groups like al-Qaeda need to be placed in a separate category 
for the purposes of this study, because their motivations have been known to be more 
abstract, which makes their behavior more unpredictable), would serve to threaten 
the world’s climate for the sake of winning a territorial dispute.  
 
   Public opinion upon a government’s actions in foreign policy is often quite 
contentious, especially when propaganda plays a part in trying to influence the 
public. Hollywood films created an atmosphere that the evil empire was that of the 
USSR. However, not all Americans or citizens of the world were enamored with 
the use of nuclear weapons. As the Harvard Nuclear Study group identified in the 
midst of the 1980s - reaffirmed Cold War (Reagan era) - there was a growing 
concern from public interest groups that emphasized the total inadequacy of 
medical care after a nuclear attack.38 Surely if America had seriously considered 
initiating nuclear war, then contingency plans would have been put in place. 
 
   The potential escalation that nuclear weapons and their use provided meant that 
forms of prevention were used to try and balance the system between the Soviet 
Union and the US. A predominant treaty was ratified between the two spectrums of 
the superpowers. Mutual Assured Deterrence substantiated that the actual role of 
nuclear weapons in warfare was terrifying. 
 
   According to deterrence theorists, MAD assumed the military potential for death and 
destruction in nuclear exchange.39 The treaties recognized that both powers had the 
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possibility to demolish the other therefore the equality of each state’s potentiality 
was recognized, and simultaneously was the need to avoid nuclear conflict. The US 
was also observed to recognize the real threat that the Soviet Union was capable of, 
having earlier believed that economic hegemony made them dominant. A further 
conception of treaties from 1969 focused on the curtailment of nuclear arms. With 
an economy that was depressing the US was keen to reduce nuclear spending, though 
needed assurances that the USSR would reciprocate these actions, otherwise the 
Soviet Union could potentially become a military nuclear hegemony. The Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) focused on this issue, and brought about a 
decreased spending of the superpowers on their military weapons. These 
negotiations were ‘to freeze offensive weapons and promote balanced verifiable 
limits on strategic nuclear weapons’.40 Clearly, the treaties limited moves to nuclear 
warfare. 
 
   In the era following on from the Cold War a Chemical Weapons Convention in 
1992 was held to ban the production and possession of chemical weapons. This was 
concluded after years of negotiations. 167 states signed the treaty, however, there 
were dissenters that included Israel, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Iraq.41  
        
   Roskin and Berry have identified a number of key potentialities if nuclear war was 
ever begun. If the oil-exporting countries were to be involved in nuclear war there is 
the overt implication that the world economy would be depressed. Further, there is a 
risk of escalation. Conflicts are contagious and affect the interests of bystanders. A 
victor of a conflict would be a security threat to other states. In the end also, there is 
a possibility that nuclear warfare would be difficult to terminate.42 A Pandora’s Box 
would thus be opened, and almost impossible to close. However, as pointed out 
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by Waltz, this is unlikely to happen. As Sagan asserts, ‘political relations between 
governments may improve so that there are no immediate fears. However, there are 
concerns that states will not always have friendly governments’.43 Decisively, there 
are numerous arguments as to the costs that initiating nuclear war would entail. 
The advent of nuclear warfare is unknown, and that is its greatest risk. Nation-states 
have avoided such conflict due to the effect that the world environment could 
endure and they have to respond to interest groups and their concerns. The role of 
treaties and deterrence is also important. If the USSR and US had been adamant on 
launching nuclear war, the conception of treaties to avoid and hedge the advancement 
of nuclear warheads would not have occurred. 
 
   For the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent it is important to analyze how far the Cold War 
model of deterrence applies to its case. The similarities have often been extolled, but 
the fact is that the two cases differ in more ways than one. Therefore, the current 
political realities in the subcontinent must be kept in mind before drawing the 
parallel too closely. Have India and Pakistan effectively demonstrated the value of 
nuclear weapons in deterring war? Deterrence optimists claim that fear of the 
ultimate weapon has restrained the otherwise rough actors who have been at each 
others’ throats more often than any other nuclear neighbors in the nuclear age.44 
Empirical evidence also suggests that the region has been spared from major wars, 
despite recurrent crises during the past two decades.  
 
   Deterrence pessimists, however, dispute that nuclear weapons have had a 
stabilizing impact in the region. Indeed, the advent of nuclear weapons has 
witnessed increased tensions, a growing arms race, and a half-dozen crises nearing 
war. The region has come close to full blows at least twice since the open 1998 
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nuclear weapons tests—in 1999 and 2001-2002—and thrice earlier in the covert 
nuclear period—in 1984, 1986-1987, and 1989-1990. In fact; the three most recent 
crises—in 1990, 1999, and 2001-2002—only avoided escalating into a full-scale war 
because of intense US diplomacy. 
 
   In fact, it could be argued that the deterrence equation in South Asia now 
implicitly depends on US intervention. In essence, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear 
policies involve what might be called the “independence-dependence paradox.” 
These two countries have attempted to wean themselves from outside support by 
using nuclear weapons. But this strategy has ironically served to make them more 
dependent on other powers which are forced to mitigate the consequences of this arms 
race. No other country has played a more crucial role than the United States. In 
many ways, this paradox does more to explain the difficulty in constraining conflicts 
that threaten to involve the two countries’ nuclear arsenals than the much ballyhooed 
“stability-instability” paradox. That term originated during the Cold War when 
analysts such as Glenn Snyder and Robert Jervis sought to explain why, in the 
first nuclear age (Cold War), the superpowers managed to avoid conventional 
armed conflicts that could have precipitated into nuclear exchange, instead using, 
“proxy wars to gain advantage over the other.” In recent years, many theorists have 
sought to apply the Cold War term to the standoff between India and Pakistan.45 But 
that has only highlighted the crucial differences between the Cold War and the new, 
complex realities in South Asia. 
 
   In the case of India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons are entangled with bitter 
regional disputes, exacerbating the instability half of the original stability-
instability paradox. Yet, the other half—stability—is still evolving and has yet to 
mature. Because the issues concerned are critical to India’s and Pakistan’s core 
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national identities, the two states have exercised force and coerced each other 
several times, pushing crises to the brink. De-escalation has, more often than not, 
required successful, outside (read, US) intervention. Having achieved requisite 
nuclear deterrence, neither side is prepared to concede to the other, each testing the 
vulnerability of the other in a game of “chicken.” This brinkmanship strategy has 
placed the region into a delicate balance whose repeated crises have only made it 
more dependent on the United States. Yet, even as India and Pakistan count on US 
intervention to restrain its adversary and ensure stability, paradoxically they are 
adamant about their professed independence in nuclear matters.  
 
   Historically, the two South Asian states developed their nuclear arsenals much against 
the will and nonproliferation efforts of the West. Even today, India and Pakistan take 
l i t t l e  heed of outside powers as they develop and possibly deploy strategic 
weapons. That attitude has constrained the ability of the United States to promote 
stability, especially in the early phases of a crisis or a ‘potential’ war.46  
 
   Underlying India’s and Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons was their 
quest for genuine independence, which began in the wake of painful experiences 
with outside powers: first, under British rule and, later, under the umbrella of Soviet 
and US-led alliances in 1960 and the early 1970s: In particular, the South Asian 
states pursued the nuclear option after repeated defeats on the conventional battlefield 
and perceived abandonment by outside allies. For India, its loss to China in a 1962 
border conflict proved decisive; for Pakistan, its twin losses to India in 1965 and 
1971 pushed it down the nuclear path. Nuclear weapons were intended to replace 
outside dependence and were seen as a source of security and political 
independence. Stephen Cohen has likened Pakistan’s strategic decisions to those of 
Israel:  
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   “Both [Israel and Pakistan] sought an entangling alliance with various outside powers 
(at various times, Britain, France, China and the US), both ultimately concluded that 
outsiders could not be trusted in a moment of extreme crisis, and this led them to 
develop nuclear weapons.”47   
 
   Soon after embarking on its nuclear program, Pakistan formally bid farewell to the US-
led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and Central Treaty Organization alliances, 
and joined India as a member of the Non-aligned Movement. Pakistan nevertheless 
slowed down open development of nuclear weapons owing to its need to ensure a 
reliable delivery system for nuclear weapons as well as maintaining good relations 
with the United States. This was formally crystallized till 1985 through a US law 
known as the Pressler amendment, after i ts  sponsor, Senator Larry Pressler (R-SU). 
That law effectively tied Pakistan’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets to a presidential 
certification that “Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons.”48 That meant 
Pakistan had to calibrate its strategic policy carefully, keeping its nuclear weapons 
development discrete and a short screwdriver’s turn away from operation. India 
likewise continued its nuclear weapons development in secret although, after 
conducting a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974, India publicly denied that it was 
proceeding to develop a nuclear-weapon capability. Until the 1998 nuclear tests, both 
countries remained ambiguous about the status of their nuclear weapons programs.  
 
   In rhetorical terms, both sides frequently used phrases such as “peaceful nuclear 
program” and “keeping open the nuclear option,” implying commitment to “not only 
[retaining] freedom of action in the narrow nuclear-strategic realm but also the 
wider principle of state sovereignty in international relations.”49 In the context of the 
larger strategic policy, a nuclear deterrent was said to fulfill various objectives: 
dissuade the adversary from contemplating aggression; deter potential enemies; 
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increase bargaining leverage; reduce dependence on allies; and acquire military 
independence by reducing dependence on external sources of military hardware.50  
 
   Before the introduction of nuclear weapons to South Asia, the United States had 
lesser stakes in resolving the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. The last serious and pro-
active attempt made by the United States was in 1962 when President John F. 
Kennedy sent Ambassador Averell Harriman as special envoy to the region on a fact-
finding mission. South Asia then had come into US focus primarily due to several 
developments in the region that related to Cold War dynamics, including the 1960 
shooting of a U-2 spy plane that had departed from its base in Peshawar, Pakistan, 
and the growing Indo-Chinese problems that eventually led to the India-China war in 
October 1962. In regard to the Indo-Pakistani dispute, Harriman concluded that 
the Kashmir problem was too intractable.51 After Kennedy’s assassination, and 
especially during the Johnson administration, other issues and events lessened US 
interest in the region.52  
    
   From then until about the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet 
Union managed to keep the standoff within bounds. But as the superpower conflict 
was winding down, both India and Pakistan were moving apace with their nuclear 
programs. As their capabilities increased, they began testing each others’ limits. An 
examination of the five South Asian crises over the past two decades reveals that 
India and Pakistan managed earlier crises without overt outside intervention, but as 
their capabilities increased, the level of crises also worsened. In fact, each crisis was 
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more severe than the previous one, and the United States incrementally became more 
involved. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration quietly urged India and 
Pakistan to back down over crises, such as India’s 1984 occupation of the Siachin 
glacier and India’s 1986-1987 attempt to revive plans for a “preventive war” in the 
garb of a military exercise, known as Brasstacks.53  
 
   But the regional leaders themselves made the overt gestures, such as President 
Zia-ul-Haq’s famous cricket diplomacy during the 1986-1987 crisis. In the three 
crises during the 1990s, on the other hand, the United States has been directly 
engaged, from Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates in 1990-1991, to 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot in 1999, and Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage in 2001-2002. 
 
   The last few years following India’s and Pakistan’s overt nuclear tests show that 
nuclear deterrence has not prevented crises. This fact was evident most notably in 
the 1999 Kargil crisis and in the crises of 2001-2002. In 1999 the Kargil crisis came 
under the clear shadow of demonstrated nuclear capability and a much-trumpeted 
bilateral meeting in the spring of that year at Lahore. Pakistan sponsored an attack 
across the Line of Control and captured an area in the vicinity of Kargil that 
threatened a strategic highway in northern parts of disputed Kashmir, which 
triggered the crisis. From Pakistan’s perspective, this was a continuum of the 
Kashmir dynamics that was dragging on regardless of other developments in the 
region. For the rest of the world, there was a new reality in South Asia. After 
demonstrating their nuclear capabilities, I nd i a  and Pakistan were required to 
manage their neighborly relations differently. In the view of some analysts, Pakistan 
might have overestimated the value of its nuclear deterrence by hoping that India’s 
response to the Kargil crisis would be tempered because it feared nuclear 
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escalation.54 Although Pakistan’s official version of the event is ambiguous and 
muted on some questions, from hindsight and available published reports it can be 
concluded that Pakistan’s military assessment grossly underestimated India’s 
response as well as the diplomatic fallout. The Kargil episode illustrated the limits 
of nuclear dependence. Nuclear deterrence might assure security from an ultimate 
aggression but does not free the state to pursue a course of causing “deliberate 
instability” at a lower level. 
 
   The other major crisis since the 1998 tests began with the 2001 terrorist attack 
against the Indian parliament. On December 13, 2001, terrorists attacked the Indian 
parliament. India accused Pakistan of complicity and mobilized conventional forces 
and demanded that Islamabad cease support to insurgents in Kashmir and hand over 
leading militants—essentially coercing Islamabad to throw in the towel. By 
deploying troops along the Pakistan border and posing a physical threat to Pakistan, 
India compelled the United States to view the Kashmir insurgency on a par with 
terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In turn, Pakistan matched India with a 
reciprocal deployment. By mid-May 2002, another crisis erupted when terrorists 
attacked an Indian army camp in Kashmir. This time, the crisis reached the brink of 
war, a situation unprecedented since the 1971 war. Islamabad then further fueled the 
crisis by conducting three missile tests in late May 2002.  
 
   Simultaneously, Pakistan threatened to withdraw forces that were deployed on its 
western border in support of US operations in Afghanistan and hinted at requesting 
the withdrawal of the US base at Jacobabad in Pakistan if war with India broke out.55 
These moves not only sent a message to India but also affected the United States and 
other Western countries, kindling fear that the countries might pass the nuclear 
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threshold if conventional war broke out. But Islamabad also sought to avoid panic 
and thus offered peaceful reassurance to both India  and the United States.56 The United 
States acted to calm the crisis through phone ca l l s  from President George W. 
Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, to the leaders of India and Pakistan and then 
by sending Armitage and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to the region. These 
actions were largely responsible for preventing escalation.  
 
   Cold War wisdom suggests that, when two states have the capability to assure each 
others’ destruction, the cost of war and the risk of inadvertent escalation must 
outweigh any potential gains either state could countenance.57 India and Pakistan, 
however, have paid some costs; and must have learned the lessons about the costs at 
stake. However, India believes that, in 2001-2002, it successfully compelled the 
United States to act and extract a public commitment from Pakistan to end support for 
militants in Kashmir. Yet, India continues to believe it has space to wage a limited 
conventional war that it can win. Pakistan believes that its policy of reciprocal 
deployment and deterrent signaling, such as testing missiles, prevented India from 
going any further and that the risk of nuclear escalation checkmates any conventional 
adventure India might contemplate. It nevertheless took ten months of mobilization 
and force deployment for India finally to conclude that the risks and potential cost of 
a general conflict “trumped any desire to resolve the Kashmir dispute by force.”58  
    
   Still, as both sides fell back to their respective positions, they repeated their 
familiar pattern: India alleged that Pakistan supported militant infiltration into India, 
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then Pakistan denied this, and so India refused to start a dialogue. Once again it fell 
to the United States to goad both sides into some sort of thaw.59  
 
   Finally on April 17, 2003, after procrastinating for several months, Indian Prime 
Minister Atal Vajpayee held out a hand of friendship. Consequently both sides 
showed flexibility and cautiously crawled back to the basics of state-to-state 
relations: exchanging envoys, resuming bus service, easing some visa issues, and 
other small steps. But they still shied away from tackling major issues, especially 
the core issue of Kashmir. Although the CBMs instituted were positive, the fear 
remained that terrorists in the region might strike and blow away the fledgling peace 
steps at any moment. More comprehensive bilateral talks become overdue in a 
volatile regional environment.  
 
   In the final analysis, the nuclear reality and the overall political and strategic 
framework make a war infeasible for both countries. India has assured asymmetric 
destruction—both conventional and nuclear—in its favor. India’s aim is to crush the 
insurgency in Kashmir, keep the limited conventional war option open, and hold 
Pakistan under threat of massive nuclear retaliation in the event Pakistan contemplates 
the threat or use of the nuclear card. This concept assumes that India could design a 
war with limited scope, retain escalation control, and thereby erode Pakistan’s nuclear 
deterrent against conventional aggression by calling its nuclear bluff. On the other 
hand, Pakistan’s strategy is to deny India space for waging a conventional war 
and to be prepared to expand any war, retain the nuclear use option, and make costs 
exceed any benefits that India might calculate—basically, to deny India victory on 
the cheap. Even if Pakistan risks survival in a prolonged all-out war due to 
structural asymmetries with India, Islamabad keeps close to its chest a repertoire of 
strategies to offset and “design around” India’s numerical conventional force 
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advantage and its own geophysical vulnerabilities. In such a deterrence construct, 
both sides seek room to elbow each other out, engage in brinkmanship, and test the 
others’ resolve. 
 
   The conundrum of nuclear deterrence stability within the dynamics of 
brinkmanship has been discussed by Professor Robert Powell of the University of 
California at Berkeley. States might seek to exert coercive pressure on each other by 
raising the risk that events will spiral out of control. How much risk they are willing to 
bear will be limited by the relative value each state places on the issues at stake 
relative to the risks involved.60 
 
   This logic implies that brinkmanship is not reckless behavior but a means to test the 
resolve of an opponent and run risks to outbid the other, especially in situations where 
all-out wars are prohibitively costly. Powell also asserts that brinkmanship crises 
only occur if the balance or resolve is uncertain.  
     
   When each state believes that it is l ikely to be more resolute than the other state, then 
each might escalate in the expectation that the other will back down.61 This logic is 
vividly applicable in the case of South Asia. Both countries hurl themselves into 
crises that deepen, escalate, and reach a point of spiraling out of control, only to 
unwind with outside intervention notably by the United States. One author has 
suggested that “India and Pakistan brinkmanship is not wild-eyed but designed to 
meet policy objectives.... Pakistan ratchets up tensions to garner external (mainly US) 
pressure on India to come to [the] bargaining table, India uses coercive diplomacy 
to bring pressure on Pakistan to halt support for militants.... In using brinkmanship both 
India and Pakistan want ultimately [to be] held back while having the United States 
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push t h e i r  interests forward.”62 But this strategy leaves the region in a dangerous 
limbo because the decision is left to the United States to determine whether it 
intervenes or not.63  
 
   The South Asian protagonists have thus become more dependent than ever on the 
United States. Yet, much to the chagrin of the region, the United States has neither 
the time nor the patience to accord priority to the region, which President Bill Clinton 
once described as the “most dangerous place.” Consequently, a dangerous pattern has 
set in: India and Pakistan push a crisis to the brink, anticipating US intervention, and 
the United States might take its time in the belief that South Asian crises are 
manageable through “firefighting diplomacy” and that there is no urgency to launch a 
proactive process of conflict resolution. The brinkmanship is not aimed to fight a war 
but to win the crisis, and both hope that the US intervention would be helpful. One 
newspaper has noted, “Each has misread its closer ties to the United States as evidence 
that Washington has embraced its perspective. Each has treated the intense 
engagement and military presence of the United States as insurance against escalation 
to war.”64  
 
   The outcome of the latest crisis, in fact, offers a cautionary tale for the future and a 
new twist on the stability-instability paradox. India believed that ensuring nuclear 
stability provided space to consider a limited war and coerce a nuclear neighbor. But 
a semblance of instability—through missile signaling (dubbed as missile antics by 
India)—worked to deter the adversary as well as induce diplomacy. War was 
prevented, but this set a dangerous precedent: India might believe that conventional 
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force mobilization did not prove sufficiently credible in this crisis; the next time it 
would test the resolve by seeking a higher threat that might include waging a war that 
would certainly spiral out of control.        
 
   The United States faces several challenges in the region. First, it must balance its 
interests regarding India and Pakistan with its global responsibilities. The US interests 
are different, less intense, and more sporadic than those of local actors, which serve 
to limit US influence even though US clout in the region has never been as 
influential as it is in this decade, especially with India. The second challenge for 
the United States is to manage the tension between its twin objectives of war 
prevention and nonproliferation. The larger US objective is to prevent nuclear states 
from going to war and prevent war-prone states from going nuclear. Efforts to solve 
regional problems, such as technical assistance for nuclear command, control, and 
communication in South Asia, might create undesirable precedents. Third, the 
United States faces a dilemma in how to balance between India and Pakistan, best 
exemplified by the difficulties it faces in providing military aid. The US efforts to 
increase one country’s security might increase the other side’s insecurity, such as 
providing F-16s to Pakistan to redress its air force deficiency or missile defenses 
to India to protect against Pakistan’s potent missile force.65 
 
   Clearly, it is mostly up to India and Pakistan to resolve their problems and reduce 
their dependence on outside powers. Both sides must initiate nuclear risk reduction 
measures; expand the existing links to include links with respective nuclear command 
authorities; revive the spirit of the existing confidence-building measures and initiate 
new ones; and expand economic ties to create more local incentives for cooperation. 
Meanwhile, the United States can play its part by engaging now rather than waiting 
to take part in crisis management. The next South Asia crisis is likely to test the 
“uncertainty of resolve” of both India and Pakistan, and the threshold and time of 
crises is likely to be compressed, leaving no time for rescheduling a crisis 
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management visit to the region.66 At a minimum, the United States should appoint a 
high-level ambassador to the region, as Kennedy sent Harriman in 1962, along with 
a strong team of US experts on the region. As reported in the press, newly sworn 
in Obama administration appointed Richard Holbrooke as its special envoy to 
Pakistan and Afghanistan in Jan. 2009, (with no mention of Kashmir among his 
tasks though). However, the diplomacy process should start at two levels. At the 
first level, the United States must not only encourage India and Pakistan to proceed 
on bilateral substantive talks on a wide range of political and strategic issues, 
including risk reduction measures and economic links, but also monitor and record 
the substance of the work in progress. At another level, US experts should produce 
a fact-finding report that the United States would use to prepare a “road map” and 
methodology for engaging the region that must include India, Pakistan and the 
dynamics emerging from the Afghanistan situation. A constructive, broad-based 
engagement by the United States - including political resolution of the core issue, 
strategic restraints on conventional and nuclear forces, and harnessing trade - 
would facilitate stability in the region. 
TWO-TRACK STABILITY PROCESS: 
 
   Throughout the five decades of Cold War competition, Washington and Moscow 
struggled to attain strategic stability. For a deterrent to be stabilizing, it must be 
credible. In the Cold War, attaining this credibility—necessary for attaining long-term 
stability— often generated short- and medium-term instabilities. Both parties 
performed elaborate rituals (nuclear testing, missile flight tests, command post 
exercises) to demonstrate the credibility of their nuclear threats. Concerns over the 
delicacy of deterrence meant that technological evolutions (ballistic missiles, 
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MIRVing, improved accuracy, and missile defenses) could trigger destabilizing 
iterations of reactions and counter-reactions. 
 
   Attempting to ascertain the source of each superpower’s nuclear policy was 
difficult, complicating the analysis of the choices the adversary would make. 
Nuclear policy, doctrine, and operations during the Cold War were the product of a 
lively and convoluted process involving thousands of players over the fifty year of 
conflict, many of which held quite different views on what stability meant. As 
former US government official Michael Wheeler observes, even the last decade of the 
Cold War produced grave concerns on both sides about the adversary attempting 
some sort of nuclear first use. Arms control restrained arms races, but strategic 
planners st i l l  sought qualitative and quantitative improvements that might allow them 
to “escape” from deterrence. In the end, the superpowers avoided conflict, but they 
never quite achieved a condition of static stability. Moscow could only keep pace by 
expending massive resources—an effort that would bankrupt its economy and 
ultimately cause its collapse. 
 
   The principal lesson of the Cold War was the necessity of a two-track stability 
process. One track involved the patient pursuit of the settlement of fundamental 
political differences. Simultaneously, negotiations were held to stabilize nuclear 
arms races and lower the risk of inadvertent or accidental triggers to nuclear war. 
Perhaps luckily, South Asian policymakers have had a much more relaxed view 
toward nuclear deterrence. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974—but 
the weapon was too large to be delivered by any aircraft in India’s arsenal. 
Pakistan matched India’s nuclear test with a not-so-hidden weapons program of its 
own. However, neither side felt compelled to test a nuclear explosive device until 
May 1998. A credible deterrent, at least initially, did not need to be visible. A bomb 
in the basement would do. Even after the 1998 nuclear tests, nuclear weapons have 
had a surprisingly low salience in regional crises and competitions. As Dr Rajesh 
Basrur of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India, argues,  
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   “In contrast with the Cold War, there has been no direct nuclear component in 
the confrontations between India and Pakistan. Though there is much talk of an 
arms race, there is no evidence of haste in the development of a range of 
capabilities.” 
    
   The untested nuclear weapons in the Indian and Pakistani arsenals were low-
maintenance devices. Force postures, doctrines, delivery systems, and command 
and control practices developed slowly, outside of the public glare, because there 
was no strategic urgency to do otherwise. While both India and Pakistan had dueling 
missile tests in the mid-1990s, their pace was more indicative of a research and 
development effort than a crash program to achieve nuclear deterrence. After the 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, US interlocutors, and nascent non-governmental 
strategic communities in Islamabad and Delhi, began to prod their governments to 
add flesh to the nuclear skeleton. India issued a draft doctrine - articulating a 
strategy of massive retaliation after the absorption of a nuclear first strike. One aspect 
of this policy—that India would not be the first to use weapons of mass destruction—
comforted the US policy-makers, although it failed to adequately reassure strategic 
planners in Islamabad. As Air Commodore Khalid Banuri of the Pakistan Strategic 
Plans Division has stated,  
 
   “Considering ‘No First Use’ (NFU) as a flawed argument, the possibility of an Indian 
pre-emptive strike cannot be ruled out. To cater for such [an] eventuality, Pakistan 
has to factor in a l l  options to ensure that its response remains viable. Thus the 
rising conventional imbalance and the lack of confidence in NFU are viewed as 
potentially destabilizing and risky.” 
 
   Pakistan had struggled since its independence in 1947 to confront an India that was 
larger and militarily stronger. Dr Rifaat Hussain, of the Pakistan National Defense 
College, has noted that Pakistan’s in i t ia l  attempts to externally balance against 
India (through alliances) failed. During the 1965 war, the United States cut off 
military supplies to both countries, despite Pakistan’s membership in the SEATO and 
CENTO alliances. In 1971, as Pakistan lost its eastern wing to an Indian-supported 
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Bangladeshi insurgency, the United States stood by. As a result, Pakistan launched its 
own nuclear weapons program, to “internally balance” the neighboring threat. 
 
   By 1985, Pakistan had developed a recessed nuclear weapons capability. Pakistani 
officials felt that their displays of military readiness (and their undeployed nuclear 
deterrent) had prevented war during the 1987 Brasstacks Crisis and 1990 Zarb-e 
Momin exercises and during several other crises over the past two decades. Their 
decision to go ahead with a nuclear capability allowed them to quickly respond in 
1998 when India tested. They believe that nuclear weapons and conventional 
forces were crucial in deterring India from prosecuting a “limited war,” as a response 
to either the 1999 Kargil operation or the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian 
parliament in New Delhi. Today, nuclear weapons are central to Pakistani strategic 
thought, especially with regard to deterring India from initiating large-scale military 
operations against Pakistan. As Rifaat Hussain stated,  
 
   “In the absence of both an offensive conventional capability, which w i l l  allow it to 
disrupt an Indian offensive preemptively, and the geo-strategic space in which to 
maneuver and fight in a defense-indepth strategy, Pakistan’s physical protection 
can only be assured by nuclear weapons. Islamabad expects that in the event of an 
Indian attack, its offensive would be met in the first instance by a non-nuclear 
defense of the forward areas close to the border. Should Islamabad fail to hold the 
front by non-nuclear combat, it would warn New Delhi that small-yield nuclear 
weapons would be used to strike at the invading Indian forces. And then, as a last 
resort, it would strike with such weapons if the warning went unheeded.” 
 
   Pakistani officials have variously clarified how strategic forces would be managed and 
how command and control would operate at the macro-level. As Brigadier Feroz 
Hassan Khan (Retired, Pakistan Army) noted,  
 
   “…the Pakistan government intentionally has not elaborated on its nuclear use 
doctrine. Islamabad officials have avoided any formal discussion of nuclear 
thresholds or weapons employment concepts so as to complicate any Indian 
decision to use force. Indian planners have viewed the situation quite differently.”  
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   And Dr Rajesh Basrur, director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India, 
observed,  
 
   “Indian planners do not believe that nuclear weapons are central to Indian 
security. Nuclear weapons, for India, are political, rather than operational, 
instruments.”  
 
   The fact that both parties had fought a limited war over the Kargil heights in 1999 
upset, but did not fundamentally alter, these Indian beliefs. The strategic planners in 
India and Pakistan apparently concluded that they could hide behind nuclear weapons 
to perpetuate low-intensity conflicts. 
 
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT  
IN SOUTH ASIA: 
 
   Despite approaching nuclear necessity from very different perspectives, both sides 
appear to be comfortable with their present nuclear status.  India feels that i ts  
large geographic size and abundant natural boundaries make its nuclear force 
relatively invulnerable. Moreover, its more relaxed retaliation-only strategy affords 
it time to react to any irrational nuclear attack. Indian planners are at least publicly 
adamant that any Indian response to nuclear use would be certain and massive. 
Pakistan feels that a mobile and dispersed nuclear arsenal is nearly invulnerable, 
even from increasingly advanced Indian conventional capabilities. Despite this 
relative comfort with the status quo, both countries face considerable strategic 
dilemmas. India hopes to conventionally threaten Pakistan in order to alter Pakistani 
political and military behavior. As General (retired) V. P. Malik, former Indian chief 
of army staff, noted,  
 
   “…when a nation is targeted by what it perceives to be state-sponsored proxy war, when 
pushed to the wall, [it] is tempted to use its conventional forces to bring the proxy war 
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into the open, rather than fight with all the limitations of a ‘no-war-no-peace 
situation.”  
 
  Thus a state can fight in the open—initiate conventional hostilities—because, as 
General Malik argues,  
 
   “space exists between proxy war/low-intensity conflict and a nuclear umbrella wherein a 
limited conventional war is a distinct possibility.” 
 
   In order to initiate hostilities against Pakistani targets, however, New Delhi must find 
ways to prevent an escalatory military spiral. It probably would do so by initiating 
attacks that are limited in time but spread out over space, or limited in space but 
spread out over time. However, it was observed that escalation is always the 
option of the opponent. Would an Indian attack lead to an unexpected and 
escalatory Pakistani counterattack? While Pakistan can escalate, is that a rational 
decision for Pakistan? Widening a conventional conflict could prove devastating to 
Pakistan given India’s growing conventional force imbalance. As Pakistani Air 
Commodore Tariq Ashraf argued,  
 
   “The increasing conventional gap is bound to result in a lowering of Pakistan’s 
nuclear threshold and making it more prone to resorting to the nuclear option in 
any future military conflict between the two countries.” 
 
   However, this is a challenging threat to make credibly. If Pakistan aims to raise the 
nuclear bogey, it must be willing to “go nuclear” in response to an Indian 
conventional attack. It must initiate this nuclear attack knowing that it will lead 
to national suicide—Pakistan will cease to exist as a viable state if India responds 
massively. India, on the other hand, must threaten to massively retaliate against Pakistani 
cities, even if Pakistan only uses a single nuclear weapon against Indian military 
forces operating in Pakistani territory. Such an attack would be disproportionate and 
unjust—but moving toward flexible response could require a massive expansion of 
 66
Indian nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and a radical revision of India’s 
existing civil-military relationships and command and control arrangements. 
 
   Controlling nuclear weapons presents its own set of dilemmas. Strategic planners 
hope, as Duke Professor Peter Feaver noted almost a decade ago, that nuclear 
weapons would always be used when ordered but never used when not. Air 
Commodore Banuri has discussed Pakistan’s unique challenges, as it faces down a 
very large-scale Indian conventional threat. Islamabad is not comforted by India’s 
nuclear “no-first-use” declaration. “Pakistan has created an elaborate infrastructure 
to improve technical and physical security of its nuclear assets and facilities during 
peace and war,” Banuri has said. He continued,  
 
   “Pakistan has created [a fairly good [command and control system] as an interim 
measure to exercise effective command over its nuclear forces that will not fail during 
crisis/war.”  
 
   While the Pakistani “mid-term quest for a robust, all encompassing and 
technological viable C4I2SR system is moving at a satisfactory pace,” Banuri noted 
the importance of human reliability,  
 
   “Technical solutions are no substitute for and do not guarantee good judgment, clear 
analysis, or self-discipline under stress.” 
    
   Pakistan has augmented its safety and security structure for its nuclear arsenal. The 
Pakistan armed forces created a security unit within the Strategic Plans Division, 
headed by a two-star general, to continuously monitor and defend against both insider 
and outsider threats. While Pakistan feels confident in the physical security around i ts  
nuclear sites, it s t i l l  remains open to outside assistance, so long as the principle of 
non-intrusiveness is maintained. 
 
   Indian command and control challenges center around efforts to ensure that a 
residual nuclear capability will still be usable after absorbing an adversary’s first 
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strike. As Brigadier (retired) Gurmeet Kanwal of the Observers Research Foundation, 
in Delhi argued,  
 
   “The credibility of a nuclear deterrent that is limited to retaliatory strikes only hinges 
around the ability of the nuclear force to survive a first strike in sufficient numbers to 
inflict unacceptable punishment in retaliation.”  
 
   By not pursuing “first use” nuclear strategies, India dramatically simplified its 
command and control requirements. By settling on a “ride-out-and-retaliate” 
posture, India will have to develop detailed plans for the succession of national 
command authority and steps to ensure that surviving nuclear warheads can be 
mated and launched even after a nuclear attack has severely disrupted the national 
command and control system. 
 
   To improve stability on the subcontinent it is necessary to create an insulated and 
sustainable process of dialogue. There should also be mutual and balanced force 
reductions, despite India’s broader concerns (read “China”) making such 
negotiations quite difficult. The two countries should also move ahead with the 
upgradation of the DGMO hotline and the establishment of a review and oversight 
commission to ensure that existing confidence-building measures are being 
implemented properly. C. Raja Mohan, Jawaharlal Nehru University professor and 
respected journalist in Delhi, argued, “It is reasonable to expect modest but steady 
progress in nuclear confidence-building in the coming period.” He summarized 
Indian thought on the issue:  
 
   “India is aware that it is at the very beginning of a process of constructing nuclear 
and conventional military stability with Pakistan. It is prepared to consider and 
implement a range of CBMs on the nuclear front that is focused on exchange of 
information, communication, and interaction. Such measures, India hopes, will enhance 
the security of both sides. India, however, is unlikely to accept at this stage any 
proposals that aim to constrain i ts  nuclear force structure and their deployment as 
some of Pakistan’s proposals for a ‘strategic restraint regime’ suggest.” 
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US ROLE DURING THE KARGIL CONFLICT 
& THE 2001-02 MILITARY STAND-OFF: 
 
Over the past five decades, successive US administrations have recognized the 
importance of stability in the India-Pakistan relationship (“the need for India and 
Pakistan to resolve their disputes” in the 2002 National Security Strategy) and the 
United States repeatedly has used techniques that arguably are dissuasive in 
nature.67 The US military, for example, understands that it “has been and will 
continue to be employed in crisis resolution situations across the globe” to head off 
confrontations or l imi t  their impact:  
 
   “The intent is to control or facilitate the control of situations through the 
application of military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national and 
international power.”68  
 
   Here we take a look at the US role in the regional equilibrium, and the US 
responses to the 1999 Kargil conflict, and the crisis of 2001-2002. The key themes of 
the US actions were: 
 
• to prevent war in the first instance, and  
• to limit the scope of conflict when prevention has failed. 
 
   During the Kargil conflict, from May to July 1999, US diplomacy was a critical 
factor in the Indian decision to limit the fighting to one isolated sector of the Line 
of Control in Kashmir. When Pakistani troops crossed the line in the early months 
of the year, India weighed options of opening new fronts elsewhere in Kashmir or, 
potentially, along the international border with Pakistan proper. The decision not 
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to expand the conflict horizontally or vertically was New Delhi’s, but Washington’s 
influence helped to reinforce Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s preference for a 
limited operation rather than open-ended war with the inherent potential for nuclear 
escalation. This new US-Indian interaction during Kargil was founded on a 
relationship that had been developing since the early 1990s, highlighted by the 
intensive dialogue between Indian Minster of External Affairs Jaswant Singh and 
American Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. 
 
   It was still a fragile and uncertain relationship in May 1999, but it gained strength 
during the crisis as the US administration clearly and publicly increased the pressure on 
Pakistan to withdraw its troops, while carefully ensuring that India’s leaders were 
apprised of US actions and perceptions. At the diplomatic climax of the conflict, for 
example, when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was meeting with 
President Clinton on the 4th of July, the US President telephoned Vajpayee several 
times to brief the Indian leader on the progress of the talks.69  
 
   The shifty border situation along the LoC and India’s earlier repeated incursion into 
the Pakistan-held territories, had been noted by the international community, but 
never openly challenged. For instance, the 1984 Indian movement into the Siachin 
Glaciers violated the LoC and international law and norms, but no fingers were 
raised. 
  
   Nonetheless, the improved US relationship with India helped US policy three 
years later as Washington engaged with India to defuse the 2001-2002 India-
Pakistan crisis.70 In the tense atmosphere following the September attack on the 
United States, a costly October suicide bombing at the Kashmir Legislative 
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Assembly, and the war in Afghanistan, terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament on 
December 13, 2001. India began the largest military mobilization since the 1971 
war. Though complicated by the importance of Pakistan to Coalition combat 
operations in Afghanistan and the presence of a small number of American troops in 
Pakistan, the US Administration, in coordination with other governments, embarked 
on a diplomatic effort to dissuade India from engaging in military retaliation with 
unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences. Centered around personal 
diplomacy by secretary of state Colin Powell and highlighted by presidential phone 
calls, the US dissuasive campaign restored a degree of stability after a trip to the 
region by Powell in January 2002 and a conciliatory speech by President Musharraf. 
 
   Neither side, however, demobilized, and another attack on an Indian Army family 
housing area in May brought the two countries to the brink once more. Personal 
diplomacy was again the centerpiece of the American approach: Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage both 
traveled to New Delhi and Islamabad in early June when tension was at its height.  
 
   This time the dissuasive impact of the US message was reinforced by public disclosure 
of US casualty estimates in the event of an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange and a 
State Department announcement authorizing the voluntary departure of non-
emergency personnel and dependents from US diplomatic missions and urging other 
American citizens to depart or defer t ravel . 71  
 
   This combination of techniques had the desired effect, creating enough space for the 
two antagonists to back away from conflict once Armitage announced a Pakistani 
pledge to renounce cross-border infiltration into Indian Kashmir.72 Hundreds of 
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thousands of troops remained deployed along the border until October, however, and 
Washington remained focused on the potential for renewed confrontation. Indeed, 
Powell and Armitage each made yet another trip to the two capitals (Powell’s third 
visit since October 2001) to stress the importance of normalized India-Pakistan 
relations. 
 
   The record of US dissuasion efforts in India-Pakistan crises is decidedly mixed, but 
examining it in detail highlights several points relative to future policy planning: 
 
• First, personal diplomacy at very senior levels is the most effective tool in 
reducing tensions and promoting stability. 
 
• Second, personal interaction at the highest echelons of the Indian and Pakistani 
governments must be supplemented by a carefully constructed public diplomacy 
strategy and integrated with economic measures. 
 
• Third, diplomatic approaches that appeal to Indian and Pakistani self-interest, 
that emphasize the unpredictable consequences of conflict, and that assist the 
two sides in finding alternatives to military action (including face-saving 
measures where appropriate) offer the best chances of success. 
 
• Fourth, military forces, if employed, must be used cautiously and judiciously. 
The US policy-makers must consider that these could have long-term costs to 
US bilateral relations and future effectiveness in the region. However, routine 
military-to-military interaction programs in advance of crises can help shape 
the local environment to reduce the likelihood of confrontation and build solid 
U.S. bilateral ties to key actors in the Indian and Pakistani governments. 
 
• Finally, the significance of Washington’s relations with New Delhi and 
Islamabad cannot be overstated. As shown most dramatically by the dialogue 
between the US and India and Pakistan in 1999 and 2002, a robust web of 
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bilateral connections based on trust and transparency provides the most 
promising foundation for potential US role in South Asia. The US role in the 
resolution of the Kashmir dispute, however, has been dismal. It has failed to 
apply its considerable clout to the long-term stability of the region. 
Unfortunately for peace in the region, India has not been willing to listen to the 
US advice on the issue of Kashmir. 
   
  STRATEGIC STABILITY  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 
 
   Defining the Middle East is considered a political and not a geographical concept. In 
1989, the IAEA reached a definition of the Middle East based on the “essential 
countries” to which other countries could be added later with a view to finally 
including all countries directly related to current conflicts in the region. The IAEA 
definition includes the area extending from Libya (to the west) to Iran (to the east) and 
from Syria (to the north) to Yemen (to the South). Thus the definition of the IAEA 
excluded Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. Turkey is a member of the NATO and there may 
be nuclear weapons on its territory. There are British military bases on the territory of 
Cyprus and Malta where no nuclear weapons have been declared. However, the 
definition did not refer to Pakistan and Afghanistan and assumed that their political and 
military orientations were directed to other matters. The above definition included, 
therefore, the “essential” countries only and not the “marginal” ones on geographical 
basis and took into account existing tensions and the ability of certain countries to 
develop weapons of mass destruction. Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia and the Arab Maghreb 
countries of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania were also excluded.73 
Considering its resources, the Middle East, has achieved less than expected in human 
                                                 
73 See the report UNIDIR/2004/24, Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle 
East. 
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security. In fact, the consequences of war, sanctions, and occupation in Iraq, Sudan, and 
Palestine have resulted in regression rather than progression. 
 
   In 2002, there were two international events that directly concern development in the 
Arab world. The first was a high profile conference on public health for health policy 
makers in Beirut organized by the World Bank and the World Health Organization, 
during which a document on the public health situation and prospects was released.74 
The second was the publication of the Arab Human Development Report 2002, 
cosponsored by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Arab Fund 
for Economic and Social Development.75 Although both events painted a challenging 
picture for development in the Arab region, they identified different sets of 
impediments to progress, priorities for development, and solutions.  
 
   The Arab Human Development Report 2002 was the first report from the United 
Nations Development Program that concerns a single region. It was written by a group 
of Arab intellectuals and experts with known concern for the Arab world. They used 
old and new methods to summarize data from different resources into indices that are 
compared with other regions. 
General development: The Arab world, despite its wealth and natural and human 
resources, fared poorly in many aspects of development (see table 4.4). Important 
problems include illiteracy, especially among women; lack of job opportunities, 
especially for young people; and slow economic growth because of loss of traditional 
economies, low productivity, and lack of innovation and competitiveness. Military 
spending is triple that of other regions. Rapid expansion of Arab populations threatens 
progress, especially in countries with limited resources such as Egypt. There are 
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important developmental gaps related to distribution of oil wealth—for example, 
between the neighbors Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  
Health development: Arab countries have made substantial progress since the 1950s in 
reducing infant and child mortality, improving life expectancy, and increasing access to 
health care. Major problems, however, remain (see Table 1.4). Public health challenges 
include high maternal mortality, malnutrition, wide disparities between rural and urban 
areas and different countries, emphasis on curative rather than preventive care, 
relatively weak public health institutions, variable quality of health care, lack of 
capacity in policy making, and unresponsive and inequitable health systems.  
Impediments to progress: The report links current development status with external 
and internal conditions. The main external factor is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Military 
spending is a direct impediment to development, especially in countries directly 
bordering Israel. Indirectly, the conflict impedes development because Arab 
governments use the pretext of security to restrict freedoms and political and civil rights 
and exclude broad public participation.  
   The report also examines the role of internal factors in the traditional social and 
political fabric of the Arab world, including conservative power institutions and non-
democratic leaderships. It identifies lack of freedom, disempowerment of women, and 
inadequate production and use of new knowledge as the three key impediments to 
development. With the enormous challenges facing Arab countries today, it is easy to 
lose sight of the possibility of change. Nevertheless, to improve their lot, debate is 
needed about the priorities, scope, and tools for improving health and enhancing 
development. The Arab world, with all its human and material resources, needs a 
vision for the future that considers all complex issues, admits to no easy solutions, and 
proposes gradual and realizable steps. How can this vision be developed and realized? 
Several key issues need consideration:  
   Role of citizens—Public involvement is crucial in setting the right agenda and enacting 
it.  
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   Increasing inter-Arab cooperation—Although it is unfashionable to speak of Arab 
unity, coordination of both policies and programs can promote security and 
development.  
   Role of international agencies—There is a need for greater international involvement in 
conflict resolution and development programs in the region.  
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Table:1.4 
 
                    Key development statistics for Arab world 
                    Population 
                   Total population 281 million Growth rate 1.3-3.7% 
                    Life expectancy 62.6 years for men and 65.2 for women 
                    Social 
  Over 58 million people are absolutely illiterate. Up to 50% of women ar
functionally illiterate  
   Unequal income distribution and low level of absolute poverty in the world 
                    Economic 
    Combined GDP only $531bn (£354bn) 
    Slow income growth (0.5%) 
    Unemployment 15% (but > 50% in Palestine) 
 
 
    
Source: Data taken from the Arab Human Development Report, 2002.  
 
   Developing an agenda— The Middle East remains one of the most complex and 
difficult regions in the world for developing a strategic paradigm that ensures security 
of all states of the region. The main problems include the salience of the proliferation 
of nuclear and other unconventional weapons as well as their means of delivery. 
During the Cold War, the Middle East was second only to Europe in its scale and range 
 77
of weaponization. Per capita military expenditure concomitantly was and remains 
among the highest. With the end of the Cold War, the Middle East is the fastest arming 
region in the world – receiving advanced weaponry from those very states that fought 
the Cold War. 
   Considering the dire consequences of the region’s nuclearization, as far back as 1974, 
Iran with the support of Egypt proposed the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ). Since that year, the United Nations General Assembly 
had adopted a resolution annually to this effect, and since 1980 the resolution has been 
adopted by consensus – garnering the support of all Arab states, Iran and Israel.  
   Before the emergence of Iran’s nuclear issue in 2002, Israel was the main target of 
numerous IAEA resolutions as the only country in the region not party to the NPT and 
having no facilities under safeguards. It was hoped that this would help push Israel to 
place its nuclear facilities under international control through a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, reports of Iran’s nuclear program have 
exacerbated an already difficult situation, and made it harder for international 
organizations to seek regional de-weaponization.  
   The reports of Iran’s nuclear program have also complicated regional and international 
efforts for pacific settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Unlike Israel’s ‘closet bomb’, 
the Iranian bomb would carry with it the weight of a significant regional power. In 
order to understand Iran’s current regional preponderance, a look at the situation in Iraq 
would be instructive.   
   Beyond the nuclear imbroglio, the evolving situation in Iraq also underscores the vital 
relevance of Iran for US policy there. As Iraq navigates its recent transfer from 
international occupation to limited sovereignty, the prospects for its short- and long-
term stability hinge to a considerable extent on the role of its neighbors. By virtue of its 
history and geography as well as its intricate religious ties to Iraq, Iran has and will 
continue to bear unique influence over the transition to a post–Saddam Hussein Iraqi 
political order. Given the centrality of success in Iraq to the United States’ broader 
 78
international objectives, the US government has an important stake in ensuring that the 
role of Iran in the future evolution of Iraq is a positive one.  
 
   IRAN’S EXPANDING 
  REGIONAL ROLE: 
 
  The post-9/11 US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought in a more 
favorable geo-strategic environment for Iran. Removal of hostile regimes on both sides 
was an unprecedented favor that Iran received from the US in the post-9/11 scenario. 
As with the Taliban, Iran’s long track record of conflict with Saddam Hussein is well 
established. The eight-year Iran-Iraq war so bitter and exhausting that it did not end in 
a formal peace treaty and relations between the two countries did not fully resume for 
the ensuing sixteen years of Saddam’s rule. Here, too, Tehran and Washington found 
themselves improbably united by a common enemy, although the problematic history 
of US policy toward Iraq and the implicit threat of Iran’s affiliation with its Shi’a 
majority added considerable layers of complexity and wariness. In the lead-up to the 
2003 campaign by the US-led coalition to remove Saddam Hussein, Iranian officials 
opposed the war in the most robust terms, mindful of the precedent that would be set 
and the fact that the US military would be parked on Iran’s western border. In private 
conversations, Iranians offered their own tragic experience in Iraq as an admonition 
against any optimism about the prospects for a positive post-conflict scenario.  
   In the immediate aftermath of the coalition victory, however, Iran also recognized an 
unprecedented opportunity to extend its own influence and encourage the ascension of 
a friendly fellow Shi’a government. As a result, Iran sanctioned cooperation with the 
US occupation via one of its primary instruments for projecting power in Iraq: the 
Shi’a opposition groups. In particular, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq, which has long-standing and intricate ties to Iran’s governing clergy, emerged 
as a central and constructive actor in the nascent politics of post-Saddam Iraq. In 
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addition, Iran offered early recognition to the precarious provisional government and 
quickly launched efforts to expand economic and cultural ties with Iraqis.  
   Just as in Afghanistan, however, Iran’s cooperation did not negate US concerns about 
its leaders’ ultimate intentions and its potential for undertaking subversive activities. 
Tehran reportedly tested the commitment of the occupying forces to preserving Iraq’s 
existing borders, briefly moving across the south-central border in the summer of 2003. 
Iran’s clerical forces also began reaching out to a wide variety of Iraqi organizations 
and leaders, including militants such as Muqtada al Sadr (whose spiritual mentor 
resides in Iran). Washington has also accused Iran of allowing foreign fighters to cross 
its borders into Iraq.  
   At the same time, Iranian leaders have taken advantage of the deteriorating security 
situation to intensify their condemnations of the US presence in Iraq. This represents a 
combination of political opportunism and authentic empathy with the plight of the Iraqi 
people and the manifest instability in the sacred Shi’a shrine cities of Najaf and 
Karbala. “The Americans, whether they want it or not, whether they accept it or not, 
are defeated in Iraq,” Ayatollah Khamenei proclaimed in 2004.76
 
  
   Notwithstanding these very real areas of conflict, there is considerable overlap between 
Iranian and US visions for postwar Iraq. Although their strategic rationales vary 
widely, both Tehran and Washington are broadly committed to promoting a unitary and 
even pluralistic post-Saddam Iraqi state. For Iran, the driving forces are purely 
pragmatic; any partition of Iraq or outbreak of civil war could pose spillover effects, 
imperiling Iran’s own stability. Although its hard-liners may maintain ties to the 
rabble-rousers such as al-Sadr, they are unlikely to truly align themselves with his 
chaotic cause, or to champion the cause of Baathist remnants that terrorize the Sunni 
center of the country. One Iranian newspaper derided the violence that has beset Iraq as 
neither guerrilla warfare nor the people's resistance, but rather “a horrible blind terror.” 
Inconveniencing the United States is one thing; sowing turmoil on Iran’s own environs 
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is quite another. In fact, at the height of recent tensions in Najaf, Iran dispatched a team 
of diplomats to mediate between US forces and the insurgent al Sadr forces.  
   Moreover, the Iranian clerics, who have resisted the expansion of popular political 
participation at home, are proving ardent champions of pluralism in Iraq. Again, this 
position, paradoxically, suits their interests—a democratic Iraqi polity is likely to 
feature strong Shi’a representation, providing Iran valuable avenues through which to 
exert its influence. In addition, such a state would be prone to internecine political 
squabbling and would thereby be an implausible rival for regional hegemony. For these 
reasons, the very clerics who undermined Iran’s recent parliamentary polls have 
welcomed Iraq’s new interim government and encouraged the early organization of 
free elections.  
   One of the central uncertainties about Iraq’s evolution is the impact it may have on 
Iran’s internal affairs. Many US proponents of regime change suggested that Saddam 
Hussein’s removal and the establishment of representative government and rule of law 
in Iraq would have a domino effect throughout the region, first and foremost in Iran.  
   Undoubtedly, a stable, pluralistic Iraq that enjoys cordial relations with its neighbors 
may have ripple effects on the evolution of Iran’s domestic political contention. And 
interaction between Iranian seminaries and the historic seats of religious scholarship in 
Iraq will intensify the debate among Shi’a clerics about the most appropriate 
relationship between religion and politics. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani commands a 
considerable following across the region—wider than that any of Iran’s ruling clergy. 
His quietist approach to clerical involvement in politics and his reported aversion to 
Iran’s theocratic system could create new Iranian adherents to the notion of separating 
religion from politics. In the short term, however, instability has incapacitated Iraq as 
well as fueling the fires of extremism throughout the region.  
   Through the 1970s and 1980s, the Arab States of the Gulf faced first the hegemonic 
ambitions of Iran under the secular and intensely nationalistic regime of the Shah and 
then the determination of the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran to export its 
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revolution across the Gulf. In between Iranian challenges came Iraqi feints at territorial 
acquisition as well as influence in decision making on Gulf and wider Arab political, 
economic, and strategic affairs. The US solution was to maintain the small naval 
presence (the Fifth Fleet) that it had first sent to Bahrain in 1949 and to encourage a 
balance of power that allowed Iran under the Shah to dominate the region. In the 
1970s—after the British withdrawal east of Suez and concerned about possible Soviet 
encroachments in the Gulf—President Richard Nixon created the Twin Pillars policy, 
which designated Iran and Saudi Arabia as proxies for US military presence in the 
region. When the Shah fell and the Ayatollah threatened the region, the United States 
increased its presence and role in the Gulf. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 
(RDJTF) was established in November 1979 and became the principal tool of the 
Carter administration, which defined the Persian Gulf as vital to US interests (termed 
as the Carter Doctrine). 
   The US military involvement increased dramatically during the Iran-Iraq war with the 
re-flagging of commercial vessels (Operation Earnest Will).77 When it seemed that 
Tehran might succeed in defeating Baghdad and increase its ability to subvert the 
smaller Gulf States, the United States provided limited assistance to Baghdad, which 
became the short-term protector in the balance of power. The US presence was still 
considered to be offshore and over-the-horizon, with no bases or home-porting rights 
(except for Bahrain and Oman, where access agreements had been established to allow 
pre-positioning of equipment). 
   The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 as a means of self-protection 
against Iraq and Iran. Although protection from war may have been an impetus, GCC 
leaders have used the organization primarily as a sounding board for regional security 
issues and cooperation on economic policy. Along with Iraq, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and 
other Middle Eastern governments, they joined the arms race, spending major portions 
of their budgets on weapon systems and training packages that they could barely 
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absorb. Interoperability was never a key concept in defense planning in the Gulf States. 
All bought what they wanted in bidding wars from whomever they wanted without a 
serious thought to how the equipment could be used in a combat situation. Arms 
purchases were not intended to bolster defense; rather, they were an extension of 
foreign policy, intended to give as many arms-merchant states as possible a stake in 
their survival. Kuwait, for example, often bought inferior if not obsolete equipment 
from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China as well as other European suppliers 
in order to help ensure political alliances. 
   Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait shattered the myth of self-protection by arms sales, GCC 
solidarity, and US over-the-horizon presence. It exposed the Arabs to their inability to 
prevent their large, powerful, and angry neighbors—first Iran, now Iraq—from taking 
out their wrath or seeking succor in the oilfields of Kuwait and the Gulf at large. To the 
relief of the rulers and the concern of the ruled, the invasion brought the United States 
military into the region with reshaped strategic doctrine and security perceptions. For a 
while after the war, it seemed as if the United States would maintain a significantly 
large footprint and the GCC would stay under a US security umbrella to protect the 
regimes, their oil, and sea-lanes from hegemonic threats from Iraq, Iran, or both. 
   Ten years after Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the 
Gulf governments prefer to reestablish the kind of balance of power in which they once 
felt comfortable—a balance maintained by de facto partnership with Iran and backed 
up by a more distant United States. The Gulf Cooperation Council holds training 
exercises, most of them bilateral ones with the United States, and occasionally some 
members raise the prospect of a 100,000-man GCC military force.78 
   The GCC states had been especially supportive of UNSCOM efforts to detect, inspect, 
and destroy Iraqi NBC capabilities. They have shown much more complacency about 
potential threats from a similarly armed Iran. At the time of Khatami’s election, they 
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were hopeful that it presaged changes in Iran’s Islamic militancy toward them. GCC 
states welcomed all signs of moderation in Iran and publicly rejected any suggestion 
that Tehran supported terrorism or intended to threaten them once it had developed the 
technology for and tested new, more sophisticated long-range missiles to carry 
biological or chemical warheads. Thus, GCC states, in efforts of early bandwagoning 
as opposed to balancing Iran’s threat, shrugged off dire predictions of the dangers of a 
nuclear Iran. However, that is likely to change if Iran fails to reassure regional security 
concerns in the process of its nuclear development and nuclear policy formulation.  
 
   IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM  
AND REGIONAL RESPONSES: 
    
   The Gulf Arab states that can afford new weapon systems—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Qatar, and UAE—probably will seek some kind of upgrade or acquisition of new 
weapon systems. Their ability to do so will be limited by suppliers (will Pakistan, 
India, France, Russia, North Korea, China, or the United States find it in their overall 
interest to sell new weapon systems?) and, more importantly, by costs. Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait have made large weapon purchases since the war even though revenues 
from oil were down and budget shortfalls up. Domestic criticism has been building in 
both countries over the costs of defense at the expense of domestic interests and over 
the extent of dependence on the United States. However, perceptions that the United 
States will back away from its security commitments in light of a nuclear-armed Iran 
will encourage GCC states in two ways: to upgrade their own defensive weapon 
systems, perhaps to include a nuclear option, and to seek ways to reintegrate Iraq into 
the Arab camp. 
   When Iran develops a nuclear capability for its missiles, what will the Gulf Arabs want 
of the United States, considering the costs, domestic criticism, and risks? They 
probably will want guarantees of enhanced protection and promises to defend them 
before Iran can make good on any threats. However, the Gulf Arabs are not likely to 
support a policy of preemptive strikes to lessen their Iran problem. As they have argued 
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against using the military option against Saddam Hussain (unless his departure could 
be guaranteed), they will argue for engagement over isolation and negotiations rather 
than military operations. On the other hand, they probably will not accept Iranian 
invitations to enter an Islamic nuclear blanket and engage in anti-US alliance building.  
   The Gulf Arab states will continue to rely on US protection to some degree, especially 
if a nuclear arms race increases the threat. If American actions or statements suggested 
that Washington would feel constrained militarily by a nuclear-armed Iran, then the 
Gulf Arabs will move closer to Iran, and at least the lower Gulf States will seek Iraq’s 
return. 
   As the United States tries to involve the Gulf States more in assuming responsibility 
for protecting their own populations through what is termed consequence management 
by US Central Command (seeing that the population is protected from biological and 
chemical weapon threats by providing protective masks and through other 
preparations), they may use this pressure to justify acquiring new defensive weapons. 
   The US ability to restrain Gulf Arab efforts to acquire new non-conventional weapon 
systems is limited. The Saudis almost certainly did not inform Washington of their 
intentions to acquire the Chinese missiles in the 1980s and probably have not revealed 
the purpose behind Defense Minister Sultan’s highly publicized visit to Pakistan, 
including his stop at its nuclear plants, last year. The United States could suggest that it 
would not continue as arms provider, protector, trainer, and technology maintainer for 
the Saudi military’s conventional forces, particularly in the Kingdom’s air defense 
systems. Such hints, coupled with a US reaffirmation of its security commitments in 
the region, would weigh heavily on the internal Saudi arms debate. 
   Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan regard the Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah triangle (as 
voiced through the press, and not from the regimes themselves) as a sort of axis of 
radical policy, the muqawamah—the “Shi’a storm”.79 Such terms were being applied to 
this axis even before the Lebanon War of the summer of 2006. The Arab countries 
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were aware of Iran, the ambitious giant that rose up from the East, at least since 
Ahmadinejad’s election as president, but they consciously chose to ignore this. In the 
accord from the March 2006 Arab summit in Khartoum, the only reference to Iran was, 
as in the past, the demand to return the three islands over which there is dispute 
between Iran and the United Arab Emirates.  
   It appears there was a conscious decision not to deal with the threats of the Shi’a axis 
and to avoid confrontation with Iran. Following the events of last summer, including 
the abduction of Gilad Shalit followed by the kidnapping of two more Israeli soldiers 
in the north of Israel, and then the war in Lebanon, it appears that the leading Sunni 
Arab countries were dealt a blow.80 It finally became clear to them that the Arab 
collective was beginning to fall apart. The Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian axis, which once 
determined the decisions of the Arab summit by concluding matters ahead of time and 
thus preventing disagreement, simply broke down and slowly dissipated. It appeared 
that a vacuum was created, but this was not really the case.  
   This vacuum was filled by other forces, forces that in the eyes of the leading Arab 
countries in the world were external: The United States with its invasion of 
Afghanistan and then the coalition in Iraq is one; Turkey, with its eyes on Europe, but 
also seeing itself as a mediator in the region clearly has interests in northern Iraq and 
its border with Syria; Israel succeeded unilaterally to dictate matters in the region, for 
example, the disengagement plan, which the Arab states did not like; and of course Iran 
— which is also not part of the Arab world — under Ahmadinejad, who since his 
election has voiced revolutionary rhetoric, which is perceived by some leading Arab 
countries as the revival of the export of the Islamic Revolution.81 
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   Iran’s regional importance entails that most that goes on in the region or in response to 
the Sunni countries refers to Iran’s hegemony in the region and its potential power. The 
common denominators of all of these countries are:  
 1. The perception of the threat posed by Iran and its allies, whether the threat is real or 
perceived.  
  
 2. The importance each country attributes to the Iranian nuclear issue; viewing the 
Iranian nuclear campaign as a way to achieve hegemony, involvement, and security in 
the region.  
  
 3. Calling together the countries defending themselves against the challenge of a new 
representation of the regional narrative. This does not only refer to events, but also to 
the perception of the region and its future.  
 Among these different attitudes toward this group of countries, many different political 
science definitions can be applied, but none of these definitions suit the countries 
supposedly defending themselves against this threat. The first definition is “axis,” or 
mihwar in Arabic. So, does a Sunni axis exist? Egypt and Jordan negate this possibility 
of a unified axis in the region, as the two countries disapprove of the axis policy. What 
is interesting is that the Saudis remain quiet, as the Saudis are not big talkers when it 
comes to policy exposure.  
  
 The second definition is “camp” or “front.” This definition does not exist in the Arabic 
press; rather it refers to “saf,” or a “line,” which of course brings up the perception of 
“wahdat al-saf”—Abd al-Nasser’s unification line. In this case, those trying to find a 
“wahdat al-saf,” a unification line, can forget about it. There is no such unification. 
This isn’t an alliance nor is it a bloc. Once we examine the characteristics of this 
joining or coalition, matters will be clearer. A “front,” the definition we reach by 
compromise, better describes the situation. This is an opposition coalition of like-
minded countries. This is not just a definition. There is also ambiguity in determining 
where this group belongs, because this coalition was created with the consultation 
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between the Saudis, Egyptians, and Jordanians on the eve of the Rome Conference on 
July 26, 2006, in order to find a solution to the war in Lebanon. Apparently, this was 
nothing more than a consultation. They became an axis—at least in the eyes of those 
who wanted this—in response to the Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis, but under different 
circumstances. We also see such a group but with additional players, in the form of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries.  
  
 Of the six GCC countries in the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, one could also 
talk about an “Arab Quartet” consisting of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates. This usually appears in the context of the international quartet’s refusal 
to answer Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt’s request to first make them observers in 
the international quartet and eventually to allow them to play a much greater role in the 
quartet.  
  
 In addition to the issue of who belongs to this coalition, there are many built-in 
problems. There is first and foremost a negative common denominator—their 
cohesiveness is low. Moreover, their decisiveness is well-measured, particular, and 
cautious. They are very hesitant. They lack almost any regional institutional 
framework. There are many differences among the countries and they lack clear 
leadership. Sometimes the Saudis lead, and sometimes the Egyptians lead. Though it is 
often claimed that everything is coordinated, this is not the case; it is simply a role-
playing game.  
  
 There is also a much more serious problem here, the lack of trust among the countries. 
Egypt, for example, has a hidden agenda in being part of this coalition; it wants to 
improve its status and regain influence. Jordan is seeking a substitute for its loss of 
strategic depth following Iraq’s collapse; and Saudi Arabia wants to become a leader of 
the region once again. The Saudis were in this position for a while during the 2002 
Arab summit in Beirut, when the summit adopted a Saudi initiative that then became an 
Arab initiative. That initiative was the Arab effort to seize the initiative from Iran on 
the Palestinian issue.  
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 However, these countries also have completely conflicting interests, or at least 
competing interests. The differences are not in the nuances, but rather in their 
perceptions. A recent example was displayed in their behavior in regard to Lebanon. 
For Egypt, for example, Lebanon was never a priority. The most important thing for 
Egypt was regional stability, not having Syria dragged into the conflict, and 
maintaining Egyptian mediation on the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia on the other 
hand, sees Lebanon as a very high priority; it has ties with the Hariri family, financial 
investments in the country, and the religious conflict certainly bothers the Saudis more 
than it does Egypt.  
  
 In light of the aforementioned facts, we must seriously question whether this coalition, 
this joining, this front for a specific and very objective goal is ad hoc or whether it will 
prove durable, will overcome its shortcomings, and will survive in the long-term. The 
more important question is whether this coalition will succeed in demonstrating new 
energies, which are lacking in the conduct of each of the countries that make up this 
coalition. Yet another problem that should be taken into account is if this decisiveness 
is adopted and they display the required energy and cohesiveness, whether or not the 
leaders of these three countries—Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—or the countries 
that join them under the various guidelines have the courage to stand up against their 
publics. One of the main problems they are up against is the Arab public, which the 
leaders view as an obstacle. In a survey conducted in mid-August 2006 by the Ibn 
Khaldoun Center headed by Dr. Sa’ad Eddin Ibrahim. Approximately 2,000 people 
were asked to rate the popularity of 80 Arab figures (This does not reflect the beliefs of 
everybody in Egypt, but this certainly gives some indication.). Sheikh Nasrallah (leader 
of Hezbollah) was voted the most popular, receiving 82 percent; Ahmadinejad received 
73 percent; Khalid Mashal received 60 percent; bin Ladin 52 percent; and Muhammad 
Mahdi Akef, head of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, received only 45 percent.  
  
 Finally, it is impossible not to note the central US role in this coalition of Arab 
countries. According to the leaders, Iran doesn’t just pose a threat to their stability and 
the stability of the region, but also sabotages the image of moderate Islam that those 
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countries have attempted to project to the outside since September 11. The moderate 
leaders were busy trying to prevent the “al-Qa’edaization” of Islam, now they can point 
to concerns about “Hezbollahization.” The six plus two coalition: the GCC countries, 
plus Egypt and Jordan is a coalition that would not have been created without 
American backing. The Americans pushed for some sort of bloc that could be relied 
upon. 
 
 The so-called ‘moderate’ Arab countries would be very interested in being not only the 
United States’ stick toward Iran and toward Iran’s allies in the region, but also to 
present a positive agenda, to be a carrot for a certain purpose, if you will; and they do 
not hide this. This was already expressed in the second meeting of the six plus two 
countries with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Cairo in October 2006. Their 
goal is to encourage as much contact as possible between Israel and the Palestinians 
and to urge the peace process on the Palestinian side and press them to reach 
solutions—the sooner the better, and not necessarily according to the Road Map.  
 
   They feel this urging will not only serve to prove their abilities to produce something 
positive, but will also signal to Syria that “you played the wrong game, and now you 
are out of the game.” Meaning, if Syria wants to be integrated in the peace process, it 
would have to think twice about its connections with Iran. How successful will this 
process be? Egypt, at least, thinks that it can influence and draw in Syria more than 
Iran, but under no circumstances does Egypt think Syria can be cut off from Iran, only 
that Syria’s world perspective might become more balanced. The Shi’a-Iran-Syria-
Hezbollah axis has two connotations. The first is an ideological one, as an active 
radical force trying to change the Middle East and hoping for change beyond the region 
as well. This axis succeeds at exporting these ideas even without any physical 
connection to other places. The reason for this is because the ideas of this axis are 
expressed throughout the Arab world and the greater Muslim world.  
    
   Second, this axis is also an actual physical one, which creates an arc starting in Tehran, 
passing through Baghdad (and when the United States leaves Baghdad, this axis will 
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hold onto Baghdad with great power), and continuing through from Syria to Lebanon. 
The actual physical effort of the ties between the Iranians and the Syrians are directed 
towards these areas, but it is important to remember that this axis does not intend to 
stop at the border of the Shi’a ethnicity. At least from what can be seen in Palestinian 
society, it is attempting to export itself in the most active way into Sunni societies as 
well. Despite the differences from the past in today’s politics, an old rule is at play: 
“My brother and I against his cousin, and my cousin against my neighbor.” When there 
is a struggle over hegemony in Iraq, the Shi’a do not hesitate to engage in conflict with 
Sunnis, nor do Sunnis hesitate to target Shi’as. Yet when confronted with a mutual 
enemy, whether it is the United States or Israel, the Shi’as of Lebanon or Iran could be 
seen to provide assistance to the Sunnis of Gaza or Jenin. This is because of the 
presence of a common enemy — Israel.  
    
   The significance of this axis, however, is not only against the state of Israel — 
according to the perception of the Sunni countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Jordan, and the Gulf countries. These countries wish to preserve stability in the Middle 
East. To them this Shi’a axis does not intend to stop at hurting Israel or even at ending 
American influence in the Middle East. Its true purpose is not only to exist within Shi’a 
society but also to gain power in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and finally—as the Egyptians 
and Jordanians fear — in Cairo and in Amman. King Abdullah of Amman expressed 
this more clearly; it has also become apparent in the Egyptian press, where there has 
been a sudden rather incredible interest in the number of Shi’as inside Egypt. This 
shows that this is a matter even Egypt is bothered by.82 The numbers are anywhere 
between 0.5 percent and one percent. The Egyptian interest in the enemy at home—in 
other words, the Shi’as in Egypt—comes from the understanding of the countries of the 
region that this alliance poses a threat to them.   
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   Moreover, the situation would change if the country leading this axis obtains a nuclear 
weapon. The Iranian effort to obtain a nuclear weapon is double in purpose. First, as a 
regional power, the Iranians have always wanted a nuclear bomb. This was also the 
case for the Shah’s regime. Second, today, the nuclear umbrella is intended to serve as 
the Shi’a axis’s ultimate shield against anybody who opposes it or attempts to curtail 
its progress.83 The Iranians perceive that without nuclear arms they would encounter far 
more international opposition, and it would be very difficult for them to stand against 
such pressure.  
   
   The countries of the region note that if there is an Iranian nuclear umbrella, they are 
the ones who will be subject to pressure and blackmail difficult for them to resist. The 
clear result of this situation is that the United States and Israel would fear responding 
in order to avoid a nuclear threat against their interests or existence. Hezbollah, 
Hamas, and other clients of Iran—which could also include the Fatah, as the past has 
shown—will have much more courage to act knowing that Israel is limited in its 
ability to respond. This is due to the fact that there would be an immediate warning 
from Iran, and Tel Aviv would need to take into account Iranian missiles when taking 
actions that the Iranians may view as harmful to their interests. The stability of a 
projected deterrence model in the region is predicated upon discernable progress 
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made in the areas of doctrinal clarity and dispute resolution. While in the case of 
South Asia some work has been done in these areas as a direct result of lessons learnt 
from the experience of overt nuclearization, in Middle East, the situation remains 
unpredictable.   
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Part II 
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
 
HEGEMONIC-OBJECTIVE CONFLICT: 
 
The first factor having a direct influence on the foreign policy in the context of 
international social environment is the response toward the policies of other states, 
especially the hostile neighboring states, In South Asia, India has remained Pakistan’s 
primary threat given its large conventional force and its array of weapon-systems 
and capabilities. Pakistan in this regard has been concerned perhaps more than 
many countries, with the problems of safeguarding its borders and protecting its 
independence and integrity. The search for security has been the principal objective 
of Pakistan’s foreign policy and s t i l l  remains its main preoccupation.84 Pakistani 
decision-makers have conducted foreign relations mainly to neutralize the threat to 
the security of the country. The security and the territorial integrity of Pakistan have 
been perceived to be vulnerable to the aggressive designs of the neighboring countries, 
especially India. The perception of this security threat from India goes back to the 
Hindu-Muslim politics of 1930’s and 1940’s.85 The Indian threat has mainly 
preoccupied those responsible for foreign policy formulation in Pakistan since 1947. 
This preoccupation seems natural if we take into account the military capabilities of 
the two countries and the border clashes between them in Kashmir and other areas. 
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Indeed Kashmir alone led to two wars between these two countries, one in 1948-49, 
the other in 1965, and a clash in 1999. 
 
In the overall regional framework, where China and Russia are also included as the 
neighboring countries, the Indian threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity has remained 
grave. Neither of the two larger neighbors to the North has a direct border dispute 
with Pakistan. On the other hand, India which has a long border with Pakistan has 
done nothing to assure Pakistan of its peaceful intentions.  Pakistan’s early policy to 
cultivate friendship with the US and seek military and economic assistance from it 
by entering into various alliances was an attempt to minimize the Indian threat. 
However, Pakistani efforts to increase its security proved unsuccessful, since in the 
occasion of wars with India and on the issue of Kashmir, its Western allies, especially 
the US, let it down. So the init ial  Indian threat to Pakistan’s security became 
increasingly entrenched in its foreign policy. This explains why the students and 
the scholars generally assume that the foreign policy of Pakistan has been shaped as 
a direct response to what India did in pursuit of its own foreign or domestic policies. 
 
The second factor in the context of international social environment is the 
geographical location of a state having a political significance for policy 
formulation. These are the geo-political and geo-strategic factors. The foreign 
context suggests that since the physical location of a state with respect to other states 
does not change to bring about a change in the geopolitical situation, certain other 
developments, like the Soviet action in Afghanistan ( in Pakistan’s case), can 
change the significance of the geo-strategic factors. The situational geo-strategic 
variables are then helpful either to describe the interaction between two or more States 
or to describe the more established pattern of relations among States. 
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With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the “request” of the friendly regime of 
Babrak Karma1 in Kabul, the interests of both the super powers were once again 
revived on the opposite sides.87 The US military and economic help to Pakistan started 
flowing in and it assumed the role of the front-line state.88 Both Pakistan and the US 
discovered their mutual desire for political intimacy despite the divergence of 
interests on some key issues. From September 1980 through January 1981 when 
the Reagan Administration took office, the US military and economic aid to Pakistan 
was resumed.89 
 
The Pakistan-US-India relations, during the cold war era of super powers’ rivalry, can 
be viewed from the perspective of geo-strategic location of Pakistan in South Asia. 
The US motive to bring Pakistan into the Western bloc, to a large extent, was to 
strengthen the opposition to the former USSR and gain physical ground to deter it. 
The US, in this context, made overtures to India, so as to neutralize its role in super 
power confrontation in the region. Pakistan, on the other hand, joined the US mainly 
because of its proximity to India and the perceived security threat from it. Another 
factor which gave impetus to Pak-US friendship was the geographical proximity of the 
former to the Persian Gulf. The US’ idea was that in the wake of Pakistan’s 
ideological solidarity with the Islamic countries, the latter could act a bridge between 
the West on the one hand and the Middle East along with its oil fields on the other.90 
 
Therefore it can be argued that the geo-strategic factor cannot be easily dismissed from 
the calculus of foreign policy, though it does not have a rigid or well-defined role in 
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the overall foreign policy formulation. The US policy toward Pakistan in the 1950s 
and 1960s was different from its policy in the 1970s. When the detente between the 
two superpowers started operating in the 1970s, the US interests in the region took a 
new turn.  Especially after the emergence of Bangladesh, the US administration 
perceived India as a pre-eminent power in South Asia, and later discovering that 
Pakistan was clandestinely involved in acquiring nuclear weapons capability, the 
bilateral relations of the two countries registered an all time low. 
 
More than two decades later, the US involvement in Afghanistan due to the 
terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan once again brought Pakistan into the 
limelight, making it the frontline slate against the threat of global terrorism. 
 
Thus, geo-politics is one of the many significant international factors which 
influence the foreign policies of the countries involved, whether directly or indirectly. 
As pointed out earlier in the context of Pak-US-India and Pak-US-USSR 
relations respectively, it can be assumed that the “specificity” of a “localized 
situation” in the overall context of geo-politics is very significant for analytical 
purposes. In addition to the permanent features of geo-politics, this  “specificity” has 
a direct bearing upon the course of foreign policy formulation. Thus Pakistan’s 
foreign and defense policy in the aftermath of South Asia’s overt nuclearization is 
symptomatic of contemporary security threats it faces at the regional and international 
levels. 
 
India would have to significantly scale-down its military posturing on Pakistan’s 
borders, for Pakistan to feel safe and make reciprocal reductions. With the mechanism 
of nuclear deterrence in place, the overall environment should be less hostile than 
earlier. However the responsibilities for peace in the region will largely lie with the 
largest country in it, as a l l  of India’s neighbors with the exception of China 
possibly feel threatened by it. As one strategist noted: “South Asia has a glorious 
future, one that assures peace, stability and prosperity for all seven of its members.” It 
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is perfectly reasonable to imagine a state of affairs as follows, say in the second 
decade of the 21st century: 
 
• India and Pakistan are at peace - a real, durable peace between two good, 
friendly neighbors. 
• The armed forces of the two states have been much reduced in size and face 
outward. They are no longer needed against each other. 
 
• India and Pakistan, the two major powers of South Asia, backed by the 
remaining five nations, stand together, and the world knows that when it 
touches one it touches the other. 
 
• There is complete nuclear co-operation between India and Pakistan, with 
nuclear scientists of the two countries working together as partners in joint 
venture. 
 
• As a result of the reduction in defense expenditure and the channeling of 
savings into development, there is a notable improvement in the standard of 
living and the quality of life in South Asia. 
 
   With India’s domineering policies, the subcontinent, has up till now, been in a 
Hegemonic-Objective conflict situation. However, progress can be made in the other 
direction starting with the removal of tensions within the region. It is noteworthy that 
of the seven sisters of South Asia, the smaller six have no problem amongst 
themselves, but each have problem with India - problems, disputes, 
misunderstandings, disagreements, call them what you will. (Even tiny Maldives 
clashed with India in 1982 over the Island of Minicoy). All the problems and 
tensions felt by the six are related to India which, at least for the moment, stands 
as an obstacle to better inter-regional relations. The Gujral doctrine of former 
Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral went to some extent in assuaging this sense of 
Indian domination on the subcontinent, but what it ended up achieving did not even 
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touch the t ip  of the hegemonic iceberg. As the largest (and most problem-
causing) state of South Asia, India must take the initiative to ease tension in the region, 
to reassure its smaller neighbors, and to move with them towards shared prosperity.  
 
   The establishment of a regional security arrangement whereby India and Pakistan 
share joint responsibilities for the security of the region would become a 
distinct possibility given the solution of Kashmir. This would involve the 
negotiation of a series of agreements, limiting forces in a spirit of trust and detente 
under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. 
 
  The precursor to a security agreement should be a trade and commerce 
arrangement whereby the two countries benefit from each other. Regional groupings 
tend to provide opportunities and offer new forms of integration that are unlikely 
to emerge from single country efforts. Pakistan with its labor, textile raw 
agricultural products, power and processed foods, and India with its array of heavy 
industry could mutually benefit by trade. The large volume of illegal trade at present 
through smuggling, ‘khepias’ misusing the personal baggage schemes, and circular 
trade through the Middle East is evidence of the viability of the scheme. 
 
   Pakistan could work at improving its industrial base by filling in niche markets in 
the engineering industry and thereby achieve the economies of scale that make the 
expansion of the industry worthwhile. This could be undertaken best under the 
aegis of the SAARC which could, with both India and Pakistan as willing and 
cooperative partners, develop into a meaningful trade agreement in South Asia. 
India would need to make concessions on its control on imports of consumer goods 
and Pakistan would need to extend Most Favored Nation status to India. 
 
   Pakistan should benefit not only from increased internal efforts but re-established 
expatriate confidence. Well-to-do Pakistanis working abroad would appreciate the 
climate of investment and help by large-scale direct investments. This would assist 
in the need for Pakistan to increase exports and commit to a free trade economy. 
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   A further development could be the integration of the ECO and SAARC through 
the land trade route available through Pakistan to India and the other SAARC 
countries. A free trade environment from the CIS to Sri Lanka would enable the 
region to wield considerable economic power in Asia. 
 
   The realization of a solution to Kashmir is the key. Whether Pakistan and India 
are prepared to pay the political price will determine the outcome. The dilution 
of a secular concept for one and possibly the reality of having to live with an 
independent Kashmir for the other is, in the view of some, an unattainable 
compromise. Does it then benefit both to continue to live with the issue as it is? 
Logically the answer would be in favor of status quo, but history has shown how 
difficult it is to isolate a festering issue; the internal ramifications of a continuing 
struggle for Kashmir are not favorable for both countries. A detonation is likely in 
either’s stance. The treatment of a political problem as a military operation has 
resulted in far too much bloodshed to be easily forgotten and has become a rallying 
point for worldwide Jihad-seekers. The options for Pakistan, therefore, are limited 
to what it can internally sustain in terms of social and political pressure from the 
religious political parties. India needs to address the issue from a realistic political 
standpoint where it draws strength from its diverse and secular political culture. 
The two countries need to emphasize their cultural and historical affinities to bring 
out a new security atmosphere in which each draws strength from the other and 
military means are one of many tools to exercise national security, the status of 
Kashmir might then be determined, in a way that is beneficial to the security of the 
region. 
 
   KASHMIR DISPUTE: 
 
   Age-old communal hatred erupted into violence that increased with the onset of 
the Subcontinent’s partition in 1947 and the subsequent killing of nearly five 
hundred thousand people. It has been accurately stated that both countries were 
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born at war. An early war in Kashmir in 1948, followed by two more Pakistan-
India wars in 1965 and 1971, has shaped the attitudes of both countries towards 
each other. The struggle in Kashmir has come to symbolize the validation of the 
two-nation theory (that Muslims and Hindus constituted two different nations on the 
Subcontinent formed the basis for Pakistan’s foundation) on one side, and secularism 
(India’s acclaimed national posture) on the other, and has driven both countries to 
aggressive hostility and mistrust. The impact of increased defense spending has been 
more apparent on Pakistan’s economy where it makes for a large four percent of the 
GDP. The 1998 Pakistani nuclear weapon testing may be a precursor of worse 
things to come to many, but could in fact bring stability to the region and reduce 
the need for conventional forces in Pakistan to a   considerable degree, provided 
the Kashmir issue was resolved to a point where deployed forces could be 
withdrawn.  
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   Given this, there is potential for diplomatic resolution to the conflict. Geography 
dictates that a nuclear conflict could be devastating to both aggressor and attacked, 
which in turn could escalate the tone of any future conflict to a point where it 
becomes total. The costs of nuclear war are so high that both countries will be driven 
to recognize the issue diplomatically and come to a lasting solution. 
    
   Since Pakistan’s creation Kashmir has been the centerpiece of its national interests 
and security policy. Some would argue that the obsession with Kashmir has been a 
dead weight that has been responsible for the Pakistan’s retarded development. 
To so categorize it would be an exaggeration, though. 
 
   Kashmir has been an important factor in determining Pakistan’s security policy. 
Financially, the conflict over Kashmir has given the armed forces an 
overwhelming portion of the national funds. However, the issue must be seen 
within the overall dissatisfaction that resulted from the boundaries established by 
the partition in 1947 and the peculiar relationship with India. Kashmir has also been a 
catalyst that most political movements have used as an election tool as a result 
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political success is often seen as synonymous with a favorable solution In Kashmir. 
This has given the issue a greater significance than other national interests. 
   Pakistan was to be formed out of the Muslim contiguous areas of British India, as it 
did in most cases, with the exception of Kashmir. Kashmir’s princely ruler, in 
violation of the understanding that all rulers would accede to the majority of the 
populace in their states, decided to declare accession to India. A tribal war resulted 
in a significant portion of the state being declared Azad or ‘free’. Subsequent to the 
1948 Indo-Pakistan war a UN resolution was passed whereby the people of Kashmir 
would decide through a plebiscite which of the two countries they wished to join. 
This resolution, s t i l l  pending in i ts execution, is the basis for the Kashmir 
Movement and the strained relations between Pakistan and India. India views the 
Kashmir issue as an internal problem while for Pakistan it is a vitally important 
unfinished part of the partition and creation of Pakistan. 
 
   The rise of rightist political elements in both Pakistan and India, the deep 
commitment to Kashmir by some of the groups involved in the Afghan War which 
draw their followers from the Pakistani youth and the militarization of the situation 
by India have further exacerbated tensions between the two countries. If the 
Kashmir dispute is amicably resolved, regional atmosphere would be characterized 
by a reduced level of animosity and power brokering. There would be a reduced 
threat for Pakistan and therefore less need for large conventional forces, 
freeing resources for use in development. Additionally there would probably be 
less interference in internal affairs from outside and the foreign policy focus could 
shift from coalition building and threat response to promoting regional harmony and 
trade. Pakistan’s regional relationships have changed significantly since the end of 
the Cold War from being a frontline state battling the communist threat, to one of 
relative obscurity where instability and poor governance have run hand in hand to 
further deter external inputs and interest. This is likely to change again where 
Pakistan will now be able to divert attention to conflict resolution in Afghanistan 
and promote regional rather than individual interests. Neighbors and other regional 
countries now forced to choose sides in their relationships with both Pakistan and 
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India will be able to establish mutually beneficial relations with both, promoting trade 
across land by road and rail. 
    
   The military confrontation between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed 
neighbors, has the world in a state of jitters. With each country mobilizing its forces 
— together totaling about a million troops along their 1800 mile border - during 
2002, there was a high probability that the face-off could lead to the outbreak of 
yet another war between these two countries. Although such a war — if it 
eventuated — was l ike ly  to involve a conventional exchange of weapons as 
happened in the 1947, 1905, and 1972 wars, there was reason to fear that it could 
escalate into a nuclear war. If such a catastrophe were to occur, American 
intelligence estimates that about 12 million people would be killed and seven 
million would be injured. 
 
   What was the response of the international community to this crisis? President 
Bush urged Pakistan and India to exercise restraint and stop cross-border 
attacks. President Jacques Chirac, President Vladimir Putin and other European 
officials echoed similar sentiments. 
 
  In the meantime, India accused Pakistan of waging a 20-year campaign of 
terrorism to dislodge India from the predominantly Muslim state of Kashmir, and 
rejected Pakistan’s repeated requests for dialogue or negotiation. 
 
   The UN had put forth a potentially reasonable solution to the conflict by 
conducting a plebiscite on the status of Kashmir -- whether it should remain part of 
India, or become part of Pakistan. These two options could be supplemented by ( a )  
outright independence for Kashmir; or (b) shared sovereignty between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir. Thus far India has dismissed the idea of holding such a 
plebiscite. 
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   Clearly missing from a l l  responses so far to the looming nuclear crisis is an 
argument for using international law to resolve the India-Pakistan conflict over 
Kashmir. This striking omission underscores, on the one hand, the widespread 
commitment to power politics and the use of war as a means of resolving 
international disputes and. on the other hand, a fundamental distrust of 
international law to resolve international conflicts. 
 
   As it happens, both India and Pakistan are parties to the 1899 Hague Convention 
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The United States is also a 
party to this 1899 Convention. The article eight is the brainchild of the United 
States. It establishes a procedure for special mediation. The states in conflict would 
each choose a power to which they would respectively entrust the mission of 
entering into direct communication with the power chosen by the other side for the 
purpose of preventing the rupture of pacific relations. For the period of this mandate, 
which could not exceed thirty days, unless otherwise agreed, the states in conflict 
would cease all direct communication on the subject of the dispute, leaving it 
exclusively to the mediating powers. In case of a definite rupture of pacific relations, 
the mediating powers were charged with the joint task of taking advantage of any 
opportunity for peace. 
 
   The threat of nuclear war between India and Pakistan directly affects the vital 
national security interests of the United States: The nuclear fallout would poison 
America and its people as well as the peoples of other countries. So the US 
government, joined by others, must formally and publicly invoke Hague Article 
8 against both India and Pakistan in case of a 2002-like stand-off situation, and 
demand the required 30-day cooling-oil period so that this special mediation 
procedure could take place. 
 
   The US government joined by others must also invoke the requirement of Article 
33(1) of the United Nations Charter providing that the two parties to the dispute 
over Kashmir “shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
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conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” UN Charter Article 
33 expressly by name requires the pursuit of the “mediation” procedure set forth 
in Hague Article 8, including the mandatory 30-day cooling off period. Time is of 
the essence when it comes to invoking Hague Article 8 and averting a nuclear war. 
 
   During his visit to India, Prime Minister Tony Blair is reported to have said that 
Britain supported India’s bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security 
Council. A similar statement, supporting India’s candidature, was issued by the 
visiting Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres. 
 
   Earlier, on April 9, 2000, in an interview with India’s state-run TV, the then-US 
ambassador to India, Richard Celeste, said that Washington supported New 
Delhi’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. “The US has to be prepared and 
will be prepared to give India serious consideration for the permanent membership of 
the Security Council,” Celeste was quoted as saying. Celeste’s remarks came in the 
wake of President Clinton’s five-day, high-profile visit to India. However, at the 
time US officials denied that Celeste’s statement reflected any institutional 
thinking in Washington. 
    
   Lots of things have changed since Celeste’s statement, post-Sept. 11 and post-
Dec. 13, 2001 [the date of a terrorist suicide attack on India’s Parliament allegedly 
carried out by Pakistani Islamist extremists that resulted in 13 deaths, including 
the five attackers]. Blair’s statement has to be seen in the backdrop of the standoff 
between India and Pakistan and juxtaposed with his remarks about “terrorist” 
groups (read, militant groups operating in Kashmir) that Islamabad is expected to 
crack down on. 
 
   This is essential for two reasons: One, any support for India’s candidature at the 
Security Council is significant only politically, since procedurally it is near 
impossible for any country, even the United States and the United Kingdom, to 
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get India a seat at the high table—as long as the United Nations is constituted as it 
is. Two, Blair’s statements in India and elsewhere must be read in the context of 
the role he has developed since 9/11, canvassing for Washington. In the 2001-2 
crisis, a similar statement was issued by the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, 
in an interview to the BBC, saying that Pakistan “needed to do more,” the 
implication being that it had not done enough vis-a-vis terrorism to defuse the crisis 
with India. 
 
   Under the circumstances, Pakistan had two choices: One was to draw the l ine and 
accept the challenge, having done everything it could to de-escalate diplomatically 
while matching India’s military buildup; two, to wriggle out of the crisist situation 
and live to fight another day. Both choices were tough. In executing its strategy to 
pressure Pakistan, India was relying not just on its own conventional strength, but 
also on the international environment in which the two adversaries were 
operating. While counterfactual assessments are difficult to make, it will be fair 
to assume, all other things being equal, that India’s ability or willingness to execute 
this strategy in another scenario would have been severely curtailed because of the 
nuclear dimension. However, as things stood, it should be quite clear that while 
ideally the United States and Britain would have wanted the crisis resolved without 
the two countries coming to blows, in the event that a bout became inevitable, they 
would not have been averse to looking the other way to give New Delhi some 
room “to teach Pakistan a lesson.” 
    
   The nuclear factor would of course have been there, but in a real showdown 
escalating to the nuclear level would have been required Pakistan to project the 
threat credibly enough. Not only would that have put immense pressure on 
Islamabad, but the need to escalate to that level also implied that Pakistan would 
have lost enough territory for it to begin to think in terms of the final option. The 
pressure of that decision itself could become unbearable, since by moving in and 
capturing territory, India would have called the bluff. 
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   There is also the possibility that were Pakistan to indeed escalate to that level, the 
United States singly, or in tandem with Israel and India, might have seriously 
considered exfiltrating the Pakistani arsenal. This is a possibility that Seymour 
Hersh had already written about in detail in The New Yorker, though he dealt with it 
in a different context. It was very risky, but not improbable. 
    
   Any thinking in Pakistan that Washington might be on Islamabad’s side is not 
supported by recent events. The United States would do what is necessary to 
achieve its own larger objectives. It has been trying to cleanse Afghanistan of the 
Islamist/fundamentalist elements. It now wants Pakistan to purge itself of these 
groups. General Musharraf’s dilemma was that these elements had been part of 
Islamabad’s strategy to put the squeeze on India. Getting rid of them ran the 
obvious risk of losing the most amenable proxies to keep the heat on India. But 
not doing so ran the greater risk of facing nearly the same, perhaps worse, situation 
that forced President Musharraf in September 2001 to affect a volte-face on 
Afghanistan. 
 
   This essentially means only one thing: If Pakistan was to rethink its role of a force 
multiplier in Kashmir, India will immediately take advantage of the situation. It 
would move in to crack down on the extremist elements, offer the olive branch to the 
moderates, and get on with the task of governing. Even if it could not 
immediately achieve a breakthrough, it would still be able to contain the situation 
and allow it to fester in order for insurgency fatigue to set in before alienating the 
extremists and reaching out to the moderates. In this scenario, the role of the United 
States is clear. I t s  objective is to retain the integrity of Pakistan, but force it to shape 
up as a benign and militarily weak state that does not punch around. 
 
   At this stage, a rethink of the traditional strategy feels painful. But the present 
situation, as well as other factors, favors that course. For a start, Pakistan needs to 
do everything, after a careful assessment of its capabilities in relation to India, to 
get out of this situation and secure its military strength. By all indications, it is 
 108
trying its best to do that. Secondly, Islamabad needs to objectively assess the ability 
and the stamina of indigenous Kashmiri groups to sustain their freedom struggle. In 
doing so it must beware that the contours of a likely solution by third parties are 
fairly clear. None of them envisages either a plebiscite or any major dislocation. 
Therefore, a strategy that relied on pulling third parties into the conflict for the 
purpose of mediation may be outmoded. Thirdly, long spells of overt activity may 
not necessarily mean the end of the freedom struggle. Through the 1970s and ‘80s, 
Kashmir remained quiet until it emerged on Islamabad’s radar screen in a big way. 
That can and may still happen. 
 
   Recent events have made one thing very clear: Power and the capability and will to 
project it make and break international norms and set standards of behavior. 
Pakistan needs to use a period of relative quiet to set its house in order and 
enhance its economic strength. A case can be made that the present chaos could in 
fact be used by Islamabad to its advantage if it can translate into a period that can 
allow it to strengthen itself. 
 
   Pakistan finds itself in the current situation because of the Islamist groups who 
broke a l l  rules of objective analysis and tried, Icarus-like, to overreach. Pakistan 
must eschew a course of action in the future that can lead to such chaos or where 
elements in a strategy can grow bigger than the strategy itself. This is a difficult 
situation but it also affords some important lessons. 
 
   SMALLER DISPUTES BETWEEN 
INDIA AND PAKISTAN: 
 
   Beyond Kashmir, there remain areas of concern where important national interests 
need to be safeguarded by both countries. Friction amongst neighbors is constant, 
however the resolution of one acrimonious issue will hopefully pave the way 
for a political and diplomatic process based on tolerance and bilateral respect for the 
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process of peace rather than one of war. Some of the regional issues to be kept in 
mind are: Contentious issues such as the distribution and control of water in the 
Jhelum River; demarcation of a mutually agreeable border in the far south in the 
region of Sir Creek; and the establishment of secure deterrence, are likely to 
fester. 
The promotion of a regional economy and the stability caused by that is l ike ly  to 
assist in conflict resolution. Enhancement in trade and exports is likely to benefit 
foreign relations in general but especially so with the CIS, Iran and Afghanistan in 
the context of oil export from the Caspian Basin. Pakistan’s southern shores are 
ideal terminal locations for secure oil export, bypassing the Arabian Gulf and the 
insecurity of the Straits of Hormuz. 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF SUBCONTINENTAL 
DETENTE: 
 
The January 6, 2004 Joint Statement of Pakistan and India, on the sidelines of the 
SAARC summit, was potentially more significant for the future of the Subcontinent 
than the three earlier accords arrived at - the Tashkent Declaration (1965), the 
Simla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999). It was not just that 
Pakistan had officially closed the chapter on the 15-year-old freedom struggle or 
‘jihad’ in Kashmir. The Joint Statement’s strategic significance lies in three areas. 
Firstly, the potential to transform the adversarial relationship between the two 
nuclear neighbors to one of competitiveness, and perhaps even co-operation. Free 
trade, soft borders and enhanced people-to-people contacts, facilitated by 
satel l i te  television, are certainly no recipe for continued confrontation. Actually, 
the 2002 10-month military standoff between Pakistan and India, with a million 
armed men facing each other in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, may have turned 
out to be a blessing in disguise, since it proved that war among nuclear adversaries 
was no longer an option. In many respects, the military stand-off- when the two 
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countries came closest to war since 1971 - was something similar to the 1962 US-
Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 
   In the 2002 South Asian “Cuban Missile Crisis”, India failed to militarily 
browbeat Pakistan, while the fact that Pakistan did not blink under a numerically 
stronger military might simply be because the nuclear factor was the deterrence 
against war, helping preserve a shaky peace and build a new balance of power. 
Secondly, for the first time in 44 years, after President Ayub Khan’s famous 
proposal of “joint defense” to India in 1960 (which India spurned somewhat 
dismissively), Pakistan sees home-grown terrorism as a bigger security threat than 
India. In 1960, Ayub Khan viewed the Communist “threat from the north” as a 
bigger security threat than India, which pushed him to offer “joint defense”. Thirdly, 
for the first time in 46 years, after Pakistan’s maiden military coup in 1958, India 
saw a political stake in the stability and survival of a military ruler. Both leaders - 
President Musharraf and former Prime Minister Vajpayee - tried to cash in on the 
new security and geo-political environment post-9/11, garnering support among 
audiences at home and abroad. 
 
   Vajpayee’s use of “peace with Pakistan” to win the forthcoming polls, hoping for a 
rich harvest of the Muslim vote, while presenting himself as a statesman to the 
West, did not win him the elections, but the incoming Congress government could 
not reverse the momentum generated by Vajpayee’s initiative. Musharraf tapped the 
“fighting fatigue” evident among the Pakistanis to sell “peace with India” at home, 
after binding down potential political critics like a section of the Muttahida Majlis 
Amal (religio-political party known to keep a rigid stance on the Kashmir issue), 
into the parliamentary rubric, while flaunting his “moderate Muslim” credentials to 
the West. 
  
   The Joint Statement vindicated both the Simla Agreement and the Lahore 
Declaration: Simla slotted Kashmir in a bilateral framework vis-a-vis India, while 
Lahore provided the roadmap for a peaceful settlement by delineating the eight areas 
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required for Pakistan-India normalization. Both referred to the Kashmir issue, but 
excluded any reference to UN resolutions or the “aspirations of the Kashmiris”. 
The Joint Statement built on both, with the added provision of a public Pakistani 
commitment renouncing use of “any territory under its control” to allow “terrorism 
against India”. 
 
   It must be understood that any state - including Pakistan - lacks the stamina and 
strength to sustain policies that are at variance with regional realities. Whether it was 
the 1965 Gibraltar Force incursion into Kashmir, the 1971 military action in East 
Pakistan, the Kargil conflict in 1999, the Taliban about-turn in 2001 and now a 
farewell to arms in Kashmir, external pressures have always taken precedence over 
the policy priorities of Pakistan in each instance, resulting, predictably, in a U-turn. 
Further, the Indo-Pakistan politics have exposed a fundamental flaw in the Pakistani 
system, namely, the absence of an institutionalized decision-making mechanism. 
Consequently, the Pakistani people are subjected to “breakfast surprises” on 
substantive issues. One fine morning, the people of Pakistan woke up to discover 
that they had lost East Pakistan. Another day they were told that the 22-year-old 
Afghan policy was flawed. Or now that the focus on militancy may have been 
misplaced, or, more to the point, its domestic ramifications were never realized. 
   In their histories, states often have to go through upheavals to change course, 
usually wars, as Germany and Japan did. Or breakups, as Russia did. Or 12 years 
of tumult during the Cultural Revolution, as China went through before changing 
course towards a “red capitalism” under Deng Xiaoping. Or a high-cost 
protracted divisive conflict which the US experienced in Vietnam, before reversing 
a 22-year-long flawed China policy. In that respect, Pakistan is perhaps fortunate 
that it can change course rather peacefully and perhaps still hope to muddle 
through, as the country has done in the past two decades. 
    
   The peace dividends for India and Pakistan are already manifesting. The talks 
between the officials and technical experts have resulted in agreement for resuming: 
a i r  links from January 1, 2004, and rail links from January 15 connecting New 
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Delhi and Lahore through the Samjhota Express. The talks for linking Pakistan’s 
Kashmir and Indian Held Kashmir from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad are also 
progressing well. So are the negotiations for linking Rajasthan and Sindh and also 
coastguard talks for joint sea operations between India and Karachi to check 
smuggling and drug-trafficking. India and Pakistan agreed to resume rail services 
from January 15, 2004, in a further move to normalize relations between the 
nuclear-armed neighbors ahead of a South Asian regional summit in Islamabad. 
These confidence-building measures were the initial steps, which would lay the 
foundation for a composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. 
 
   To begin with, India was taken by surprise by Pakistan’s peace initiative. The then 
Pakistani Prime Minister, Mir Zafarulla Khan Jamali announced on November 23, 
2003, that Pakistan had decided to observe ceasefire unilaterally along the LoC. 
With alacrity India responded positively to demonstrate that the peace process 
initiated by Vajpayee was still working. A Foreign office spokesman said: “We said 
our troops will respond to a ceasefire along the Line of Control. In fact, we want 
the ceasefire to extend beyond the LoC into the glaciers of Siachen”. India’s offer 
to extend unilaterally the ceasefire beyond the LoC to Siachen was welcomed by 
Pakistan. Pakistani Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri stated on 
November 24 that Pakistani Prime Minister Jamah’s offer of a ceasefire extended to 
Siachen too. The only rider New Delhi attached was: “If they stop shelling our 
positions on the LoC we will do the same. For the ceasefire to hold, the infiltration 
has to be ended”. India decided that it would implement the ceasefire with effect from 
the holy Eid day. The ceasefire is mutually beneficial as the ceasefire l ine  extends 
beyond the 740 kilometers of the LoC to the Actual Ground Position Line 
(AGPL) of 132 kilometers of Siachen border. Prime Minister Vajpayee was 
particularly gratified as his peace efforts were reciprocated positively by Pakistan. 
With a sense of satisfaction Vajpayee reacted on November 26: “After long 
persuasion Pakistan has agreed to the ceasefire and I am sure it will last long”. But 
the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was more optimistic. He said on 
November 30:  
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   “The steps both the countries have taken recently are just a beginning towards 
establishing a long lasting peace in South Asia”. 
 
   Meanwhile, President Musharraf took a big step when he announced on December 
18, 2003, that Pakistan was prepared to be more “flexible” about the UN Resolutions 
on a mandate for a plebiscite in Kashmir, Pakistan always maintained that Kashmir is 
the “core” issue between India and Pakistan and the cause for four wars (including 
the Kargil War). Hence Pakistan (whether political leaders or military rulers) held 
on to this policy as axiomatic to any peaceful resolution of Indo-Pakistan 
conflicts. Hence, the “flexibility” talk by President Musharraf was very crucial to the 
progress for a dialogue between the two nations. India, notwithstanding its rigid 
stand on the cross-border terrorism and infiltration by militants and the kil l ing of 
civilians in Jammu and Kashmir, had been showing sufficient flexibility by 
periodically surprising Pakistan and the international community about unilateral 
peace initiatives. However, Pervez Musharraf’s interview with Simon Denver of 
Reuters on December 19 was most revealing.91 He told him that he had “left aside” 
the 50-year old demand for a UN mandated plebiscite on Kashmir and was 
willing to meet India “halfway” in a bid for peace on the subcontinent. 
 
   DETENTE, CBMs, 
  AND LINKAGES: 
 
   Detente could have a strong impact on the interlinked sectors of energy, 
transportation, and environment. Energy is a basic requirement for economic 
development, and caring for the environment is crucial to sustainable development. 
The transportation sector is the fastest growing user of energy, and in most urban 
areas the largest contributor to environmental degradation. A decision by India and 
Pakistan to cooperate in importing natural gas from Southwest or Central Asia would 
                                                 
91 See Indian Express, December 20, 2003, p. 9 
 114
supply cleaner energy to both countries, build confidence, and open up a new 
dimension of trade for all the countries of Southern Asia. 
 
   During the Cold War, the key feature of detente was the notion of linkage. As 
Kissinger later wrote in his memoirs,  
 
   “Events in different parts of the world, in our view, were related to each other; even 
more so, Soviet conduct in different parts of the world. We proceeded from the 
premise that to separate issues into distinct compartments would encourage the Soviet 
leaders to believe that they could use cooperation in one area as a safety valve while 
striving for unilateral advantages elsewhere. This was unacceptable.”92  
 
   Or as Harvard professor Stanley Hoffmann has described the approach:  
 
   “The bear would be treated like one of B.F. Skinner’s pigeons: there would be 
incentives for good behavior, rewards if such behavior occurred, and punishments if 
not. It may have been a bit pedantic, or a bit arrogant; it certainly was rather 
theoretical.” 
 
   The Nixon/Kissinger linkage strategy suggests that to combine carrots and sticks 
effectively across issue areas, policy-makers need to both have something to offer 
and be able to deliver on what is being offered. What the Soviets wanted most was 
an American-Soviet alliance against China, something the US was not prepared to 
pursue. One of Kissinger’s chief aides, William Hyland, has written that “at 
one point [Soviet ambassador Anatoly] Dobrynin bluntly asked what was in it for 
Moscow if the Vietnam War ended. And Kissinger rather lamely suggested trade 
and a summit meeting.”93 You cannot dissuade another country with carrots if the 
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93 Hyland, William G., Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan, New York: 
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prospective benefits do not outweigh the benefits the target state already receives 
from the unwanted behavior. 
 
   Even if the carrots are “lame,” you have to be able to deliver them, and Kissinger 
was hamstrung by domestic opponents in Congress. Kissinger’s idea of linkage 
was to dangle economic incentives in front of the Soviets to encourage cooperation 
on Vietnam and arms control, and the major economic carrot was the possibility of 
Most Favored Nation trade status for the Soviet Union. But Senator Henry 
“Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) had a different view of linkage, believing that MFN 
should be tied to Soviet internal behavior. He and Representative Charles Vanik 
(D-OH) succeeded in gaining approval for an amendment to the trade act of 1974 
linking MFN status with Soviet emigration practices. As Kissinger had to confess to 
Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at a meeting in Moscow,  
 
   “On MFN, it was in this room, or a similar room, that we agreed on MFN... in 1972. I 
had never heard of the Jackson amendment at that t ime. . .  The Administration, under 
extremely difficult circumstances, attempted to fulfill a promise to the Soviet Union, 
and I regret the behavior of Senator Jackson.”94 
 
   The carrots have to be acceptable not just to any actors in the target state/group 
but to those responsible for the behavior in question. Economic technocrats in the 
USSR were eager for cooperation with the US but the groups responsible for 
expansionist policies—the military and the ideologues—were the ones who needed 
to be moved. On Iran, Russian defense analyst Independent defense analyst Pavel 
Felgenhauer wrote in 2003,  
 
   “In the last year the building of the Bushehr reactor has been legally taken over by one 
of Russia’s oligarchs, and the [Atomic Energy] Ministry is not in charge anymore. 
The Iranians are paying very generously, in cash, for work done. If the US wants to 
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slop the nuclear cooperation promptly, it should talk compensation with the real 
people in charge, not irrelevant officials, including President Vladimir Putin.”95  
 
   For successful negotiations to take place, policy-makers must be able to deliver the 
carrots, as Kissinger was unable to do with respect to MFN. 
 
   More than two-thirds of the population of South Asia was born after the partition of 
the subcontinent, and has grown up in a time of tense relations between India and 
Pakistan. It is hard for them to imagine what prolonged peace might mean for the 
region. Significant benefits are likely across the board. In the quest for sustainable 
development, three sectors —energy, environment, and transportation—stand to 
benefit in interrelated ways. Energy and transportation are two of the most 
important components of development; they also have immense implications for 
the environment. 
 
   The rate of economic growth in India and Pakistan has been in the range of 4-5 
percent per year but shows signs of accelerating. In India, for example, the growth 
rate averaged 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 1980, 5.4 percent per year from 
1980 to 1990, 5.9 percent per year between 1990 and 2002, and over 8 percent per 
year during recent months.96 Energy use has increased at roughly the same 
rate. The availability of affordable energy is a major constraint on the region’s 
economic growth. Neither India nor Pakistan is self-sufficient in energy. Both 
import oil, primarily for transportation; they use domestically available sources for 
electricity generation, industry, and other purposes. India relies on coal for well over 
half of its commercial energy, whereas Pakistan depends almost equally on natural 
gas and oil. Both countries face considerable difficulty in keeping these energy 
profiles. India’s larger coalfields are up to a thousand miles from the sites of 
greatest demand. The railway system is already stretched to capacity, and w i l l  have 
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difficulty transporting additional coal to meet the growing need for electricity in the 
next decades. Domestic resources are unlikely to meet energy needs in either 
country. The proved reserves of natural gas are barely adequate to meet even 
current demand. There is considerable public opposition to large hydroelectric 
projects, which usually require the displacement of thousands of persons. India 
is one of the world’s top five countries in wind power capacity. However, wind and 
solar energy are likely to provide less than five percent of India and Pakistan’s 
commercial energy needs by 2020. 
 
   Affordable energy supplies will almost certainly have to come from other 
countries. Pakistan already imports more than half of its oil, and India almost two-
thirds. Both countries also import some high quality coal, mainly for steel 
production. Natural gas would be a more environmentally friendly source for 
energy imports. South Asia, now in the early stages of industrialization, is 
undergoing environmental problems similar to those that prevailed in early 
industrial Europe and the United States. In many cases, conditions are even worse, 
partly because the population is much larger than in Europe or North America at a 
similar stage of development, and partly because the growing middle class is already 
using automobiles and electrical appliances. Environmental degradation worldwide 
has led to efforts to make development sustainable by minimizing adverse 
consequences to human health and to the ecosystem. Virgin forests, and the unique 
flora and fauna that existed there, have disappeared in many parts of South Asia 
within the last two generations. Water quality has deteriorated so much that it is the 
largest single source of illness. In many cities and in rural households, breathing 
polluted a i r  is a major source of respiratory diseases.97 Land use has changed 
notably in South Asia during the past 50 years, due mainly to population growth, 
demand for farmland, and continued dependence in rural areas on biomass fuels. 
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Biodiversity has been lost, primarily from once forested areas. Bringing natural gas 
via pipelines to rural India (to some extent this has already happened in Pakistan) 
could reduce the pressure on forests. It would also reduce the loss of land to coal 
mining in India, and the pressure to use India’s own poor-quality coal. 
 
   Pakistan has a serious salinity and waterlogging problem near the Indus River, 
where the land has been cultivated for centuries. This area and adjacent parts of 
India continue to suffer from water shortages. The Indus Waters Treaty (1960) 
represents the only ongoing agreement between India and Pakistan that has not 
been disrupted by wars or periods of high tension. Cooperation that builds on this  
treaty could not only present opportunities for better water management between 
those two countries, but also serve as a model for water-sharing arrangements 
between India, Bangladesh, and Nepal. However, India needs to remain steadfast in 
its commitment to the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty. The recent issues 
surrounding Baglihar Dam have forced Pakistan to seek World Bank (the original 
guarantor of the treaty) intercession. Another environmental concern, a i r  quality, 
is also affected by choices made in the energy and transportation sectors. Of all 
human activity, energy use has the largest impact on air quality. It also has 
adverse impacts on land, in the form of coal mining, and on water, in the form of 
oil discharges into rivers and oceans.98 
 
   The most visible and widespread impact of energy use is air pollution in South 
Asian cities, and in rural households using biomass for fuel.99 Further, the burning 
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discussed, for example, in Smith, K.R. 2000, “National Burden of Disease in India from Indoor Air 
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of fossil fuels is the largest man-made source of carbon dioxide emissions, the 
largest contributor to the greenhouse gases responsible for global climate change. 
The larger cities of the subcontinent are among the most highly polluted in the 
world. The maximum annual averages for participates in such cities are frequently 
more than three to four times the level recommended by the World Health 
Organization. Sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, lead, and other pollutants have 
also reached harmful levels. Large increases in the use of petroleum fuels for 
transportation, as well as the use of coal and oi l  for electricity generation and in 
industry are major causes of a i r  pollution. The demand for energy is expected to 
continue rising for several decades, due to population growth and higher 
consumption per capita. Urban households are using more electrical appliances 
and operating more vehicles. The population of Delhi, for example, grew from 
about 3.7 million in 1971 to about 13 million at present, an increase of about 350 
percent. During the same period, the number of vehicles grew from 0.2 million 
to about three million—an increase of 1,500 percent.100 On another front, global 
climate change has become a focus for international action. More than 120 countries 
have signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). This requires industrialized countries to reduce their emissions of 
greenhouse gases on average to 5-7 percent below 1990 levels. Developing countries 
are not legally required to reduce the ir  emissions, but are urged to try to slow down 
the rate of increase without jeopardizing economic development. India has 
overtaken the United Kingdom and Germany and now ranks fifth in the world in 
emissions of carbon dioxide, the greenhouse gas that is the largest contributor to 
global climate change. Much of this is due to India’s heavy reliance on coal. The 
United States has cited the lack of limits on emissions from large developing 
countries such as China and India as a main reason for not signing the Kyoto 
Protocol, the agreement designed to implement the UNFCCC. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
 
100 Current data are from Delhi Traffic Police, Article 35, Jan. 16, 2003. Earlier data are available in 
Tata Energy Research Institute,  2001,  TEDDY 2001/2002.  
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   At the height of the crisis between India and Pakistan in 2002, the airline of each 
country was prohibited from flying over the other. Instead, the trip went from 
Delhi to Dubai to Islamabad, took about 26 hours, and covered more than 3,000 
miles. Even though flights between India and Pakistan resumed in 2004, there are 
still  no non-stop flights between Delhi and Islamabad. In low-income countries, 
few people can afford to travel by air; buses and trains will remain the major 
modes of travel. After a suspension of about two years, bus link between Delhi and 
Lahore have resumed. 
 
   There is thus a pressing need to improve the transportation infrastructure both 
within and between the countries of South Asia and beyond. An India-Pakistan 
detente is crucial for the latter, and highly desirable for the former. 
 
   Natural gas has emerged as the energy source of choice for the early 21st century 
—available, easy to transport, and less polluting than coal and oil. Although most of 
the larger countries in South Asia have some proved reserves of natural gas, the 
amount available to each country compared to its annual consumption (referred to 
as the reserves to production ratio, or R/P) varies a great deal. India and Pakistan 
have an R/P ratio of about 25 years, whereas Iran and Qatar have ratios that exceed 
100. Recent discoveries in India are in the Krishna-Godavari basin off the east coast. 
They could be easily used up in southeastern  India  and  would  not eliminate  the  
need  to  import  natural  gas  to  the northwest. Similarly, recent discoveries in 
Pakistan would help to prevent current production there from declining, but 
would not fill the anticipated growth in demand. Natural gas can be transported by 
pipeline, or in liquefied form (LNG) in especially built tankers. The latter option is 
usually more expensive, depending on a number of factors such as distance and 
terrain. India has explored both tanker and pipeline options, but concerns about the 
reliability of a pipeline through Pakistan have led it to initiate LNG imports. These 
will mainly feed the existing natural gas system in the northwest, a region that could 
be less expensively served by a pipeline from Iran, the Gulf States, or 
Turkmenistan. India’s natural gas needs are expected to exceed seven billion cubic 
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feet per day by 2010. Importing by pipeline instead of tankers could save India 
more than two billion US dollars per year. The pipeline could also help meet 
Pakistan’s rising import needs, and save that country almost one billion US dollars 
per year. 
 
   The proposal to build a natural gas pipeline to India through Pakistan has been 
under discussion for over a decade. Obstacles have been mainly political rather 
than economic or technical. The cost of building the pipeline has been estimated at 
four-five bi l l ion US dollars, but local private investors could finance most of it. 
Multilateral funding agencies such as the Asian Development Bank have also 
indicated interest. Given the anticipated rates of return, large commercial banks are 
also likely to be interested. India’s main concern is the possibility of Pakistan 
cutting off gas supplies during periods of tension between the two countries. There 
are a number of ways to overcome this concern, including joint investments from 
both countries, guarantees by the country supplying the gas, and “take or pay” 
clauses in the supply contract (i.e., Pakistan would have to pay the supplier for the 
entire amount of gas, even if it did not transmit it on to India) .  The government in 
Pakistan was once reluctant to promote a project that would benefit India; but 
recently the pipeline has had the support of the larger political parties. During the past 
year, natural gas pipelines within Pakistan, and oil pipelines in Iraq, have been 
blown up by extremist groups. This concern would be shared by both countries, 
and could be reduced by Pakistani patrolling of the pipeline route, placing electronic 
sensors along the route, and aerial monitoring. Over time, more than one pipeline 
may be b u i l t ,  since demand in India for clean energy is so high. Simultaneously, a 
Southeast Asia component of a Southern Asia pipeline could be started, linking 
the existing Hazira-Bijaipur-Jagdishpur pipeline near Delhi with Bangladesh and 
subsequently Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia. Each country would have the 
ability to pump gas into the system, or to extract gas from it, as needed. 
 
   In the field of renewable energy, India’s experience building and operating wind 
and solar facilities could benefit Pakistan and other neighboring countries. 
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Similarly, some of the small-scale hydropower systems developed in Nepal, and 
energy-efficient water pumps developed in Pakistan, could be used throughout 
South Asia and beyond. Even though similar technology is available from several 
industrialized countries, it would have to be adapted to the subcontinent’s physical 
and social conditions. There are thus clear benefits to making use of South Asia’s 
own renewable-energy experience. 
 
   Fossil fuels, particularly coal and oil, are the world’s largest source of urban a i r  
pollution. Coal will continue to be the largest source of commercial energy in India 
for at least the next few decades. To eliminate i ts  use is unrealistic; but it may be 
possible to reduce its rate of growth, and this is where natural gas pipelines can 
have a major impact—improving air quality in the cities while helping to 
mitigate global climate change. 
 
   The construction and maintenance of a major natural gas pipeline network would 
require the simultaneous development of a parallel road system. India-Pakistan 
cooperation on a pipeline from Iran, the Gulf States, or Turkmenistan would provide 
an impetus for improving existing roads and railways and building new ones 
throughout the region. Especially important would be upgrading the rail link 
between Delhi and Lahore, and establishing new rail and road systems between 
Pakistan’s borders and Afghanistan and Iran, leading to Central Asia. Trade 
between countries requires mutual interest as well as the presence of a suitable 
transportation infrastructure. Neither has been present between India and Pakistan 
for most of the last 50 years. Trade declined substantially after the partition of the 
subcontinent. During 1948-49, for example, about 56 percent of Pakistan’s total 
exports were to India, and 36 percent of its imports came from India. Around 1970, 
there was essentially no official trade between the two countries. During the fiscal 
year ending in 2002, less than 03 percent of India’s exports went to Pakistan, and 
only about 0.1 percent of its imports came from Pakistan. Without trade, even the 
modest transportation infrastructure that once existed has deteriorated. If detente 
between India and Pakistan were to last, new infrastructure would be needed to 
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handle larger volumes of trade. This could be expanded to connect both countries 
with Central and Southwest Asia and the ASEAN countries. The landlocked Central 
Asian countries have, during most of the past century, oriented their trade toward 
Russia, but new transportation links southward would open up important trade 
channels with Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and beyond. 
 
   In April 2004, 23 countries signed an agreement to complete a massive Asian 
Highway Network to rival the ancient S i lk  Road. The main route, Asian Highway 
One, would start in Tokyo and pass through North and South Korea, China, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Armenia, ending in Istanbul. Detente between India and Pakistan would facilitate 
the smooth functioning of the Network, and contribute greatly to regional 
development. Many of the links already exist, but would have to be upgraded to 
meet the requirements of an international highway. The agreement was brokered 
by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
which has also proposed trans-Asian railway routes. These may take a little longer to 
implement due to the variety of track widths in different parts of Asia. Within South 
Asia, however, most of the main lines have the same gauges. Thus movement of 
passengers and cargo within the region, once the political climate improves, would 
not have to await the construction of additional tracks. 
 
   An India-Pakistan detente would provide an opportunity for policy-makers, 
technical experts, the business community, and others from the region to work 
together on crucial sustainable-development issues such as the following: 
 
• Estimating future energy requirements, assessing options for meeting them, 
and identifying the most economical and environment-friendly ones. 
 
• Establishing a mechanism for local investors to work with multilateral funding 
agencies. Large-scale energy projects are more likely to succeed if local 
people have a vested interest in them—for example, if a pipeline company 
 124
was substantially owned by small shareholders in India, Pakistan, and 
neighboring countries. 
• Examining options for improving air quality, along with their costs and 
social/political implications, and suggesting strategies for urban and rural 
areas. Encouraging countries to pool their technological expertise. 
 
   Groups established under the SAARC have begun discussing some of these issues. 
Strained relations between the two largest countries in the region have prevented 
much progress in the past, and the current thaw provides a great opportunity to move 
forward. Good relations between India and Pakistan could benefit all of South Asia, 
as well as Afghanistan, Iran, and the countries of Central Asia and ASEAN. Detente 
could benefit many sectors—economic development, political relationships, resource 
management, and trade patterns. It could also bring considerable humanitarian 
benefits, such as facilitation of visits between family members on opposite sides of 
the border. 
 
   A lasting detente between India and Pakistan could also result in a substantial 
reduction in military spending, about ten billion US dollars and three bi l l ion US 
dollars for India and Pakistan respectively.101 This “peace dividend” could be used 
to build the natural gas pipeline, rail and road links, and infrastructure to handle 
increased regional trade. This could transform South Asia and neighboring countries. 
It was hoped that the 2004 thaw between India and Pakistan will lead to a genuine 
and long-lasting detente. 
 
   During periods of high tension between India and Pakistan, several countries, 
including the United States, China, and members of the European Union and 
SAARC, have helped to reduce tensions. Regarding the natural gas pipeline, Iran, 
Qatar, Oman, and Turkmenistan have provided encouragement. These efforts 
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should continue; and international development agencies, including the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank, should lend support. Major projects such 
as those discussed above would require substantial investments “over lengthy 
periods” and the help of many countries and organizations. But the benefits would 
go not only to India and Pakistan but also to neighboring countries and to the 
global community as a whole.  
 
THE MIDDLE EAST  
PEACE PROCESS: 
    
   Israelis have long believed that their military superiority over any potential 
combination of enemies was decisive in bringing about the peace process. Since the 
PLO’s recognition of Israel within the 1949 Armistice Lines (the “Green Line” 
separating Israel from the West Bank and Gaza), Palestinians presented Israel with 
the offer of a Jewish state on 78 percent of Israel/Palestine in return for a Palestinian 
state on 22 percent  – the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. This is a proposition 
supported by a large majority of both Palestinians and Israelis. As reported in 
Ha’aretz on January 18, 2005: 
 
   “Some 63 percent of the Palestinians support the proposal that after the establishment of 
the state of Palestine and a solution to all the outstanding issues - including the refugees 
and Jerusalem - a declaration will be issued recognizing the state of Israel as the state of 
the Jewish people and the Palestinian state as the state of the Palestinian people...On the 
Israeli side, 70 percent supported the proposal for mutual recognition.” 
 
   And if Taba and the Geneva Initiative are indicators, the Palestinians are willing to 
“swap” some of the richest and most strategic land around Jerusalem and up through 
Modi’in for barren tracts of the Negev. 
 
   On the issue of refugees, the Palestinians want their right of return acknowledged. 
That position is supported by international law. They also want Israel to acknowledge 
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its role in driving the refugees from the country in order that a healing process may 
begin (consider how important it is for Jews that their suffering be acknowledged). 
But they have said repeatedly that when it comes to addressing the actual issue, a 
package of resettlement in Israel and the Palestinian state, plus compensation for 
those wishing to remain in the Arab countries, plus the possibility of resettlement in 
Canada, Australia and other countries would create solutions acceptable to all parties. 
Khalil Shkaki, a Palestinian sociologist who conducted an extensive survey among 
the refugees, estimates that only about 10 percent, mainly the aged, would choose to 
settle in Israel, a number (about 400,000) Israel could easily digest. 
 
   With an end to the occupation and a win-win political arrangement that would satisfy 
the fundamental needs of both peoples, the Palestinians could make what would be 
perhaps the most significant contribution of all to peace and stability in the Middle 
East. The Palestinians, despite political weakness, possess one source of power: They 
are the gatekeepers to the Middle East, as the Palestinian conflict is emblematic in the 
Muslim world. It encapsulates the “clash of civilizations” from the Muslim point of 
view. Once the Palestinians signal to the wider Arab and Muslim World that a 
political accommodation has been achieved that is acceptable to them, and that now is 
the time to normalize relations with Israel, it will significantly undercut the forces of 
fundamentalism, militarism and reaction, giving breathing space to those progressive 
voices that cannot be heard today – including those in Israel. Israel, of course, would 
also have to resolve the issue of the Golan Heights, which Syria has been asking it to 
do for years. Despite the neocon rhetoric to the contrary, anyone familiar with the 
Middle East knows that such a dynamic is not only possible but would progress at a 
surprisingly rapid pace. 
 
   The problem is Israel in both its pre- and post-state forms, which for the past 100 
years has steadfastly refused to recognize the national existence and rights of self-
determination of the Palestinian people. Time and again it has said “no” to any 
possibility of genuine peace making. The latest example is the Convergence Plan (or 
Realignment) of Ehud Olmert, which seeks to end the conflict forever by imposing 
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Israeli control over a “sovereign” Palestinian pseudo-state. At the Herzliya 
Conference in January 2006 Olmert said, 
 
   “Israel will maintain control over the security zones, the Jewish settlement blocs, and 
those places which have supreme national importance to the Jewish people, first and 
foremost a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. We will not allow the entry of 
Palestinian refugees into the State of Israel.”  
 
   Olmert’s plan, which he had promised to implement just as soon as Hamas and 
Hezbollah were dealt with, would have perpetuated Israeli control over the occupied 
Palestinian territories. It could not possibly have given rise to a viable Palestinian 
state. While the “Separation Barrier,” Israel’s demographic border to the east, takes 
only 10-15 percent of the West Bank, it incorporates into Israel the major settlement 
blocs, carves the West Bank into small, disconnected, impoverished “cantons” 
(Sharon’s terminology), removes from the Palestinians their richest agricultural land 
and one of the major sources of water. It also creates a “greater” Israeli Jerusalem 
over the entire central portion of the West Bank, thereby cutting the economic, 
cultural, religious and historic heart out of any Palestinian state. It then sandwiches 
the Palestinians between the Wall/border and another “security” border, the Jordan 
Valley, giving Israel ‘two’ eastern borders. Israel would retain control of all the 
resources necessary for a viable Palestinian state, and would also appropriate the 
Palestinians’ airspace, their communications sphere and the right of a Palestinian state 
to conduct its own foreign policy. This plan is obviously unacceptable to the 
Palestinians so it would have to be imposed unilaterally, with American assistance. 
Even without a new “Convergence” plan, Israel probably believes that maintaining 
the status quo while building settlements has been an effective policy for the past four 
decades and can be extended. The Lebanon War of 2006 and, as this is being written, 
an assault on Gaza, show that the Israeli public has accepted that there is no “partner 
for peace.” So if there is any discontent among the voters, they are more likely to vote 
out the liberals and bring in the rightist parties that propound military-based security. 
However, for peace and security – “the right to be normal,” as Olmert put it – Israel 
must explore creative ways for resolving the conflict. Aggressively pursuing 
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settlement expansion and military confrontation with the Palestinians and Israel’s 
neighbors, even though wanting to get the albatross of occupation off their necks, is 
not a feasible option for Israel. While yearning to “separate” from the Palestinians, 
offering them so little that separation is simply not an option, even if the Palestinians 
are willing to make major concessions, cannot lead to peace. “The files of the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry,” writes the Israeli-British historian Avi Shlaim, “burst at the seams 
with evidence of Arab peace feelers and Arab readiness to negotiate with Israel from 
September 1948 on.”102 The following few examples can be counted as the 
opportunities lost: 
 
• In the spring and summer of 1949, Israel and the Arab states met under the 
auspices of the UN’s Palestine Conciliation Committee (PCC) in Lausanne, 
Switzerland. Israel did not want to make any territorial concessions or take back 
100,000 of the 700,000 refugees demanded by the Arabs.  
 
• In 1949 Syria’s leader Husni Zaim declared his readiness to be the first Arab 
leader to conclude a peace treaty with Israel – as well as to resettle half the 
Palestinian refugees in Syria. In the end only an armistice agreement was signed. 
 
• King Abdullah of Jordan engaged in two years of negotiations with Israel but 
was never able to make a meaningful breakthrough on any major matter before his 
assassination. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett commented tellingly: “Transjordan 
said – we are ready for peace immediately. We said – of course, we too want peace, 
but we cannot run, we have to walk.” Three weeks before his assassination, King 
Abdullah said: “I could justify a peace by pointing to concessions made by the Jews. 
But without any concessions from them, I am defeated before I even start.” 
 
• In 1952-53 extensive negotiations were held with the Syrian government of 
Adib Shishakli, a pro-American leader who was eager for accommodation with Israel. 
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Those talks failed because Israel insisted on exclusive control of the Sea of Galilee, 
Lake Huleh and the Jordan River. 
 
• Nasser’s repeated offers to talk peace with Ben Gurion, beginning soon after the 
1952 Revolution, finally ended with the refusal of Ben Gurion’s successor, Moshe 
Sharett, to continue the process and an Israeli attack on an Egyptian military base in 
Gaza. 
 
• In general, Israel’s post-war inflexibility was due to its success in negotiating 
the armistice agreements, which left it in a politically, territorially and militarily 
superior position. “The renewed threat of war had been pushed back,” writes Israeli 
historian Benny Morris in his book Righteous Victims, “So why strain to make a 
peace involving major territorial concessions?”103 In a cable to Sharett, Ben Gurion 
stated what would become Israel’s long-term policy: “Israel will not discuss a peace 
involving the concession of any piece of territory. The neighboring states do not 
deserve an inch of Israel’s land…We are ready for peace in exchange for peace.” In 
July, 1949, he told a visiting American journalist, “I am not in a hurry and I can wait 
ten years. We are under no pressure whatsoever.” Nonetheless, this period saw the 
emergence of the image of the Arab leaders as intractable enemies. Morris writes:  
 
“For decades Ben-Gurion, and successive administrations after his, lied to the Israeli 
public about the post-1948 peace overtures and about Arab interest in a deal. The Arab 
leaders (with the possible exception of Abdullah) were presented, one and all, as a 
recalcitrant collection of warmongers, hell-bent on Israel’s destruction. The recent 
opening of the Israeli archive offers a far more complex picture.”104 
 
• In late 1965 Abdel Hakim Amer, the vice-president and deputy commander of 
the Egyptian army invited the head of the Mossad, Meir Amit, to come to Cairo. The 
                                                 
103 Morris, Benny, Righteous Victims, A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, Vintage, Aug 
28, 2001. 
104 Ibid. p. 268 
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visit was vetoed after stiff opposition from Isser Harel, Eshkol’s intelligence advisor. 
Could the 1967 war have been avoided can never be known. 
 
• Immediately after the 1967 war, Israel sent out feelers for an accommodation 
with both the Palestinians of the West Bank and with Jordan. The Palestinians were 
willing to enter into discussion over peace, but if that meant an independent 
Palestinian state, an option Israel had refused. The Jordanians were also ready, but if 
they received full control over the West Bank and, in particular, East Jerusalem and 
its holy places. King Hussein held meetings with Israeli officials but Israel’s refusal 
to contemplate a full return of the territories scuttled the process. This was followed 
by the annexation of a “greater” Jerusalem area and immediate program of settlement 
construction. 
 
• In 1971 Sadat sent a letter to the UN Jarring Commission expressing Egypt’s 
willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Israeli acceptance, according 
to some analysts, could have prevented the 1973 war. After the war Golda Meir 
dismissed Sadat’s renewed overtures of peace talks. 
 
• Israel ignored numerous feelers put out by Arafat and other Palestinian leaders 
in the early 1970s expressing a readiness to discuss peace with Israel. 
 
• Sadat’s attempts in 1978 to resolve the Palestine issue as a part of the Israel-
Egypt peace process that were rebuffed by Begin who refused to consider anything 
beyond Palestinian “autonomy.” 
 
• In 1988 in Algiers, as part of its declaration of Palestinian independence, the 
PLO recognized Israel within the Green Line and expressed a willingness to enter 
into discussions. 
 
• In 1993, at the start of the Oslo process, Arafat and the PLO reiterated in writing 
their recognition of Israel within the 1967 borders (again, on 78 percent of historic 
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Palestine). Although they recognized Israel as a “legitimate” state in the Middle East, 
Israel did not reciprocate. The Rabin government did not recognize the Palestinians’ 
national right of self-determination, but recognized the Palestinians as a negotiating 
partner. Not in Oslo nor subsequently has Israel ever agreed to relinquish the territory 
it conquered in 1967 in favor of a Palestinian state despite this being the position of 
the UN (Resolution 242), and since 1988, the Palestinians.  
 
• Successive Labor and Likud governments nearly doubling Israel’s settler 
population during the seven years of the Oslo “peace process” (1993-2000), thus 
threatening to eliminate the two-state solution. 
 
• In late 1995, Yossi Beilin, a key member of the Oslo negotiating team, 
presented Rabin with the “Stockholm document” (negotiated with Mahmoud Abbas’s 
team) for resolving the conflict. So promising was this agreement that Mahmoud 
Abbas (Abu Mazen) had tears in his eyes when he signed off on it. Rabin was 
assassinated a few days later and his successor, Shimon Peres, turned it down. 
 
• Israel’s dismissal of Syrian readiness to negotiate peace, repeated frequently, if 
Israel will make concessions on the occupied Golan Heights. 
 
•  The international community’s view was expressed in the most recent offer 
made in 2002 by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, however Bush administration’s 
preoccupation in Iraq; Israeli emphasis on keeping the focus on Iran’s perceived 
nuclear threat; and the Israeli engagement with Hezbollah in Lebanon, scuttled the 
hopes for any substantial progress in the peace-process. The offer made by Arab 
League was of recognition, peace and regional integration in return for relinquishing 
the occupation, but Sharon’s government ignored it.  
 
• Sharon’s disqualification of Arafat, by far the most congenial and cooperative 
partner Israel ever had, and the last Palestinian leader who could “deliver,” and his 
subsequent boycott of Mahmoud Abbas. 
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• Olmert declared “irrelevant” the Prisoners’ Document in which all Palestinian 
factions, including Hamas, agreed on a political program seeking a two-state solution 
– followed by attempts to destroy the democratically-elected government of Hamas 
by force.  
 
• In September and October 2006 Bashar Assad made repeated overtures for 
peace with Israel, declaring in public: “I am ready for an immediate peace with Israel, 
with which we want to live in peace.” On the day of Assad’s first statement to that 
regard, Prime Minister Olmert declared, “We will never leave the Golan Heights,” 
accused Syria of “harboring terrorists” and, together with his Foreign Minister Tzipi 
Livni, announced that “conditions are not ripe for peace with Syria.” 
 
   Further, the unnecessary wars, more limited conflicts and the bloody attacks that 
served mainly to bolster Israel’s position, directly or indirectly, appear to be an 
attempt to extend its control over the entire land west of the Jordan: The systematic 
killing between 1948-1956 of 3000-5000 “infiltrators,” Palestinian refugees, mainly 
unarmed, who sought mainly to return to their homes, to till their fields or to recover 
lost property; the 1956 war with Egypt, fought partly in order to prevent the 
reemergence onto the international agenda of the “Palestine Problem,” as well as to 
strengthen Israel militarily, territorially and diplomatically; military operations 
against Palestinian civilians beginning with the infamous killings in Sharafat, Beit 
Jala and most notoriously Qibia, led by Sharon’s Unit 101. These operations 
continued in the occupied Palestinian territories and Lebanon, mainly for purposes of 
collective punishment and “pacification.” Others included the campaign, decades’ 
old, of systematically liquidating any effective Palestinian leader; the three wars in 
Lebanon (Operation Litani in 1978, Operation Peace for the Galilee in 1982 and the 
war of 2006).  
 
   Lurking behind all these military actions, be they major wars or “targeted 
assassinations,” is the consistent and steadfast Israeli refusal (in fact extending back 
to the pre-Zionist days of the 1880s) to deal directly and seriously with the 
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Palestinians. Israel’s strategy has been to bypass and encircle them, making deals 
with governments that isolate and, unsuccessfully so far, neutralize the Palestinians as 
players. 
 
   In the Madrid peace talks, Israel only allowed Palestinian participation as part of the 
Jordanian delegation. In the Oslo “peace process”, while Israel insisted on a letter 
from Arafat explicitly recognizing Israel as a “legitimate construct” in the Middle 
East, and later demanded a specific statement recognizing Israel as a Jewish state 
(both of which it got), no Israeli government ever recognized the collective rights of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination. Rabin explained: If Israel recognizes the 
Palestinians’ right to self-determination, it means that a Palestinian state must by 
definition emerge – and Israel did not want to promise that.105 So except for 
pronouncements about not wanting to rule over another people and “our hand 
outstretched in peace,” Israel resisted the framework for genuine negotiations. Israel’s 
response to the eruption of the second Intifada, when it shot more than a million 
rounds, including missiles, into civilian centers in the West Bank and Gaza despite no 
shooting from the Palestinian side during the Intifada’s first five days, can only be 
explained as punishing them for rejecting what Ehud Barak presented to them at 
Camp David, disabusing them of the notion that they were equals in deciding the 
future of Israel.  
 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
AND ISRAEL: 
 
   As the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict has demonstrated so far, Israel’s policy of 
ignoring the Arabs as ‘partners-in-peace,’ has been a success. Since a state of non-
conflict is considered better than peace (Israel has such a relationship with Syria, with 
whom it has not fought for 34 years, and is thereby able to avoid the compromises 
associated with peace that might threaten its occupation of the Golan Heights), Israel 
                                                 
105 Savir, Uri, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed The Middle East, Vintage, June 29, 1999, p. 47. 
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makes “peace” only with countries that acquiescence to its expansionist agenda. 
Jordan gave up all claims to the West Bank and East Jerusalem and has ceased to 
actively advocate for Palestinian rights. Peace with Egypt cost Israel the Sinai 
Peninsula, but it left its occupation of Gaza and the West Bank intact. Differentiating 
between those parts of the Arab world with which it wants an actual peace agreement, 
those with which it needs merely a state of non-conflict and those which it believes it 
can control, isolate and defeat creates a situation of great flexibility, allows Israel to 
employ the carrot or the stick according to its particular agenda at any particular time. 
Israel can pursue this strategy because of the political, military and financial umbrella 
provided by the United States. This is rooted in many different sources including the 
influence of the organized Jewish community and the Christian fundamentalists on 
domestic politics and the US Congress. Bipartisan and unassailable support for Israel, 
however, arises from Israel’s place in the American arms industry and the US’ 
defense diplomacy.  
 
   Since the mid-1990s Israel has specialized in developing hi-tech components for 
weapons systems, and in this way it has also gained a central place in the world’s 
arms and security industries. One could look at Israel’s suppression of the Intifadas, 
its attempted pacification of the Occupied Territories and occasional combat with the 
likes of Hezbollah as valuable opportunities in almost laboratory-like conditions to 
develop useful weaponry and tactics. This has made it extremely valuable to the 
West. In fact, Israel is among the five largest exporters of arms in the world, and is 
poised to overtake Russia as number two in just a few years (based on Jane’s 
assessment of May 2, 2006).  
    
   The fact that it has discrete military ties with many Muslim countries, including Iran, 
adds another layer of rationality to its guiding assumption that a separate peace with 
Arab states is achievable without major concessions to the Palestinians. If any state 
significantly challenges Israeli positions, Israel can pull rank as the gatekeeper to 
American military programs, including to some degree the US defense industry, and 
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thus to major sources of hi-tech research and development, a formidable position 
indeed. 
   
   Israel’s concept of “security” has been exaggerated and it leaves no breathing space 
for the Palestinians, thus eliminating any viable resolution of the conflict. This 
reflects its traditional reliance on overwhelming military superiority (the “qualitative 
edge”) over the Arabs. This despite its near-disaster in the 1973 war, its failure to 
pacify the occupied Palestinian territories and, most recently, its failure against 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Several Israeli scholars, including ex-military officials, have 
written on the preponderance of the military in formulating government policy. Ben 
Gurion’s linking the concept of nation-building with that of a nation-in-arms, writes 
Yigal Levy reviewing Yoram Peri’s recent book Generals in the Cabinet Room: How 
the Military Shapes Israeli Policy, made the army an instrument for maintaining a 
social order that rested on keeping war a permanent fixture. 
 
   The centrality of the army depends on the centrality of war. When political leadership 
opted to create a ‘mobilized,’ disciplined and inequitable society by turning the army 
into the ‘nation-builder’ and making war a constant, the politicians became dependent 
on the army. It was not just dependence on the army as an organization, but on 
military thinking. The military view of political reality has become the main anchor 
of Israeli statesmanship, from the victory of Ben Gurion and his allies over Moshe 
Sharett’s more conciliatory policies in the 1950s, through the occupation as a fact of 
life from the 1960s, to the current preference for another war in Lebanon over the 
political option as noted in Ha’aretz on August 25, 2006. 
 
   Ze’ev Maoz, in an article entitled “Israel’s Nonstrategy of Peace,” argues that,  
 
   “Israel has a well-developed security doctrine [but] does not have a peace 
policy…Israel’s history of peacemaking has been largely reactive, demonstrating a 
pattern of hesitancy, risk-avoidance, and gradualism that stands in stark contrast to its 
proactive, audacious, and trigger-happy strategic doctrine…The military is essentially the 
only government organization that offers policy options – typically military plans – at 
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times of crisis. Israel’s foreign ministry and diplomatic community are reduced to public 
relations functions, explaining why Israel is using force instead of diplomacy to deal with 
crisis situations.”106  
 
   Feeling that its security is guaranteed by its military power and that a separate peace 
(or state of non-conflict) with each Arab state is sufficient, Israel allowed itself an 
expanded concept of “security” that eliminated a negotiated settlement. If the conflict 
is defined as the US defined its War on Terror: As an us-or-them equation then “they” 
are fundamentally, irretrievably and permanently our enemies. It then no longer 
remains a political conflict, and thus it has no solution. Israel’s security, in this view, 
can be guaranteed only in military terms, or until each and every one of “them” [the 
Palestinians] were either dead, in prison, driven out of the country or confined to a 
sealed enclave. Thus rational attempts to resolve the conflict based on mutual 
interests, identifying the sources of the conflict and negotiating solutions can prove 
futile.   
 
   The prominence (or “monopoly”) of the military in political policy-making explains 
why the Labor party in the post-Ben Gurion era chose territorial expansion over 
peace. Uri Savir, the head of Israel’s Foreign Ministry under Rabin and Peres and a 
chief negotiator in the Oslo process, provides a glimpse into this dynamic in his book 
The Process. After the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians 
was signed on the White House lawn in September 1993, Rabin chose a new team of 
negotiators. Led by Deputy Chief of Staff Gen. Amnon Shahak, it was composed 
mostly of military officers. When the military grumbled bitterly at having been shut 
out of the Oslo talks, Rabin did not reject the criticism: that Israel’s approach should 
be dictated by the army invariably made immediate security considerations the 
dominant one, so that the fundamentally political process had been subordinated to 
short-term military needs.  
 
                                                 
106 Moaz, Zeev, “Israel’s Non-Strategy for Peace,” Tikkun 21(5), September 2006, pp. 49-50. 
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   In Grenada, Peres had painstakingly explained to Arafat Israel’s stand on security, 
especially external security and the border passages. “Mr. Chairman, I’m going to 
give you the straight truth, without embellishment,” he said…We will not 
compromise on the operational side of controlling the border passages [to Jordan and 
Egypt]. We’re concerned about the smuggling of weapons. Ten pistols can make for 
many victims,” he stressed. “This is absolutely vital to our security.” Arafat, who 
translated this straight talk into a vision of Palestinians caged in on all sides, replied: 
“I cannot go for a Bantustan….” In the end, Israel’s security doctrine generally 
prevailed. Would compliance with Arafat’s demand for more power and 
responsibility have improved Israel’s security? Under the peace process, when 
transfer of authority took place, the Israeli bureaucrats and the officers who ruled the 
Palestinians and had been asked to pass on their powers to their “wards”…found it 
almost unbearable to sit down in Eilat with representatives of their “subjects.” The 
Israeli officials thought of themselves both as “more equal” – and at the same time 
the threatened side, therefore justifiably hesitant.  
 
   The idea of national security state trumping the establishment of a ‘social welfare 
state’ was discussed by Aitzaz Ahsan in the context of Pakistan in his book The Indus 
Saga. Just as Pakistan’s predicament vis-à-vis the role of military in politics cannot be 
seen without reference to its security dilemma vis-à-vis India, the role of Israeli 
military would have to be seen in the context of Israel’s security environment. 
However, not unlike Pakistan, in Israel “security” became constrictive. Right-wing 
soldiers and security advisors began moving into the highest echelons of the military 
and political establishments during the years of Likud rule. Fourteen of the first 
fifteen chiefs of staff were associated with the Labor Party; the last three – Shaul 
Mofaz, Moshe Ya’alon and Dan Halutz – are associated with the right wing of the 
Likud, a mix of ideology and militarism that reinforces a concept of security that, 
even if sincerely held, cannot create the space needed for a viable Palestinian state.  
 
   Israel’s European orientation, including a view of the Arab world as a mere hinterland 
offering Israel little of value, explains why Israel does not place more importance 
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pursuing peace with its neighbors. Israel does not consider itself a part of the Middle 
East and has no desire whatsoever to integrate into it. If anything, it sees itself as a 
Middle Eastern variation of Singapore. Like Singapore, it seeks a correct relationship 
with its hinterland, but views itself as a service center for the West, to which its 
economy and political affiliations are tied. (Israel, we might note, has built the 
Singaporean army into what it is today, the strongest military force in Southeast 
Asia.) That means it lacks the fundamental motivation to achieve any form of 
regional integration, as evidenced by its dismissal of the Saudi Initiative of 2002 that, 
with the backing of the Arab League, offered Israel recognition, peace and regional 
integration in return for relinquishing the occupation of Palestinian territories.  
 
   Israel believes that it can achieve a separate peace with Arab and Muslim countries 
(and maintain its overall strong international position) without reference to the 
Palestinians. Because it is not prepared to make concessions to the Palestinians “on 
the ground”, Israel is willing to limit its state of peace/non-conflict with governments 
– Egypt, Jordan, an emerging Iraq (although Israel is arming the Kurds), the Gulf 
states, the countries of North Africa (Libya included), Pakistan, Indonesia and some 
Muslim African countries. In the view of Israeli leaders surveying with satisfaction 
the political landscape, the notion that Israel is too strong to ignore seems to hold 
true.  
 
   Israel’s security, then, rests in that broad sphere defined by military might, services 
provided to the US military, the uncritical support of the American Congress, its 
military diplomacy including arms sales, Israel’s central role in the neo-con agenda, 
its ability to parley European guilt over the Holocaust into political support, its ability 
to manipulate Arab and Muslim governments and its ability to suppress Palestinian 
resistance. However, if one truly wants peace, security and “the right to be normal” – 
then considerations of justice and human rights enter into the equation. From a purely 
utilitarian perspective, Israel is a success. Perhaps the most hopeful sign of Israel’s 
“normalization” is its acceptance by most of the Arabs, best illustrated by the Saudi 
Initiative (2002) Israel ignored. But this also pinpoints the problem. The Saudi/Arab 
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League offer was contingent upon Israel’s relinquishing the occupation of Palestinian 
territories, something it is not prepared to do. Israel responded to the offer “on the 
ground” rather than through diplomatic channels. Sharon carried out his plan of 
“disengagement” from Gaza explicitly to ensure Israel’s permanent and unassailable 
rule over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, while his successor Olmert vigorously 
pushed a plan under which the occupied territories would be transformed into a 
permanent state of Israeli control. All this conforms to Israeli policy since Ben Gurion 
which asserts that if Israel limits its aim to achieving a modus vivendi with the Arabs 
rather than full- fledged peace, it can ensure its security while retaining control over 
the land west of the Jordan River. Occasional spats will erupt such as those in Gaza or 
with the Hezbollah in Lebanon, or Israel could be called upon to do America’s work 
in Iran, as it played its role (limited as it was) in Iraq. But those (or at least this was 
the thinking before the Lebanese debacle) are easily contained, American co-opting 
of Egypt and Jordan providing the requisite room.  
    
   This Israeli realpolitik rests on a pragmatic approach to the conflict akin to what the 
British termed “muddling through.” If Israel’s goal was to resolve the conflict with 
the Palestinians and seek genuine peace and regional integration, it could easily have 
adopted policies that would have achieved that, probably long ago. The goal, 
however, is conflict management, maintaining the “status quo” in perpetuity, and not 
conflict resolution. Muddling through well suits Israel’s attempt to balance the 
unbalance-able: expanding territorially at the expense of the Palestinians while still 
maintaining an acceptable level of security and “quiet.” It enables Israel to meet each 
challenge as it arises rather than to lock itself into a strategy or set of policies that fail 
to take into account unexpected developments. Yesterday we tried Oslo; today we’ll 
hit Gaza and Lebanon, tomorrow “convergence.” 
 
   It may not look rational or neat, but conflict management means going with the flow; 
staying on top of things, knowing where you are going and having contingency plans 
always at the ready to take advantage of any opening, and dealing with events as they 
happen. Not long-term strategies but a vision implemented in many often 
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imperceptible stages over time, under the radar so as to attract as little attention or 
opposition as possible, realized through short-term initiatives like the Convergence 
Plan which progressively nail down gains “on the ground.” If this analysis is correct, 
Israel is willing to settle for peace-and-quiet rather than genuine peace, for 
management of the conflict rather than closure, for territorial gains that may 
perpetuate tensions and occasional conflicts in the region, but do not jeopardize 
Israel’s essential security. Declaring “the right to be normal” becomes a PR move 
designed to blame the other side and cast Israel as the victim; it is not something that 
Israeli leaders sincerely expect. Indeed, their very policies are based on the 
assumption that functional normality – an acceptable level of “quiet,” the economy 
doing well, a fairly normal existence for an insulated Israeli public most of the time – 
is a preferred status to the concessions required for a genuine, and attainable, peace. 
   Yet despite its overwhelming military might, massive and permanent controlling 
presence in the occupied territories, how does the future look for Israel? While Israeli 
Jews got everything they wanted – the entire Land of Israel west of the Jordan River – 
and the Arab governments suing for peace, but besides risks associated with Iran’s 
purported nuclear program mentioned earlier, four more elements stand to challenge 
the paradigm of power: 
 
   (1) Demographics. Israel does not have enough Jews to sustain its control over the 
greater Land of Israel. (Indeed, whether Israel proper can remain “Jewish” is a 
question, with the Jewish majority down just under 75 percent, factoring in the Arab 
population, the non- Jewish Russians and emigration.) Zionism created a strong state, 
but it did not succeed in convincing Jews to settle it. The Jewish population of Israel 
represents less than a third of world Jewry; only one percent of American Jews made 
aliyah. In fact, whenever Jews had a choice – in North Africa, the former Soviet 
Union, Iraq, Iran, South Africa and Argentina, not to mention all the countries of 
Europe and North America – they chose not to come to Israel. And it is demographics 
that is driving Olmert’s convergence plan. “It's only a matter of time before the 
Palestinians demand 'one man, one vote' - and then, what will we do?", he asked 
plaintively at the 2004 Herzilya conference. Olmert’s scheme retains control of Israel 
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and the occupied Palestinian territories (in his terms Judea, Samaria and eastern 
Jerusalem) while doing the only thing possible with the Palestinians who make up 
half the population – locking them into a truncated Bantustan on a sterile 15- 20 
percent of the country. 
 
   (2) Palestinians. Israel’s historical policy of ignoring and bypassing the Palestinians 
can no longer work. Palestinians comprise about half the population of the land west 
of the Jordan River, all of which Israel seeks to control, and will be a clear majority if 
significant numbers of refugees are repatriated to the Palestinian Bantustan. Keeping 
that population under control means that Israel must adopt ever more repressive 
policies, whether prohibiting Israeli Arab citizens from bringing their spouses and 
children from occupied Palestinian territories to live with them in Israel, as recent 
legislation has decreed, or locking them behind the 26-foot concrete wall. Despite 
Olmert’s assertion that Israelis have a right to live a normal life, normalcy cannot be 
achieved unilaterally. Neither an occupation nor a Bantustan nor any other form of 
oppression can be normalized or routinized; it will always be resisted by the 
oppressed. Strong as Israel is militarily, it has not succeeded in pacifying the 
Palestinians over the last 40 years of occupation, 60 years since the Naqba or century 
since the Zionist movement claimed exclusive patrimony over Palestine and begin to 
systematically dispossess the indigenous population. The Palestinians today possess 
one weapon that Israel cannot defeat, that it must one day deal with, and that is their 
position as gatekeepers. Until the Palestinians signal the wider Arab, Muslim and 
international community that they have reached a satisfactory political 
accommodation with Israel, the conflict will continue and Israel will fail to achieve 
either closure or normalcy. 
 
   (3) The Arabs. The role of Palestinians as gatekeepers reflects the rise in importance 
of civil society as a player in political affairs. Israel’s lack of concern over the Arab 
and Muslim “streets,” its reliance solely on peace-making with governments, 
indicates a major failure in Israel’s strategic approach to the conflict: Its 
underestimation of the power of the people. Sentiments such as “We don’t care about 
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making peace with the Arab peoples; correct relations with their governments are 
enough,” ignore the fragile state of Arab governments created by the rise of Muslim 
fundamentalism, which in turn has been fueled in large part (though not exclusively, 
of course) by the occupation. If Hezbollah has the power to create the instability it 
has, imagine what will happen if the Muslim Brotherhood seizes power in Egypt. The 
disproportionate bias towards Israel in American and European policies only fuels 
and sharpens the “clash of civilizations,” while Israel’s occupation effectively 
prevents progressive elements from emerging in the Arab and Muslim World. The 
strategic role played by Palestinians as gatekeepers has a significant effect upon the 
stability of the entire global system. The Israel-Palestine conflict is no longer a 
localized one. 
    
   (4) International civil society. As we have seen, Israeli leaders, surveying the 
international political landscape as elected officials do, take great comfort. They 
believe that, with uncritical and unlimited American support, their country is 
“winning” its conflict over the Palestinians (and Israel’s other enemies, real and 
imagined). Like political leaders everywhere, they don’t seriously take “the people” 
into account. Yet, The People – what is known as international civil society – have 
some achievements under their belt when it comes to defeating injustice. They forced 
the American government to enforce the civil rights of black people in the US and to 
abandon the war in Vietnam. They played major roles in the collapse of South 
African apartheid, of the Soviet Union and of the Shah’s regime, among many others. 
Since governments will almost never do the right thing on their own, it was civil 
society, through the newly established UN, that forced them to accept the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions and a whole corpus of human 
rights and international law. With the International Court of Justice and the 
International Criminal Court, as well as other instruments, such as civil society’s 
organized Social Forums and other forms of action coalitions, major cases of 
injustice, such as Israel’s occupation, are becoming less and less sustainable. As the 
occupation assumes the proportions of an injustice on the scale of apartheid – a 
conflict with global implications – Olmert could have convinced Bush and Blair to 
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support his plan, but the conflict will not be over until two gatekeepers say it is, the 
Palestinians and the people worldwide. 
 
  FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT  
TO NORMALIZATION: 
 
   In order for Israel to move from conflict management to normalization and conflict 
resolution, it must put aside the militaristic ideology. Instead of blaming Arafat, 
Hamas and the Arabs in general, or playing the victim, Israel must work with the 
Palestinians to create a genuine two-state solution. Instead of a Geneva Initiative 
whereby the Palestinians get a non-viable 22 percent of the country; or 
convergence/realignment, Israel could opt for an end of occupation and a return to the 
1967 borders (in which Israel still retains 78 percent of the country.) Other than the 
two-state solution, bringing closure to the issue would remain difficult. 
 
   Over time, the Palestinians - contrary to most Israeli fears - might even use their good 
offices to eventually enter into a regional confederation with the neighboring states. 
This is a tall order, and it will not happen soon. The military’s mobilization of Jewish 
Israelis has created a remarkably high consensus (85 percent support the construction 
of the Wall; 93 percent supported the recent war in Lebanon), making it impossible 
for truly divergent views to penetrate. Some of this has to do with feelings of self-
righteousness, combined with the perception of Israel as the victim (and hence having 
no responsibility for what happens, a party that cannot be held accountable). Disdain 
towards Arabs also allows Israel to harm Palestinian (and again Lebanese) civilian 
populations with impunity and no sense of guilt or wrongdoing. Although Israel has a 
small but vital peace movement and dissident voices are heard among intellectuals 
and in the press, the combination of mystification (“there is no partner for peace”), 
disdain, vilification and dehumanization of the Palestinians, a self-perception of 
Israelis-as-victims, the supremacy of all-encompassing “security” concerns, and a 
compelling but closed meta-narrative means that little if any space exists for a public 
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debate that could actually change policy. Because the Israel public has effectively 
removed itself as a player – except in granting passive support to its political leaders 
who pursue a program of territorial expansion and conflict management – a genuine, 
just and sustainable peace will not come to the region without massive international 
pressure. Zionism, which began as a movement of Jews to take charge of their lives, 
to determine their own fate, has ironically become a skein of pretexts serving to 
prevent Israelis from taking their fate in their own hands. The “deal” with the political 
parties has turned Israeli government policies into mere pretexts for oppression, for 
“victory” over another people, for colluding with the global super power: US. 
 
   However, if Israel’s actual agenda is territorial expansion, retaining control of the 
entire country west of the Jordan and foreclosing any viable Palestinian state, then 
any negotiations that might threaten that agenda are put off, delayed or avoided. It is a 
win-lose equation. If the principle that ‘the Arabs will sue for peace even after we get 
everything we want, then why compromise’ is true, Israel could have had peace, 
security and normalization years ago, but not a “unified” Jerusalem, Judea or 
Samaria. If the price is continued hostility of the Arabs without integration into the 
region, then, in the meantime, Israelis would have to rely on the military to handle 
any challenges, to either the occupation of Palestinian territories, or to Israel’s 
hegemony, that might arise. 
 
   This logic carried Israel to Olmert’s convergence plan that was intended to “end” the 
occupation and establish a permanent regime of Israeli dominance. And then Israel hit 
the wall: The rise of Hamas to power in the Palestinian Authority and the traumatic 
“non-victory” over Hezbollah. Both those events exposed the flaw of the non-conflict 
peace policy. The Palestinians are the gatekeepers, and the Arab governments in 
whom Israel placed all its hopes are in danger of being swept away by a wave of 
fundamentalism fueled, in large part, by the occupation and Israel’s close alignment 
with US, the extra-regional actor. Peace, even a minimally stable non-peace, cannot 
be achieved without dealing, once and for all, with the Palestinians. The war in 
Lebanon has left Israel staring into the abyss. The Oslo peace process died six years 
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ago, the Road Map initiative was stillborn and, in the wake of the war, Olmert has 
announced that his convergence plan, the only political plan the government had, was 
being shelved for the time being. Ha’aretz commentator Aluf Benn wrote: 
    
    “Cancellation of the convergence plan raises two main questions: What is happening in the 
territories and what is the point of continuing Olmert's government? Olmert has no answers. 
The response to calls to dismiss him is the threat of Benjamin Netanyahu at the helm. But 
what, exactly, is the difference? Both now propose preservation of the status quo in the 
territories, rehabilitation of the North and grappling with Iran. At this point, what advantage 
does the head of state have over the head of the opposition?” (Ha’aretz, August 25, 
2006) 
    
   Without the ability to end or even manage its regional conflicts unilaterally, faced 
with the limitations of military power, increasingly isolated in a world for whom 
human rights does matter, yet saddled with a political system that prevents 
governments from taking political initiative and a public that can only hunker down, 
Israel finds itself not in a status quo but in a downward spiral of violence leading 
nowhere. Moreover, it finds itself strapped to a superpower that itself is discovering 
the futility of unilateralism in its own Middle East adventures.  
 
   Still, the door to peace is still wide open. The Palestinian, Lebanese, Egyptian and 
Syrian governments have said that war raises new possibilities for peace. Even Peres 
said as much, but was forced to backtrack when Tzipi Livni, the Foreign Minister, 
declared the “time was not ripe” for talks with Syria. Instead the Olmert government 
appointed the chief of the air force to be its “campaign coordinator” in any possible 
war with Iran, and then named Avigdor Lieberman, the extremist right-winger who is 
on record as favoring attacks on Iran as well as a nuclear strike on Egypt’s Aswan 
Dam, as Deputy Prime Minister and “Minister of Strategy.” There is no indication 
that one of the lessons learned from the Lebanese disaster will be the futility of 
imposing a military solution on the region. On the contrary, the chorus of protest in 
Israel in the wake of the war is: Why did not the government let the army win? 
Demands for the heads of Olmert, Peres and Halutz come from their military failure, 
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not from a failure of their military policy. But instead of demanding a government 
inquiry as to why Israel lost the war, the Ha’aretz columnist Danny Rubinstein 
suggests a government inquiry on why Israel has not achieved peace with its 
neighbors over the past sixty years. The question then is, would peace be achieved in 
the form of a settlement agreeable to all the parties?  
    
   Resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute would also most likely inspire a reframing of 
global issues and opportunities, and if Israel sparks such a reframing, if it generates a 
movement of global inclusiveness and dialogue, then it might, in spite of itself, yet be 
the “light unto the nations” it has always aspired to be. The 2002 Arab League offer 
was an attempt by the Arab world to seize the initiative from Iran on the Arab-Israeli 
issue. However, Israel scuttled the process. The peace process must be pursued 
vigorously on account of Iran’s nuclear program in particular. Israel’s resolution of its 
territorial disputes, and normalization of relations with Arab neighbors, would 
remove an area where Iran can evoke regional support by flexing its military muscle.  
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  Part III 
 
  STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR 
DOCTRINE  
 
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND STABILITY: 
 
In this part, it has been posited that doctrinal clarity, and the defensive, as opposed to 
aggressive, nature of nuclear doctrine, is a factor in maintaining stability of nuclear 
deterrence.107 By its very nature a doctrine is an enabling document. Edward Mead 
Earle defined strategy as “the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a 
nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital 
interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, 
potential or merely presumed.” H e  went on to describe grand strategy as that 
“which integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is 
either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of 
victory.”108 Paul Kennedy defines “grand strategy” as the integration in “a coherent 
fashion” of “over-all political, economic and military aims—to preserve long term 
interests.”109 
    
   Doctrine comprises features of grand strategy and strategy as it presents the 
national objectives and their rationales, and the means and the methods to achieve 
them. However, doctrine is declaratory in nature. That was made clear when the US 
                                                 
107 Lavoy, Peter, Scott Sagan and James Wirtz eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will 
Use Nuclear Biological, and Chemical Weapons, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000. 
108 See Earle, Edward Mead, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy Princeton, N.J; Princeton University 
Press, 1943, p. VIII in ‘Forward’. 
109 See Kennedy, Paul, ed. Grand Strategy in War and Peace New Haven and London: Yak University 
Press, 1991, pp. IX-X of Preface. 
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President James Monroe in 1823, warned European States against venturing into 
Central and South America on pain of war with the United States. Thus a doctrine is a 
policy guideline of an enduring nature with a view to make public a great power or 
prospective great power’s geo-strategic design to achieve security and/or political 
influence. The United States and the Soviet Union both enunciated doctrines of 
“massive [nuclear] retaliation” during the Cold War to demonstrate power and 
maintain deterrence. 
 
   Some of the key areas that the nuclear doctrine should address could be: Who 
should have the overall control over both the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons? 
At what stage of the conventional battle the nuclear attack becomes essential? 
Should there be firm and final control with the political Chief Executive or some 
flexibility be given to the field commanders based on ‘launch on warning’ or 
‘launch through warning’ strategies? Should there be a pre-emptive nuclear strike 
included in the overall operational plan? Which are the targets to be pre-designated 
during peacetime and whether those should be counter value or counter force 
targets?110 If these areas are not adequately addressed or implications not correctly 
assessed, with doctrines formulated having ambiguities and lacking transparency 
and nebulous command and control mechanisms, then it cannot be called, by 
western standard, a fail safe system.  
 
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR POSTURE: 
 
   Pakistan’s strategic defense is based on the concept of Minimum Nuclear 
Deterrence. Pakistan’s security perceptions within its geo-political setting entail 
that a strategic equilibrium be maintained on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, which 
                                                 
110 Matinuddin, Kamal, The Nuclearization of South Asia, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, 
p. 234. 
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can be achieved through a minimum deterrence.111 However, it is a concept that has 
not been elaborated into a full fledged nuclear doctrine. While Pakistan has 
expressed its desire to not fall into the trap of vertical nuclear escalation, 
nonetheless, the enunciation of a nuclear doctrine would be in Pakistan’s interest 
to add more clarity to the subcontinental security equilibrium. 
 
   With their governments having chosen to go nuclear the people of India and 
Pakistan must become fully aware of the risks that go with possessing nuclear 
weapons. Thanks to the worldwide notoriety that the ghastly attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki have received over the decades, there is some public awareness of 
the holocaust that results when nuclear bombs are dropped on civilian 
populations. But the death and destruction caused by nuclear weapons need not be 
confined only to situations when they are used in war as part of a calculated 
military decision. There are other substantial dangers that go with possessing 
nuclear weapons in addition to the consequences of their deliberate and premeditated 
use in war.112 
 
   Any assessment of the extent of these hazards on the South Asian subcontinent 
has to be based on the size and scope of the nuclear arsenals that India and Pakistan 
are expected to possess within a few years. While we will never really be told, on 
grounds of national security, the details of nuclear capabilities, a rough estimate 
can be made from the nuclear postures. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine demands a 
capability, in the event of an enemy attack, for “punitive retaliation” to “inflict 
damage unacceptable to the aggressor”, “even in case of a “significant 
                                                 
111 Statement by Pakistan Ambassadorr Munir Akram to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), 
Geneva, on the CTBT and FMCT, 30 J u l y  1998. 
112 See Bracken, Paul, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear 
Age, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999. 
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degradation by hostile strikes”.113 For this purpose the Doctrine calls for a well 
spread out nuclear capability based on a “triad of aircraft, mobile land-based 
missiles and sea-based assets”, with the survivability of the arsenal to be enhanced 
by “multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception”.  
 
   In order to inflict this retaliation promptly, the level of readiness of the weapons 
will be such that one can “shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable 
forces in the shortest possible time”. Taken together these statements seem to call, 
even conservatively, for well over a hundred nuclear bombs widely dispersed over 
land and sea, with an associated fleet of missiles and jet bombers fuelled by 
extremely volatile liquid fuels, all in some state of near readiness, day after day, 
for a possible retaliatory attack. There is every possibil i ty that the subcontinent 
may, over the years, gel itself into a hairtrigger situation wherein each country has a 
battery of nuclear-tipped missiles, all set to go from launching pad to target within a 
matter of minutes. India has declared a No First Use (NFU) policy and stated that 
its nuclear arsenal is intended only to be a deterrent. Nevertheless, a deterrence 
policy employing such a large and widespread arsenal brings with it a host of other 
dangers. 
 
   In the aftermath of nuclearization, both India and Pakistan possess a stockpile of 
nuclear weapons components and could assemble and deploy several nuclear 
weapons within a few days to a week. The size, composition, and operational status 
of each nuclear arsenal are closely guarded secrets, but sufficient public 
information exists to make general assumptions about the strategic balance in 
South Asia.114 Assuming that the Cirus and Dhruva research reactors produce 25-40 
kilogram of bomb-grade plulonium annually, by the end of 2002 India had 
                                                 
113 National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, “Draft Report”, August 17, 
1999. 
 
114 Ibid. 
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stockpiled between 280-600 kilogram of weapon-grade plutonium.115 Although 
India also has a program to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), it is not 
known if the program has managed to produce weapon-grade H E U ,  Experts assess 
that India could require as lit t le as five kilogram and as much as seven kilogram of 
plutonium per weapon. Considering the worst- and best-case assumptions about 
Indian weapon design, it could possess enough fissile material for between 40 and 
120 weapons, with 70 as the median estimate. 
 
   Unlike India, which relies on plutonium for its weapons, Pakistan’s nuclear 
program is based on HEU. If Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment plant is able to 
produce 80-140 kg of weapon-grade uranium per year, Pakistan today could 
have 815-1230 kg available for weapons production. The amount required for a 
bomb is believed to be 12-25 kg, depending on the weapon design Pakistan 
employs. In addition, a heavy-water research reactor recently constructed at 
Khushab produces plutonium that could be reprocessed to make a few nuclear 
weapons annually. Adding together i ts  possible plutonium and HEU inventories, 
Pakistan could have enough fissile material to produce between 35 and 95 weapons, 
with 60 as the median estimate. 
        
   Each state has various aircraft and ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver 
nuclear weapons. In 2001, the US Department of Defense assessed that India would 
most l ikely employ lighter-bomber aircraft for delivery because its ballistic 
missiles probably were not yet ready. The air force has several aircraft that could 
be employed for this mission, but the best suited would be the Jaguar, Mirage-
2000, MiG-27, or Su-30. India has deployed short-range Prithvi I missiles that are 
capable of carrying a 1000 kg warhead (the presumed maximum size of a nuclear 
device), but because of Prithvi’s restricted range, India wi l l  probably turn to its new 
                                                 
115 More detailed information on the India-Pakistan strategic balance can be found in Lavoy, Peter 
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solid-propellant Agni I missile, which has a 700-900 km range and was rushed into 
development after the 1999 Kargil conflict. The Agni I and the 2000-3000 km-range 
Agni 2 missile are likely to become India’s preferred missile platforms when they 
become operational. 
 
   Pakistan has placed a high priority on acquiring ballistic missiles to offset India’s 
conventional military advantages and to ensure reliable delivery of nuclear 
weapons. Although the Pakistan Air Force F-16 and Mirage 5 aircraft probably 
are capable of nuclear delivery, the liquid-fuel Ghauri 1 and 2 missiles developed 
with North Korean assistance, and the solid-fuel Shaheen 1 and 2 missiles developed 
with Chinese help, are more likely choices.116 
 
   India’s draft nuclear doctrine, published in August 1999, is based on a retaliatory, 
no-first-use policy.117 The Doctrine casts Indian nuclear forces principally as a 
deterrent against a nuclear attack on India.  
 
   Pakistan has not publicly announced an official nuclear doctrine, but it is 
concerned with deterring India from taking advantage of i ts conventional 
superiority. Pakistan appears to have adopted a nuclear first-use policy to deter 
India from using its conventional military superiority.118 Although limited Indian 
attacks, such as a retaliatory strike on the ground or through the air, would not 
serve as a real threat to Pakistan’s strategic weapon systems, the asymmetries of 
strategic depth and offensive military capability give India an operational 
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advantage, and may create a situation in which India’s conventional ground or air 
forces come into contact with Pakistan’s strategic nuclear forces. Pakistan’s 
shorter-range Hatf 3/M-11 ballistic missiles must be stationed fairly far forward to 
reach strategic targets in India, perhaps leaving them vulnerable to both air and 
ground attack. The same is true of Pakistan’s forward airbases, which are within 
easy striking distance of the border. Pakistan places great emphasis on its strategic 
nuclear forces to deter a large-scale conventional attack by India. The survival of 
Pakistan’s strategic forces is critical to Pakistan, and a threat to them could place 
pressure on Pakistan to launch a nuclear attack while the strategic forces are still 
intact and capable of making a credible impression upon India. 
    
   Further, India’s presumed retaliatory-only nuclear doctrine appears more rhetoric 
than reality, given the declaration to attack even a non-nuclear state suspected to 
possess chemical or biological weapons. 
 
   Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan also could threaten 
vital strategic command and control functions. Further, India has made a 
major investment in intelligence gathering and precision-strike capability.119 There 
also may be a significant overlap between Pakistan’s normal conventional 
operational command and control structures that would be subject to attack in a 
large-scale war and its strategic command and control structure. If Pakistan lost 
command and control of its strategic forces, national command authorities 
could consider ordering the use of remaining strategic nuclear forces while they 
could still affect some degree of deterrence. Pakistan must be able to identify and 
attack India’s C4I to cause appreciable loss of command and control to India’s 
strategic force during a conventional war. This precept is reinforced by several 
factors, including India’s reliance on negative control features, and its greater 
strategic depth. 
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   There are no indications that India has pre-delegated nuclear release authority. 
However, New Delhi might find that its strategic command and control functions 
are unable to cope with the effects of a full-scale conventional war.  
 
  Under such circumstances, India’s senior leadership may have to cobble together 
a system while under pressure. There are no indications that Pakistan has pre-
delegated nuclear release authority. However, it too may find that its strategic 
command and control functions are unable to cope with the effects of a full-scale 
war. Pakistan would be under tremendous pressure to create a workable system if 
its strategic command and control system is at risk. Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear 
deterrence could force it to adopt pre-delegation of nuclear release authority if there 
were no other method to ensure delivery. 
        
   Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan almost certainly 
would include air and ballistic missile attacks. Attacks by these inherently dual-
use systems have the potential to be interpreted as pre-emptive attacks to destroy or 
neutralize the adversary’s nuclear capability. This is especially true for Pakistan 
since India has invested heavily in improving its intelligence gathering and 
precision-strike capability. Pakistan may believe that India was trying to gain the 
ability to launch a pre-emptive attack and deny Pakistan the ability to counter with 
an effective second-strike with a reduced force. This concern could lead Pakistan to 
adopt a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack posture where any Indian air- or 
ballistic missile attack could be interpreted as a pre-emptive strike and cause 
Pakistan to launch its nuclear weapons. 
        
   Pakistan’s limited ability to identify and attack India’s strategic nuclear assets 
probably precludes any appreciable loss of India’s retaliatory capability even if 
Pakistan launched a pre-emptive attack. This condition is reinforced by India’s 
greater strategic depth, and its superior air and ballistic missile defenses. An air- or 
ballistic missile attack on India probably would elicit a strong response, but 
probably not a nuclear response. 
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   India and Pakistan do not want war; and they certainly do not want to fight a 
nuclear war. As strong as this desire is, however, New Delhi and Islamabad are 
caught in a spiral of tension and mistrust that could cause the next regional crisis to 
flair into armed conflict. If India and Pakistan do find themselves engaged in a 
large-scale conventional war, escalation to a nuclear exchange probably would be 
averted because of the strategic balance that now obtains. However, their 
asymmetrical conventional force capabilities and doctrines could create pressures 
for one side to launch nuclear weapons, even if they would prefer not to. Even if the 
risk of inadvertent nuclear war is judged to be low, steps should be taken to ensure 
that India and Pakistan do not become embroiled in even a limited war. The 
United States can play a constructive role in the region by taking steps to help keep 
the peace and reorienting its arms transfer policy to help stabilize the military 
balance. 
    
   The role of the United States need not be underestimated. The sense of nuclear 
apartheid has increased among many nations, particularly Muslims, due to the 
preferential treatment meted out to India by the United States and other powerful 
members of the international community. In South Asia, India pressures nuclear 
reactor suppliers to adapt the nonproliferation regime to India’s benefit. India wants 
access to nuclear reactors and other sensitive technologies that have been denied 
on nonproliferation grounds. New Delhi makes such cooperation a test of US 
willingness to elevate Indo-American relations. Russia already agreed to supply 
reactors to India prior to 1992 and, like France, may be interested in new sales if 
nonproliferation strictures could be revised. Conversely, Japan and other non-
nuclear-weapon states strongly resist “rewarding” India for its development of a 
nuclear arsenal. 
 
   Clearly the regional security and political dynamics in the Middle East, the 
Persian Gulf and South Asia relate many of these proliferation “cases” to each other. 
The security considerations of Iran, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and India affect each 
other; as important, the political symbolism of nuclear competition among these 
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states affects their leaders’ willingness to stem nuclear proliferation. Even if the 
major security rationales for seeking nuclear weapons were removed, political issues 
of equity, prestige, and partisan opportunism could make political leaders reluctant 
to abandon completely nuclear aspirations and capabilities. However, every state 
calculates its policy preferences according to the cost-benefit analysis. If the costs 
of nuclearization outweigh the security or political considerations that necessitate 
it, the state is more likely to withdraw its nuclear program. Nuclear arms reduction 
and conflict resolution go hand in hand. The resolution of major international 
disputes is the best guarantee against vertical and horizontal nuclearization. 
 
   Pakistan has declared that its commitment to minimum nuclear deterrence stems 
from the fact that India’s tests of May 1998 brought about a new strategic instability, 
and it was the need to sustain a credible deterrence that led Pakistan to test overtly 
in response.120 The stability of a minimal level of nuclear deterrence lies in 
preventing a spiraling arms race in areas such as fissile materials, ballistic missiles 
and conventional forces. India’s policy of buttressing its conventional forces 
according to its nuclear doctrine would increase the conventional imbalance and 
make Pakistan’s reliance on its nuclear capabilities more acute and thereby will 
lower the nuclear threshold. Pakistan declared that it was not prepared to get into 
an arms race with India. However, if India continued to move up the nuclear 
ladder, Pakistan, while not seeing the need to match weapon for weapon, would be 
compelled to keep the minimum credible deterrence at a higher numbers’ level. 
 
   Although India has also stressed “minimum deterrence”,121 however its’ doctrine and 
arsenal development depict the nuclear expansion and the development of a 
triad of weapon-systems. Pakistan’s commitment to a low level of deterrence 
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has led it to focus primarily on land-based missile delivery systems, centering on 
medium range missiles, with an emphasis on improving the Circular Error 
Probabilities (CEPs) and solid fuel capabilities of its existing missile categories. 
The Ghauri I (1,500 kilometer range with a 700 kg payload), Ghauri II (2,000 – 2,300 
km range with a 1,000 kg payload) and Shaheen series (solid-fuelled) serve as 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ delivery systems. 
 
   In the matter of No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has chosen to 
keep its options open. It considers it justifiable in view of its geo-strategic security 
compulsions. Nonetheless, President Pervez Musharraf made clear during the 2002 
Compound Crisis that nuclear weapons would only be used as a weapon of last 
resort. Besides, NFU “has never been accepted as the basis for determining the 
deterrent postures of any of the Nuclear Weapon States.” Pakistan’s nuclear 
doctrine is that of a strategic restraint regime. Pakistan sees this as comprising 
reciprocal agreements with India on nuclear, missile and conventional restraint. 
 
   Pakistan has declared it wishes to pursue Arms Control and Disarmament at the 
global and regional levels, while maintaining minimal deterrence. While both 
India and Pakistan have refused to join NPT as non-nuclear states, Pakistan 
appears to have been more agreeable to signing FMCT. Pakistan supports the 
CTBT in principle, but needs to build up national consensus on the issue, so that it 
could be ratified. In its pursuit of strategic stability in South Asia, besides the 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia proposal in the United Nations General 
Assembly in the wake of the 1974 Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan proposed talks on 
conventional arms control and disarmament as well as CBMs and nuclear restraint 
between Pakistan, India, Russia, China and the US (the five states proposal). 
This was followed by a 5+2 proposal to include UK and France and then the 
5+2+2 proposal to include Japan and Germany also. Pakistan proposed a Zero-
Missile Regime for South Asia in 1994, and ratified the International Convention 
on Nuclear Safety on 30 September 1997. In keeping with the requirements of this 
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convention, Pakistan created its nuclear regulatory authority (PNRA) for civilian 
nuclear matters in 2001.122 
 
   Pakistan has developed its land-based missile forces as its main delivery system. Its 
strategic missiles range from SRBMs to MRBMs. To secure its nuclear assets, the 
National Command Authority (NCA) was formally set up on 7 February 2000. 
Within the NCA there is a bifurcation of functions with two committees 
functioning under NCA: The Employment Control Committee and the 
Development Control Committee. The safety and stability of the nuclear arsenal is 
ensured with a central command structure. However, the credibility of Pakistan’s 
minimum deterrence posture could be threatened by Indian acquisition of high-tech 
systems including Russian aerial platforms and the Phalcon radar system.123 Even 
without the Arrow system, the Patriot and S300V missiles will upset the strategic 
deterrence. The nuclear stability on the Subcontinent is also threatened by the 
new Indian war doctrine’s notion of integrated battle groups drawn from the navy 
and air force, known as “Cold Start” strategy. Further, the US by giving legitimation 
to Indian nuclear status, has thereby created strategic disparity/instability, from 
Pakistani vantage point, in the region. 
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INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: 
 
   The Indian nuclear doctrine is premised on a nuclear triad of forces,124 that is land-
based, air- launched and submarine launched nuclear weapons. It provides for 
second-strike capability, that is, the ability to survive a nuclear attack and 
retaliate requires massive capability far beyond the stated “minimum deterrence”. It 
envisions massive retaliation: “Nuclear retaliation for a first strike will be massive 
and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”125 There is a desire to develop 
ICBMs,126 as well as space-based systems. There exists a growing commitment to 
nuclear defense/war fighting rather than just deterrence, with plans to acquire 
missile defense systems. 
 
   The doctrine envisions limited No First Use, in that the commitment is not applicable 
against a NNWS allied to a NWS.127 In 2003, in its enunciation of its NCA— which 
actually was a further expansion of the nuclear doctrine—India has expanded the 
operational parameters for its nuclear doctrine. It will not only use nuclear 
weapons against a nuclear strike against its own territory but will also use nuclear 
weapons against a nuclear strike on Indian forces “anywhere.” Also, it will use 
nuclear weapons even to counter a chemical or biological attack “against India or 
Indian forces anywhere”,128 effectively a “First Use” principle and applicable against 
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a non-nuclear state. This development is in line with the new US preemptive 
doctrine and the US Nuclear Posture Review whereby the US has begun to 
rationalize the military viability of nuclear weapons, even against certain non-
nuclear states that may possess other weapons of mass destruction. 
 
   The Indian Nuclear Doctrine, in effect, means that India plans to target the whole 
Asian region. Its naval reach threatens the entire Indian Ocean region. As with the 
nuclear tests, the missile defense part of the Indian nuclear doctrine will instigate a 
nuclear and missile arms race, and since there is no commitment to reduce 
conventional forces so the threat to neighbors is doubled. The doctrine shows Indian 
intent to retain and develop its nuclear capability. The doctrine envisions the use of 
this capability to push for “great power” status. It negates several measures for 
mutual restraint identified in the Lahore Declaration’s MoU dealing with the nuclear 
issue, including a commitment “to adopt measures for promoting a stable 
environment of peace and security between the two countries.”129 The Indian 
Nuclear Doctrine would make it difficult for Pakistan to sustain its commitment to 
a nuclear restraint regime, especially with the Indian decision to opt for missile 
defense systems.130 
   In January 2003, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security approved the draft 
nuclear doctrine as official doctrine and went a step further than the nuclear 
doctrine drafting group (NDDG) had done in committing the country to a 
possible nuclear response to attack from any source by biological and 
chemical weapons. This is something the drafters had resisted including in the 
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doctrine despite some pressures from within the group to do so. It was argued that 
a nuclear reply to the use of biological weapons against Indian targets, say, made 
li ttle sense because it would (a) be difficult conclusively to differentiate a 
biological weapon attack from the sudden onset of an epidemic due to natural 
causes, as happened with the breakout of plague in Surat in the early 1990s, (b) be 
harder still to prove that this or that country was responsible for it, and in the event 
(c) be foolish and foolhardy in the extreme to retaliate with nuclear weapons against 
any state on such flimsy basis. 
 
   But, the Indian government in its wisdom apparently decided there will be no 
problems in identifying the villainous country nor that any danger of rapid 
escalation exists in meting out swift and condign punishment of the kind 
contemplated here. It implies that New Delhi would be prepared to nuke a 
country on mere suspicion that it used biological/chemical weapons. The Indian 
government has not clarified whether proven use of biological/chemical weapons 
by a terrorist organization allegedly based in Pakistan, will result in a nuclear 
strike on that country. This is so obviously a disproportionate and incredible 
response, and accentuates regional instability. 
 
THE US NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: 
    
   It has been noted in this dissertation, that in the case of Iran, as well as North Korea, 
and others in the past, it was primarily the threat to regime survival (either from 
regional actors or extra-regional actor as in the case of Iran vis-à-vis the US) that 
propelled the nuclear program. Therefore, it is posited that in Iran’s case, it would be 
more sensible to foreclose the option of regime-change at the policy level, in order for 
nuclear talks for a ‘package deal’ etc. to be initiated. In order to understand the South 
Asian and Middle Eastern nuclear environments, it would be relevant to take a look 
at emerging US nuclear postures. As demonstrated by the Cold War, while 
regional conflicts have their own trajectories, yet they remain susceptible to 
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influences from the international environment. The US nuclear strategy has been 
discussed here with its implications upon the international system as a whole. In 
2002, the US government produced its policy for the emerging international 
politics. It was the ‘National Security Strategy’. The policy paper affirmed the 
Bush administration’s lexicon of ‘preemption’ as a full-fledged position in the 
American vision of the future world. In a post-9/11 world, the nature of perceived 
threats to the US had changed. This was reflected in the US policy of preemption 
taking the place of traditional notion of deterrence. The VNSAs that now 
threatened US global interests could not be deterred through traditional methods 
because of the absence of a return address. This changing threat environment 
had prompted policymakers to reconsider deterrence as the cornerstone of defense 
policies. The ‘shock and awe’ policy had failed to deter anti-American terrorists in 
Iraq. Besides, the dangers of nuclear proliferation had convinced US policy-
makers that a preemptive strike would be the best bet against a state in the process 
of building nuclear weapons, instead of waiting to act t i l l  it has acquired the 
capability. However, it has been noted in this dissertation, that in the case of Iran, as 
well as North Korea, and others in the past, it was the threat to regime survival that 
propelled the nuclear program. Therefore, the threat of regime-change could be 
counterproductive in this case.  
 
   The NSS further noted that the traditional differentiation between internal and 
external security was fading. Most terrorist activities were reportedly planned 
inside the US. Changes in US military structure and policy reflected this 
renewed attention to the issues of preventive war, preemption and warfighting. 
 
   The December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) unveiled a new strategic 
triad, consisting of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear precision-strike capabilities, and 
passive and active defenses. The Bush administration’s new strategic triad was 
intended to integrate defenses (i.e., missile defense), nuclear weapons and 
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“non-nuclear strike forces”131 into a seamless web of capabilities to dissuade 
potential competitors from mounting a military challenge to the United States,132 to 
deter adversaries and to fight and win wars if deterrence fails. The NPR noted that 
the strike elements “ . . .can provide greater flexibility in the design and conduct of 
military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities 
may be particularly useful to l imi t  collateral damage and conflict escalation. The 
NPR emphasizes technology as a substitute for nuclear forces that are withdrawn 
from service. Global real-time command and control and reconnaissance 
capabilities will take on greater importance in the new strategic triad.”133 
 
   The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction was the development of Grand Strategy for the US. Of the many 
fundamental changes legislated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the 
requirement for the President to submit an annual comprehensive report to the 
United States Congress on the national security strategy of the United States is 
arguably the most far reaching. The National Security Strategy report was 
envisioned to be the pre-eminent document used to define the worldwide interests, 
goals and objectives of the United States. This report was to induce: a 
comprehensive description and discussion of the foreign policy; worldwide 
commitments and national defense capabilities of the United States; the proposed 
short-term and long-term uses of the elements of national power required to protect 
and promote the interests and achieve the stated goals and objectives; and to 
provide an assessment of the capabilities of the United States to implement its 
national security strategy. Consequently, in 1987, 1988, 1994, 1998, and 2002 
National Security Strategy Reports were submitted by the President to the 
                                                 
131 Ibid. 
132 News Transcript from the United States Department of Defense, Briefing by J.D. Crouch, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy, Wednesday, January 9, 2002, p. 6. 
 
133 Ibid. 
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Congress. The intent of Goldwater-Nichols was providing a unifying (grand) 
strategy for the United States. 
 
   The Bush administration’s new “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,” released to the public on December 11 ,  2002,134 asserts that 
“weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in 
the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security 
challenges facing the United States.” The three pillars of the Bush strategy are: 
counterproliferation to combat WMD use, enhanced nonproliferation to combat 
WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use. 
 
  While WMDs were viewed during and immediately after the Cold War as 
weapons of last resort, the Bush strategy observed that WMDs were “militarily 
useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation’s advantages in 
conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our 
friends and all ies in regions of vital interest.” “In addition,” the new strategy 
asserted, “terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of 
ki l l ing large numbers of our people and those of our friends and allies—without 
compunction and without warning.” 
 
   Further, the NSS stated, “the inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy 
of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm” all contribute to a clear 
and present danger.135 
                                                 
134 The concept of dissuasion is a new term in US doctrine. It apparently suggests that US military 
forces will be so technologically and operationally superior, that potential competitors will 
abandon efforts to challenge the United States. Efforts at dissuasion, however, might simply 
channel the military strategies and capabilities of potential competitors away from US strengths 
to attack US vulnerabilities, i.e., to adopt asymmetric strategies. 
 
135 The NPR can be found at the globalsecurity.org website.  
 
 165
COUNTERPROLIFERATION: 
 
   The first pillar of the new WMD strategy is counterproliferation to combat WMD 
use. It is a policy that the Department of Defense (DoD) had been carrying out for 
over nine years. Counterproliferation referred to the full range of military 
preparations and activities to deter, defeat, and defend against the threat posed 
by WMD-armed adversaries. The three key elements of the Bush 
administration’s counterproliferation strategy were deterrence, interdiction, and 
defense and mitigation. 
 
   The Bush administration proclaimed the US government’s “right to respond with 
overwhelming force— including through resort to all of our options—to the use of 
WMD against the United States, its forces abroad, and friends and allies.” 
 
   In addition, the new strategy called for improved military and civilian capabilities to 
defeat and defend against WMD use—including missile defenses and force 
enhancements such as intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and even domestic 
law enforcement—which combined to strengthen deterrence by “devaluing an 
adversary’s WMD and missiles.” Recognizing that deterrence may not succeed, 
and that WMD employment against the US population or military forces could be 
devastating, the new strategy required US military forces and appropriate civilian 
agencies to be prepared to “detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before 
these weapons are used” and to have in place “robust active and passive defenses 
and mitigation measures” to enable US authorities to accomplish their missions, 
and to assist friends and allies when WMDs were used. The counterproliferation 
policy had introduced a new element of interdiction. The Bush administration 
planned enhancing, 
 
   “the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement 
communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and 
expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.”  
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   The seizure of a North Korean ship carrying Scud missiles bound for Yemen was 
evidence of this new approach. Because the missiles were going to a close a l l y  
in the war on terrorism, the shipment was allowed to sail on to Yemen, but the 
outcome would have been different had the ultimate recipient been a US adversary, 
such as Iraq, or a stateless terrorist group, such as al-Qaeda. The episode, however, 
resulted in the enunciation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which 
generally permitted interdiction on the high seas. 
 
   The Bush administration’s non-proliferation diplomacy stipulated suspending 
multilateral negotiations on the compliance and transparency protocol of the 
thirty-year old Biological and Toxin Weapon convention, cutting funding for 
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs initiated to counter the danger of Soviet 
legacy WMDs, and accepting India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states. 
The new WMD strategy promised to “actively employ diplomatic approaches in 
bilateral and multilateral settings in pursuit of our nonproliferation goals.” 
 
   The third pillar of the new WMD strategy was responsiveness to the consequences 
of WMD use against the American homeland or US forces abroad, and to assist 
friends and allies if they came under WMD attack. The new National Strategy for 
Homeland Security called for greater preparedness to prevent, protect against, and 
respond to acts of terrorism on American soil,136 and the (recently established) 
Department of Homeland Security would have unprecedented resources and 
responsibilities to face the threat posed by the consequences of WMD use.137 
        
                                                 
136 Cohen, William S. “Message of the Secretary of Defense,” in the Department of Defense, 
Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, December 2002. 
137 The National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002. 
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   The most important aspect of the President’s strategy on WMD was the fact of 
policy formulation about WMDs at the highest levels of the government. Previously 
the State Department was responsible for nonproliferation, the Defense 
Department looked after counterproliteration, and domestic authorities oversaw 
homeland security. With a national strategy a l l  these areas had been combined in 
the form of a single defensive effort. “What’s new here is that we have a 
comprehensive strategy,” a senior administration official said during a White 
House background briefing, “Every administration comes under criticism for not 
having an integrated strategy on issues like this. We do.”  
 
   As a practical step toward counterproliferation, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) was a political framework for an ad hoc cooperative effort by a 
number of states to restrict WMD-trafficking in the air, on land and at sea. Its 
aims, informally and p i t h i l y  summarized by a senior US official, were to create 
a basis “for action to ensure that, if proliferators manage to place their deadly 
cargoes aboard a ship, plane, or truck, we are prepared to stop them in their 
tracks.” Begun in May 2003, the core group of PSI, numbering around 16 states, 
includes the UK, the US, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Russia, Japan and Singapore. The core states are attempting to gain global support 
for the initiative; altogether more than 70 states have expressed political support for 
the Statement of Interdiction Principles agreed at the PSI meeting in Paris on 
September 4, 2003. The initiative aims to enhance coordinated efforts to impede 
and stop sea, air and land shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related 
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to 
prevent ‘WMD proliferation facilitators’ from trading in such goods.  
        
   The Statement of Interdiction Principles set out the kinds of practical 
implementation steps that the participating states had agreed to take. They 
included reviewing and strengthening national laws, streamlining information-
sharing procedures, preventing anyone under the jurisdiction of the participating 
state from transporting such goods to actors of proliferation concern, and permitting 
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or undertaking interdiction (interception) efforts. Under the initiative, ‘states or non-
state actors of proliferation concern’ were countries or entities that the PSI states 
establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they were engaged in 
proliferation through efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems, or transfers of WMD, their 
delivery systems or related materials. As part of the initiative, a number of air, ground 
and sea interdiction training-exercises, organized by the UK, US, France and 
Australia, among others, had been held and more were planned. The US had also 
recently signed ship-boarding treaties with two of the largest shipping-registry 
states, Liberia and Panama. The treaties permit the US under certain 
circumstances to forcibly stop, search and detain ships flying Panamanian or 
Liberian flags that were suspected of transporting WMD and related goods. The 
treaties also contained provisions allowing Liberia and Panama speedily to grant 
permission to a third state to undertake similar operations against their flag-flying 
ships. However, concerns had been raised that the initiative aims to permit 
the interdiction of ships on the high seas over which the PSI states had no 
jurisdiction. On its face, however, the Statement of Interdiction Principles was 
consistent with international law, including the law of the sea, and encourages 
measures that were consistent with international law and the laws of the 
participating states. 
 
   The PSI did not itself provide any legal basis for intercepting suspected shipping 
on the high seas without flag state consent. There would be a problem in international 
law only if the U.S. (or other PSI partners) undertook interdiction operations without 
host stale consent and in reliance on a wide doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense. 
But that was what the U.S. policy planners seemed to have had in mind. The incident 
with the So San was the trigger that led to the realization that the U.S. needed 
more sweeping legal powers to interdict foreign vessels. 
 
   In late 2002, United States officials learned that an unflagged merchant vessel -the 
So San - had left the North Korean port of Nampo bearing suspicious cargo, 
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heading west toward an unknown destination. The So Sun eventually was 
intercepted on the high seas some 600 miles off the coast of Yemen by the Spanish 
frigate Navarra, part of the international coalition patrolling the Arabian Sea in 
search of fleeing members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Spanish troops boarded 
the So San’s by helicopter after it attempted to flee, and with the assistance of US 
personnel eventually discovered 15 Scud missiles and 24 tanks of rocket fuel 
additive hidden beneath the So Son’s declared cargo of cement. But there was a 
caveat in the interdiction operation - the missiles had been legally purchased from 
North Korea by the government of Yemen. Press Secretary Ari Fleischer 
accordingly explained that “[w]hile there is authority to stop and search, in this 
instance there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of Scud missiles from 
North Korea to Yemen. And therefore, the merchant vessel is being released.” 
The same day, the White House released the National Strategy to Combat Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (NS-CWMD), a policy paper identifying proliferation as a 
grave threat to US national security.  
 
   According to the NS-CWMD, interdiction is a “critical part of the US strategy to 
combat WMD and their delivery means.” But the So San incident dramatically 
illustrated an important limitation on interdiction as a tool of counter-proliferation 
policy: decision-makers may be reluctant to use the interdiction option if they lack 
plausible authority under international law to stop and search the target and to 
seize dangerous cargo discovered as a result. This dilemma did not go unnoticed. 
Speaking in Krakow in May 2003, President Bush surprised many observers by 
declaring a new counter-proliferation initiative:  
 
   “When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have 
the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to light 
proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and a 
number of our close allies . . . have begun working on new agreements to search 
planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile 
technologies. Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to 
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keep the world’s most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands 
of our common enemies.” 
 
   John R. Bolton, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
stated his government’s position while addressing the Federalist Society, 
Washington, DC, on November 13, 2003: “The PSI is, without question, 
legitimate and will be extremely efficient in its efforts against weapons of mass 
destruction.” He said the PSI, created by the United States “and 10 close allies and 
friends,” sought to stop proliferant behavior by interdicting shipments of critical 
weapons and technologies “to prevent hostile states and terrorists from acquiring 
these dangerous capabilities.” Bolton said, “the governments of participating 
countries have conducted thorough reviews of this initiative, and we are very 
confident that we have substantial legal authority to conduct interdiction operations. 
“[W]here there are gaps or ambiguities in our authorities, we may consider seeking 
additional sources for such authority, as circumstances dictate,” he said. “What we 
do not believe, however, is that only the [UN] Security Council can grant the 
authority we need, and that may be the real source of the criticism we face.” 
        
   The international law basis for this entire project of interdicting land, air or sea 
shipments of materials was scanty. It had the flavor of a vigilante operation related to 
the pre-emption policy. If these actions were confined to national territories, 
national air space, and territorial waters of participant states with domestic 
legislation that made WMD materials contraband and subject to seizure, and to 
aircraft and vessels that were owned or registered by participant states and thus fell 
under their jurisdiction, there might have been a legal basis for action. However, 
neither vessels nor aircraft in international waters or international airspace owned 
by countries not participating in the Initiative nor the territory of those countries 
were covered. Moreover, the Law of the Sea Treaty provided for peaceful 
passage of territorial waters even of countries that belonged to the Initiative. Countries 
like China were predictably apprehensive about possible inroads on their 
sovereignty from this measure. In the view of the Chinese government, “... the 
legality of some of the PSI measures has some negative aspects that could result in 
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bad consequences and have raised a lot of concerns. PSI member states should 
earnestly consider this ...”138 
 
   On December 3, 2003, China released a White Paper on i ts  non-proliferation 
policy and measures. It states that, “... the international non-proliferation mechanism 
must be continually improved and export controls of individual countries must be 
updated and strengthened, and on the other hand, proliferation issues must be settled 
through dialogue and international cooperation.”139 Stressing the need to consider the 
development of the initiative within a multinational framework, Mr Jianchao, 
spokesperson for the Chinese government argued, “... China has all along 
maintained that the resolution of non-proliferation issues should be done within 
the framework of international law and based on political and diplomatic methods 
to resolve proliferation concerns ... Any non-proliferation efforts should be 
beneficial to regional and international peace, security and stability”.’ 
 
   According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, interdiction 
on the high seas is permissible under the following exceptional circumstances: 
 
• Interdiction by Permission:  When the ‘flag State’ permits the boarding of 
i t s  vessel. 
• Interdiction of Stateless Vessels: Ships that are not the ‘flag earners’ of any 
state. 
• Interdiction: Where the Vessel in Reality Is of the Same Nationality:  
Such a situation, obviously, does not present any legal complications. 
• Interdiction to Suppress Prohibited Activities: the Convention specifies 
three types of undesirable activities justifying interference with freedom of 
                                                 
138 Bolton, John. “‘Legitimacy’ in International Affairs: The American Perspective in Theory and 
Operation”. Remarks to the Federalist Society Washington, DC 13lh November 2003. 
139 See “China voices concern over WMD non-proliferation plan’s legality” in HiPakistan, 
December 9, 2003. 
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navigation - piracy, slave trading, and unauthorized broadcasting. 
Proliferation concerns, in contrast, are not mentioned at a l l  in the 
Convention. The absence of any non- proliferation legislation in the arena 
of the Customary Law has resulted in the situation where the suspected 
presence of WMDs or missiles aboard a foreign vessel on the high seas 
does not - standing alone - authorize search or seizure at this time. 
• Interdiction as a Form of Anticipatory Self-Defense: This is a final possibility. 
The traditional notion of anticipatory self defense measured by the test stated 
by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in connection with the famous case of 
the Caroline, was squashed by the Bush Administration in its National 
Security Strategy of the United States in September 2002: “We must adapt 
the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s 
adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using 
conventional means. . . . Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, 
the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily 
concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. . . . The greater the 
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and   the  more  compelling  the  
case   for  taking  anticipatory  action  to  defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” 
 
   In the given circumstances the US and its allies who have joined the PSI, had 
the following options for generating legal authority for interdiction: 
 
? Expand the Permission Network - Bring in more states. 
? Amend the Convention - As noted, the Convention permits 
interference with freedom of navigation to suppress certain 
undesirable activities such as i l l i c i t  broadcasting. An effort 
should   be made to add i l l ic i t  WMD and missile transactions to 
this list. 
? Amend the Proliferation Treaties - To strengthen 
compliance regimes and to provide authority for PSI 
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interdictions in the event of an illegal WMD or missile 
transfer. 
? Playing the Security Council Card - Security Council 
approval would eliminate all questions of authorization for 
PSI interdictions. The apprehensions of the Chinese and 
Russians about PSI would have to be addressed at that forum.140 
? Seek the endorsement of regional organizations. 
 
? In short, the PSI needed to be further multilateralized.141 
Multilateral treaties represent promising tools for endeavors like 
the Proliferation Security Initiative: 
 
? T h e  multilateral treaties are all-inclusive and promote 
cooperation among and integration of all states. Initiatives 
involving cooperation among like-minded states are often 
criticized as exclusive clubs. These initiatives do not include 
the states of most concern and tend to antagonize rather than 
promote cooperation with these states. 
? The provisions of the treaties can extend beyond regulating 
state actions in their requirement for national implementation. 
Thus each   state   party   takes   the necessary measures to 
implement the articles of the treaty. 
? The full and universal implementation of the treaties would 
entail wide-ranging measures addressing the threat of terrorists 
gaining access to WMDs. 
? The extent of these treaties is not limited to the texts of the 
treaties. It is actively strengthened through review conferences. 
Agreements reached at these conferences, while not legally 
binding, are politically binding. 
                                                 
140 White paper on “China’s non-proliferation policy and measures”, chapter 1, paragraph 2 in fine. 
141 Op. cit. 
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   Multilateral instruments can be flexible, involve new approaches, and adapt to 
current realities, yet these instruments are not being used to their full potential.35 
Multilateral disarmament treaties (and in the case of the PSI: self-regulation by a l l  
states of their territorial waters) are not being used effectively for three main 
reasons: 
•  A crisis in leadership: The US has long been a leader in promoting 
international cooperation on disarmament and non-proliferation. Since the Bush 
administration took office in 2000, it set the global agenda unilaterally without 
much regard for establishing a multilateral consensus. The Bush administration 
called for “effective multilateralism”. In reality, the Bush administration used a 
strategy of “selective multilateralism” and embraced international regimes mostly 
in rhetoric rather than in deed. The Bush administration also indicated that it had no 
intention of improving the effectiveness of these regimes by strengthening them 
from within. Instead, the administration was determined to pursue US interests 
outside of these frameworks with other like-minded states. The lack of US support 
for multilateral regimes had compromised progress on disarmament and non-
proliferation and jeopardized the staying power of these regimes, which are 
dangerously close to becoming relics of the Cold War. 
• A shift from non-proliferation and disarmament to counter-proliferation: 
There has been a notable shift from non-proliferation and disarmament to 
counter-proliferation. According to John Bolton, it is the long-term objective of the 
US “to create a web of counter-proliferation partnerships.” There is certainly room 
for these types of initiatives. However, there is a danger in creating an 
imbalance between supply-side initiatives such as the PSI and demand-side 
instruments such as the multilateral disarmament treaties. The current emphasis 
on counter-proliferation combined with the lack of action and leadership on the part 
of the US with regard to multilateral disarmament regimes may lead to increased 
demand for WMD. In this case, supply-side instruments will be forced to expand and 
become more and more costly in the long-term. 
• Lack of political will to implement the treaties and strengthen them to 
meet current threats: The multilateral treaties are not effective on their own. They 
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are essentially broad international frameworks for addressing these global issues. 
To be effective, these regimes must be implemented fully through the 
development and enforcement of national legislation and measures. The non-
proliferation and disarmament regimes are tools for addressing the threat of WMD, 
not actors. They are only as effective as their users allow them to be. 
 
If the US and its allies resort to selective multilateralism and core-group initiatives on 
issues of non-proliferation and nuclear security, the ensuing division at the global 
level would mean that other countries forming groups of their own would use the 
same legal justifications, and international security would eventually be more 
compromised than strengthened (the international division at the time of Iraq War in 
2003 encapsulated US’ crisis of leadership). In this regard, the PSI, among other non-
proliferation initiatives, presents an opportunity of moving towards inclusive 
approaches, and enhancing the body of International Law by calling upon its spirit  of 
multilateralism.  
 
IRAN’S PROJECTED  
NUCLEAR POSTURE: 
   
  Few meaningful data are available on Iranian nuclear doctrine and targeting, 
assuming any current plans would even be relevant in the future. In the absence of 
clear enunciation of strategic objectives, the same is true of Iranian plans to limit 
the vulnerability of its weapons and facilities – and whether Iran would try to create 
a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack capability. It is easy to speculate at vast 
length on what Iran would do with nuclear weapons. It is impossible, however, to 
determine how aggressively Iran would exploit such a capability in terms of 
threatening or intimidating its neighbors, or putting pressure on the West. Trying to 
guess at Iran’s war fighting doctrine and actions in using weapons of mass 
destruction simply lacks meaningful data. However, Iran’s progress toward a 
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nuclear bomb would lead to further expansion of Iran’s regional influence. There 
are certain trends that need to be noted.  
• In recent years, Iran has signed bilateral agreements with a number of regional 
countries, among them Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These deals are an 
indication that the countries of the Middle East are preparing for a nuclear 
Iran, and that they do not expect the US to stay in the region long enough to 
protect them. 
• The second trend that is likely to emerge in the near future is a new arms race 
in the Middle East. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have shown signs of seeking 
expanded strategic capabilities in order to counterbalance a potential Iranian 
bomb. 
• The third trend that could be expected is expanded proliferation. Iran is 
already a “secondary proliferator,” and Iran could provide nuclear technology 
to other Muslim states.  
• The fourth trend is increased radicalism. Iran is already supporting radical 
groups in Lebanon and Iraq, and if it has the nuclear muscle to back it up, Iran 
will be bound to feel greater freedom to export its radical revolutionary 
principles. 
• Fifth, we can expect an upsurge in strategic blackmail emanating from the 
Islamic Republic. Given its strategic location atop the Strait of Hormuz, Iran 
has the ability to virtually dictate energy terms to the United States and 
Europe. 
• The sixth trend is regime longevity. Iran today is in ferment, with rampant 
social discontent, unemployment and drug use. All of this, however, is likely 
to change if the regime acquires the bomb. The closer the Iranian regime gets 
to a nuclear capability, the more its leaders will feel that they can repress their 
domestic opposition without serious repercussions from the international 
community. An Iranian bomb, in short, will fundamentally alter the 
relationship between the regime and its population. 
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Hence, it can be observed that the threat from Iran is expanding. Iran first tested its 
Shahab-3 medium-range missile in 1998. It is also believed to have tested a missile 
with an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warhead. And Iran is known to have tested a 
short-range ballistic missile off a barge in the Caspian Sea, indicating that it may 
hope to use a low-tech delivery system in order to attack the United States from 60 
to 100 miles offshore, where detection would be difficult. 
   Much is not known about Iran’s nuclear capabilities. But what is known about 
Iran’s nuclear capabilities is just as troubling. IAEA inspectors have indicated that 
Iran’s uranium (UF-4 and UF-6) is not of good quality, which makes enrichment 
much more difficult. What is not known is how much this complicates Iran’s 
nuclear efforts, and how long it will take to resolve. It is also not known if Iran has 
used its centrifuges to enrich UF-6, imported from China. If it has, Iran may have 
enough enriched uranium for 20-25 bombs. The biggest unknown, however, may be 
the existence of a parallel program using the same technology and being perfected 
in sites that are buried and unknown to IAEA inspectors.  
   In case of Iran’s nuclearization, the question of deterrence would come to the fore. 
There is a body of opinion that nuclear weapons bring stability through deterrence. 
The thinking goes that if Iran becomes a nuclear state, somehow this would add to 
the overall stability of the region. After all, Israel is presumed to have nuclear 
weapons, and because the Cold War “balance of terror” worked so well, it can be 
replayed on a smaller scale. 
   As discussed earlier, during the Cold War, the deterrence model was based on many 
more variables than simply the assumption that countries will not employ nuclear 
weapons because if they annihilate a country, they will be annihilated in return. One 
of the key assumptions in deterrence modeling is that of having rational actors on 
both sides. The commonly cited objection to this model in the case of Iran is if the 
Iranian leadership is not rational, or if they are working under a rational framework 
that is based on a radically different view of reality, then all bets are off. 
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   Another assumption underlying the deterrence model is that each side has full 
information about the capabilities of the other; in other words, transparency. Also, 
both sides must have a presumed or demonstrable second strike capability, meaning 
that a country can absorb the blow from the other side and then respond with 
sufficient force to annihilate the aggressor. This is necessary to forestall a first 
strike “bolt from the blue” scenario. In other words, just to get to deterrence you 
would need an arms race. Yet another requirement is open communications. 
   Furthermore, these issues are only at the high-intensity end of the conflict spectrum. 
But there are other aspects to this that make deterrence even more sophisticated. 
The value of nuclear weapons is to enable conflict (i.e. low intensity conflicts) at 
other levels of the spectrum by engaging the fear of escalation. That is the reason 
there were proxy wars during the Cold War. However, the limitations of this 
approach (threat to stability due to potential for risk-escalation) have earlier been 
discussed in South Asia’s context in the case of the Kargil crisis. 
   If Iran succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons, therefore, the US would have to stop 
talking about regime change, at least by force. Iran, on the other hand, would be 
able to employ a variety of force options. So is it possible to deter a nuclear-capable 
Iran, as was done with the Soviet Union during the decades of the Cold War? The 
answer is mixed. On the one hand, it is surmised, that Iran today is very different 
from the USSR. The latter was rigid and bureaucratic, which made their actions 
fairly easy to predict. It was known exactly what their military capabilities were and 
that their leadership did not want to go to war. In addition, by the 1950s, the Soviet 
Union was pretty much a non-ideological enemy. Iran, on the other hand, appears 
unpredictable, fanatical and religiously motivated. However, on the other hand, the 
proponents of deterrence maintain that it is relevant and workable under the 
circumstances currently prevailing in the Middle East. Moreover, under certain 
conditions, it might be the only option left. 
   There is no way to know what strategy Iran will choose in the future, or how the 
international community will respond. Iran’s possible efforts to acquire nuclear 
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weapons are an ongoing test of the entire process of arms control and the ability to 
limit nuclear proliferation. At the same time, they raise critical issues about how 
Iran might use such weapons and the security of the Gulf region -- an area with 
more than 60 percent of the world’s proven conventional oil reserves and some 37 
percent of its gas. 
   Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons is not simply a struggle over issues of 
national prestige or “rights.” It has a major potential impact on regional stability 
and future warfighting. If Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, it is possible that it 
will use them largely as a passive deterrent and means of defense. It is also possible, 
however, that Iran will use them to put direct or indirect pressure on its neighbors, 
threatening them to achieve goals it could not achieve without the explicit or tacit 
threat of weapons of mass destruction. Iranian possession of nuclear weapons, or of 
highly lethal biological weapons for that matter, would change the military map of 
the region. It would almost certainly lead to contingency planning by other nuclear 
powers to attack Iran -- certainly Israel and possibly Pakistan and India. Such 
planning in potentially “existential” conflicts takes place when there is a possibility, 
even if there is not a probability. 
   The US and allied forces in the Gulf would have to plan for nuclear war or the risk 
of nuclear escalation, and for preventive, preemptive, deterrent, and retaliatory 
options. Iran would target cities, key civilian facilities, and military targets with 
nuclear weapons and be targeted in return. The risk of misunderstandings, 
misperceptions, and miscalculations would be significant in a crisis or war both 
before any use of nuclear weapons, and during the attack and conflict termination 
phases. At the same time, it can be difficult to stop a truly dedicated Iran with either 
military operations or steps like sanctions. They might well simply push Iran into 
more concealment, more drastic options, or alternatives like biological weapons. 
This does not mean such options cannot be effective, at least in slowing any Iranian 
efforts (halting them would probably require political conditions in Iran to change). 
It does mean that no single set of actions to halt Iran can be decisive if Iran is 
determined to continue and willing to pay the cost. 
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   It is far from clear whether Iran will stop its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and it may 
be only a matter of time before it acquires nuclear weapons. However, it is very 
unclear what kind of a nuclear power Iran is or will seek to be. No plans have ever 
surfaced as to the number and type of weapons it is seeking to produce or the nature 
of its delivery forces. Iran might be content to simply develop its technology to the 
point it could rapidly build a nuclear weapon. It might choose to create an 
undeclared deterrent and limit its weapons numbers and avoid a nuclear test. It 
might test and create a stockpile, but not openly deploy nuclear-armed missiles or 
aircraft. It also, however, might create an overt nuclear force. Each option would 
lead to a different response for Saudi Arabia and Iran’s other neighbors, as well as 
provoke different responses from Israel and the US — creating different kinds of 
arms races, patterns of deterrence, and risks in the process. 
Iran can pursue a wide range of nuclear weapons development options–many of 
which could be effective even if Iran was subject to many forms of preemptive 
attack: 
• Simply carry out enough ambiguous activity to convince outside nations it has an 
active nuclear weapons effort, seeking to use the threat of development to create 
some degree of nuclear ambiguity. 
• Pause long enough to win international belief Iran now complied, while creating 
new disperse facilities and improving concealment and deception. 
• Pause most efforts, but push forward with more advanced centrifuge and possible 
laser isotope separation. Accelerate efforts to acquire boosted or thermonuclear 
weapons. Leapfrog a pause in activity by having more advanced production 
capabilities when large-scale activity resumes and more lethal weapons requiring 
less fissile material. 
• Carry out a low-level research and development effort that was covert enough to 
steadily move it towards a break out capability to rapidly create weapons 
production capabilities, but not actually build production facilities. It could 
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maintain ambiguity by using small redundant efforts, canceling efforts when 
uncovered, or pausing when acute pressure came from the outside. Developing truly 
advanced centrifuges or LIS facilities, and completing bomb design and simulation, 
before beginning development of production facilities are particularly attractive 
options. 
• Covertly develop a highly dispersed set of small and redundant production 
facilities, combing covert facilities like small “folded centrifuge” operations with 
sheltered or underground facilities. Slowly acquire actual production capability and 
begin stockpiling. 
• Rely on covert simulation to test bomb designs and their weaponization; test a 
fractional weapon underground under the cover of an earthquake, or overtly 
conduct a surface test as proof of Iran’s nuclear capability. 
• Appear to cancel most of its ambiguous activities, and wait until its civil nuclear 
reactor and technology program advances to the point where it is no longer 
dependent on outside supply, and possibly it can use some of its power reactors to 
obtain plutonium. Use compliance with the NPT to proliferate. 
• Assemble a limited number of nuclear devices without any public statement. Such 
a “bomb in the basement” strategy could allow sudden testing to prove its existence, 
be used in surprise attacks, and be linked to covert attack strategies or carried to the 
level of weaponization necessary for use in missile warhead or bomb. 
• Deploy its Shahab missiles with conventional warheads, and create a launch on 
warning/launch under attack capability mixed with sheltering and mobility. Arm the 
missiles with weapons of mass destruction once this capability is ready. 
Alternatively, covertly arm some missiles as soon as the Shahab and warheads are 
ready and/or seek at least limited missile defenses like the SA-400. Combine 
Shahab forces with air units and sea-based cruise missile units to create survivable 
and redundant forces. Either announce nuclear capability once a 
survivable/retaliatory force is in being or rely on nuclear ambiguity. 
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• Stop at fission weapons, or go on to develop “boosted” and true thermonuclear 
weapons. 
• Stop building up a force at the level of minimal assured deterrence; participate in 
an open ended arms race, seek “parity” with other regional powers like Israel – at 
least in terms of weapons numbers. 
• Rely on an area targeting capability or develop a point target capability as well. 
• Deploy its Shahab missiles as conventionally armed missiles, and give them 
mobility to hide them, or organize them with suitable warning and command and 
control system so they can launch on warning (LOW) or launch under attack 
(LUA). It can “instantly” convert part of its air force to an LOW or LUA capability 
simply by arming them with nuclear weapons and putting them on alert. Even a few 
nuclear deployments of this kind could act as a powerful deterrent to both Israel and 
the US, and do serious damage to any Gulf state or major Gulf energy facility. 
Deploy satellites to improve targeting, damage assessment, and C4I capabilities. 
• Develop small weapons, and/or radiological weapons, for possible covert delivery 
or use by extremist and/or proxy organizations. Use the threat of transfer as a 
further deterrent, execute strikes in ways where deniability of responsibility has 
some credibility, or use actual transfer to aid in attacks or for retaliatory purposes. 
It is also impossible to dismiss the possibility that Iran could respond to any 
decision to give up nuclear weapons by developing and producing advanced 
biological weapons, or that it may already have biological and nuclear efforts going 
on in parallel. It might also choose to develop and use “radiological weapons.” Such 
weapons might take three forms—all of which would interact with its potential use 
of chemical and biological weapons. 
• The first would be a "dirty weapon" using fissile material with contaminated or 
low enrichment levels that would have limited heat and blast effects, but still 
produce yields of three to five kilotons, and which would effectively poison a city if 
 183
detonated near the ground. Such a device would reduce some of the manufacturing 
and design problems inherent in creating clean or efficient nuclear weapons. 
• The second would be to use a weapon that had not been tested, which was felt to 
be unreliable, or which was on an inaccurate missile and detonate it near the ground 
so that radiation effects compensate for a failure to reach design efficiency or 
accuracy of the delivery system. 
• The third would be to use radioactive material in micro-powder or liquid form as a 
terror or unconventional weapon. It would be very difficult to get substantial 
lethality from the use of radioactive material, and such a weapon would be less 
efficient than biological weapons in terms of weight and lethality. It would, 
however, have the capacity to contaminate a key area and to create panic. 
   While the US and Russia has rejected radiological weapons because they have the 
ability to precisely control the yield from their nuclear weapons, such options might 
be attractive to Iran. As is the case with chemical and biological weapons, even the 
prospect of Iran's acquiring any such nuclear weapons has increased its ability to 
intimidate its neighbors. 
   Iran could deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons on any of its fighter-
bombers, use covert delivery means, or use its missiles. It could use its Scuds and 
some types of anti-ship missiles to deliver such warheads relatively short distances. 
Its Shahab-3 missiles could probably reach virtually all of the targets in Gulf 
countries, including many Saudi cities on the Red Sea coast and in western Saudi 
Arabia. 
   As has been discussed earlier, Iran’s Shahab-3s are probably too inaccurate and 
payload-limited to be effective in delivering conventional weapons. This does not 
mean that conventionally-armed Shahab missiles would not use terror weapons, or 
weapons of intimidation, but they could only have a major military impact – even 
against area targets – if they were armed with warheads carrying weapons of mass 
destruction. Moreover, Saudi Arabia faces the possibility of an Iranian transfer of 
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weapons of weapons of mass destruction to some anti-Saudi extremist group or 
proxy. These currently do not seem to be probable scenarios, but Saudi Arabia 
could have cause to worry.    
   It is also quite possible that Iran has not yet looked far enough beyond its nuclear 
weapons acquisition efforts to work out detailed plans for possession. There is no 
way to know if Iran would choose a relatively stable model of deterrence or 
aggressively exploit its possession politically. It is equally difficult to guess whether 
Iran would develop an aggressive doctrine for use, consider developing a launch on 
warning/launch under attack capability, or reserve the use of such a weapon as a last 
resort.142  
   As for warfighting capability, any working nuclear device Iran is likely to develop 
will be sufficient to destroy any hardened target, area target, or city in the Middle 
East if the delivery vehicle is accurate enough. Nuclear weapons do, however, differ 
sharply in their effect as they grow in size and if Iran had to rely on inaccurate 
delivery systems it not only would have to target area targets like cities and major 
energy facilities, it might have to either use multiple strikes or develop more 
advanced and higher yield nuclear weapons like “boosted weapons.” Alternatively, 
it might rely on ground bursts and fallout. Iran’s nuclear efforts will also interact 
heavily with the progress Iran makes in biological and chemical weapons programs 
and its efforts to improve its delivery capabilities. By the time Iran has significant 
nuclear capability, it may have significant missile, cruise missile, and long-range 
strike aircraft capability - although it may not have cruise missiles capable of 
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carrying a nuclear weapon. It may also have rebuilt much of its conventional 
capabilities to the point where it has significant war fighting capabilities. 
   Iran will encounter certain practical problems regardless of which weapons of mass 
destruction Iran develops and deploys: 
• Unless Iran acquires satellites it will have limited dynamic targeting capability 
and limited ability to assess the impact of any strikes it launches. Even if it does 
acquire satellites, it will experience serious problems in trying to assess damage 
and its target and escalatory options in the event of a chemical and biological 
strike or in terms of nuclear fall out. 
• It would take a major surface testing effort to be certain of the reliability and 
yield of its weapons designs, and testing of actual bombs and warheads to know 
the success of its weaponization effort – although a nuclear devise could be tested 
using non-critical materials to determine that its explosive and triggering systems 
functioned. 
• Quite aside from theoretical accuracy problems, long-range missiles are subject 
to some loss of accuracy depending on the vector they are fired in, as well as 
potential weather effects. Combined with targeting, weapons design, and other 
accuracy problems – plus reliability problems – a significant number of Iranian 
strikes might miss their targets and some might hit unintended targets. 
• Past tests have shown that efforts to apply chemical and biological lethality data 
based on laboratory or limited human testing simply do not provide anything 
approaching an accurate picture of area lethality. Nominal lethality data can be 
wrong by more than an order of magnitude–so far, by exaggerating lethality. The 
impact of nuclear strikes on large, semi-hard, area targets is very hard to predict.  
• Iranian C4I systems might not be adequate and survivable enough to maintain 
cohesive control over Iran’s weapons and launch forces. Any reliance on launch 
on warning or launch under attack virtually precludes such control, and could 
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trigger Iranian action based on false alarms or serious misunderstanding of the 
developing tactical situation. If Iran was pre-empted or subject to a first strike, its 
ability to characterize the result could be equally uncertain. 
• Iran might well have equal problems in characterizing enemy responses and 
retaliatory strikes once exchanges begin. 
• For all these reasons, Iranian command and control might well have to operate 
on the basis of grossly inadequate information in both planning operations and 
conducting them. The “fog of war” might well be exceptionally dense. 
What is clear is that if Iran acquired a working nuclear device, this would suddenly 
and radically change perceptions of the military balance in the region. Iran is likely 
to acquire such weapons at about the same time it acquires MRBMs, and this would 
be a volatile combination. Iran could then destroy any hardened target, area target, 
or city within the range of its delivery systems. 
   Iran’s Southern Gulf neighbors are vulnerable to attacks on a few cities, and even 
one successful nuclear attack might force a fundamental restructuring of their 
politics and/or economy. They are effectively “one bomb” countries. The same is 
true of Israel, although it could launch a massive retaliatory nuclear armed missile 
strike against virtually all of Iran’s cities, besides the limited missile defenses that it 
is steadily improving. Any discussion of Iran’s CBRN and missile programs is not 
complete without discussing the role of outside powers. Some of the most important 
technologies that Iran uses, particularly in its nuclear and missile programs, were 
acquired from foreign sources. Iran at times sought the help of countries in its effort 
to develop nuclear capabilities in the case of Russia, for example. At other times, 
Iran worked hard to acquire the technology covertly through legitimate institution 
and the open market in Europe, Russia, and even the United States before the 
revolution. It also attempted to acquire such expertise through the black market. 
   Regardless of the ways in which Tehran attempted to adapt new technologies, there 
is little doubt that the Iranian nuclear and missile program — and to a lesser extent 
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its CBW programs — have relied heavily on foreign help and expertise. In 2001, 
the United States Department of Defense cited Iran as one of the major concerns in 
international proliferation. It stated that “Iran, with foreign assistance, is buying and 
developing longer-range missiles, already has chemical weapons, and is seeking 
nuclear and biological capabilities.”143 
   A European assessment, dubbed an “early warning,” by British, French, German, 
and Belgian intelligence services was leaked to the press following Tehran’s 
decision to resume its nuclear research in January 2006. The estimates, reportedly, 
concluded that,  
   “In addition to sensitive good, Iran continues intensively seek the technology and know-
how for military applications of all kinds.”  
   According to the Guardian, Iran was working on acquiring such technology 
through, 
   “an extensive web of front companies, official bodies, academic institutes and middlemen 
dedicated to obtaining — in western Europe and in the former Soviet Union — the 
expertise, training, and equipment for nuclear programmes, missile development, and 
biological and chemical weapons arsenals.”144 
   The document added that Iran was using “middlemen” in Azerbaijan and Armenia 
to gather expertise in nuclear and missile technology in FSU states. According to 
the Guardian, the estimate listed more than 200 front companies, government 
offices, and academic institutions to engage in “weapons research.” 
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ISRAEL’S OPTIONS: 
   
   Israeli policy makers have been satisfied with the stance of nuclear ambiguity that 
in their view has successfully met its objectives of providing Israel nuclear 
umbrella and thereby ensuring its security. However, the challenges to Israeli 
statehood have been significant. Further, a nuclear-armed Iran would affect Israel’s 
strategic planning in significant ways. Israel would intensify its demands on the 
United States for security guarantees, new weapon systems, and a more aggressive 
US stance on anything pertaining to Iran.  
   From Israel’s creation in 1948 through 1973, the Arab rejection of Israel was 
expressed through pan-Arab nationalism. In the classic Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab 
states formed alliances in the name of Arab unity. They aimed to isolate Israel and 
to build an Arab coalition that could wage war against Israel on two or more fronts. 
This was the classic phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was the era of Arab 
unity plans and pan-Arab treaties and alliances directed against Israel.  
   The flaw of this strategy lay in the weakness of pan-Arabism. Arab states could not 
agree on objectives or on strategies to achieve them. The resulting failure of Arab 
states to coordinate led them to defeats in multi-front Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 
1967. In 1973, Egypt and Syria did launch a well-coordinated surprise Arab assault 
on Israel with partial success. Egypt then opted out of the Arab collective by 
reaching a separate peace with Israel in 1979, and the Arab-Israeli conflict came to 
an end. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict took its place. In this second stage, the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) used a mix of politics and armed struggle 
to open up new fronts against Israel: in Jordan and Lebanon, in the heyday of the 
fedayin; in the West Bank and in Gaza, during the first intifada; and in Israel proper 
in the second. However, the Palestinian struggle also stalled as the PLO grew 
inefficient and corrupt. Its absorption into the ramshackle Palestinian Authority 
(PA) amplified its weaknesses.  
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   The Palestinian movement under Yasser Arafat never really developed a coherent 
strategy. It lurched from policy to policy according to the whim of one man; and 
when Arafat died in 2004, his demise effectively marked the end of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
   In the third and present stage, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been superseded by 
the Israeli-Islamist conflict. There had always been an Islamist component to the 
resistance against Israel. One could trace it all the way back 60 years, but it had 
always played a supporting role, first to the Arab states and then to the PLO. It was 
Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamist revolution in Iran, who pioneered an 
entirely different vision of the role Islamism should play opposite Israel.  
   Khomeini rejected the view that Israel had become a fait accompli. He was not 
impressed by Israeli victories or Israeli power. Khomeini believed that Islam had 
the power to call forth the sacrifice and discipline needed to deny legitimacy to 
Israel and ultimately to defeat it.  
   To achieve that goal, Khomeini said Islamists could not rest content with a 
supporting role; they had to push themselves to the front. By establishing Hezbollah 
as an armed vanguard in Lebanon, Khomeini sought to open a new Islamist front 
against Israel, independent of the weak Arab states and the ineffective PLO. 
Hezbollah, from the moment of its creation, sent out exactly one message: Israel 
should be met only with resistance, which would ultimately be victorious.  
   The resistance alternative built up a bit of steam in the 1990s as Islamist movements 
gained ground across the Middle East. These years of the “peace process”, with the 
signing ceremonies on the White House lawn, saw Islamists building momentum. 
The Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas, filled the vacuum left by the PLO’s 
incompetence. It began to flex its muscles by launching resistance without seeking 
the approval of the PLO. Hezbollah waged a successful campaign to end the Israeli 
occupation of south Lebanon, much to the astonishment of the Arab world, which 
had come to believe that Israel left land only in return for peace treaties.  
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   Yet while Islamists rejected peace with Israel and called for resistance, they did not 
yet challenge the prerogative of the Arab states and the PLO to design a grand 
strategy toward Israel; that is, until most recently this past year.  
   Now, two developments have put the Islamists in the driver’s seat. First, Palestinian 
elections in January 2006 carried Hamas to power in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Hamas has regarded the elections as much more than a mandate to substitute good 
governance for PLO corruption. They see it as a mandate to bend Palestinian 
strategy to the Islamist vision of gradual attrition of Israel.  
   Second, Iran’s nuclear drive under President Ahmadinejad has revitalized the idea 
that Israel can be confronted on the external front. The possible combination of 
Iranian nukes, Hezbollah rockets, and Hamas resistance has excited the jihadists. 
Last summer brought the Islamist coalition into play against Israel for the first time. 
It was not the war that Iran would have chosen. Iranian strategy would have 
deployed the coalition at a moment of its own choosing, probably closer to the 
make-or-break moment in Iran’s nuclear plans. Yet Israel preferred to meet the 
challenge early by launching what was, effectively, a pre-emptive war against 
Hezbollah’s missiles, rockets, and infrastructure.  
   The verdict on the war is still out. However, the war does offer some glimpses into 
the possible character of this Israeli-Islamist conflict by showing the intrinsic 
strengths and weaknesses of this Islamist coalition. The strengths of the Islamist 
coalition include ideological discipline and leadership authority. The Islamist 
coalition also brings together a very flexible mix of assets, comprised, as it is, of a 
state actor (Iran), a quasi-state actor (Hamas), and a sub-state actor (Hezbollah). 
They have developed innovative weapons systems, with suicide bombings and 
rockets that go over and around Israel’s conventional strengths.  
   In the Lebanon War, there was evidence that this kind of mix could be very 
effective in identifying and exploiting Israel’s vulnerabilities. Moreover, if Iran 
were to acquire nuclear weapons, this would give this coalition a card no previous 
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adversary has held. Nuclear weapons in Iran’s hands would transform Israel’s small 
size from an advantage—and it has been an advantage; for example, short lines of 
supply—into a liability, a total vulnerability to one strike. An Iranian nuclear 
weapon could transform the Israeli-Islamist conflict into a dangerous game in which 
periodic nuclear alert crises could bring about the economic, the political, and even 
the demographic attrition of Israel.  
   On the other side of the ledger, the Islamist coalition also has weaknesses. First, as 
has been mentioned, its backbone is Shi’a. Some Sunnis, including Islamists, see 
the coalition as a threat to traditional Sunni primacy as much as it currently poses a 
threat to Israel. Saudi Arabia in particular has been mobilizing against the Iranian-
led coalition, which makes it more difficult for the coalition to keep Sunni Islamists 
in its orbit. Moreover, while the coordination between Iran and Hezbollah is total, 
Hamas does have its own approach, which reflects its own predicament and 
constraints imposed by the Arab states on which it depends.  
   The other major weakness of the anti-Israel coalition is its lack of direct access to 
Israel’s borders. The unmarked turf between Israel and the West Bank has been 
closed off by Israel’s separation barrier, to the detriment of Hamas. In the summer 
war, Hezbollah did lose its exclusive control of Lebanon’s border with Israel, which 
was arguably the most significant strategic outcome of the war. Without access to 
Israel’s borders, the coalition cannot control a sustained war of attrition with Israel. 
Moreover, if the coalition uses its rocket arsenal — its remaining offensive 
capability — this effectively licenses Israel to retaliate with devastating force. The 
coalition’s offensive option is presently reduced to the firing of Qassam rockets 
from Gaza.  
   So, while Islamists believe they have made gains, yet never before have Israel’s 
borders been so inaccessible to its adversaries, Islamists included. Moreover, 
without Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, this coalition is likely to remain 
blocked unless it includes an Arab state or Arab territory that neighbors Israel. 
Syria, of course, is an obvious candidate for that role, but its present leadership acts 
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as an ally of the coalition and not a full-fledged member in it. Until now, it has kept 
its own border with Israel closed to any resistance. There are also radical political 
movements in Egypt and Jordan that would eagerly join the coalition, but they are 
presently kept at bay by the regimes.  
   Given these limitations, the Israeli-Islamist conflict does not yet define the new 
Middle East, but a nuclear Iran would be an entirely different scenario. Experts in 
think-tanks may convince themselves that it would not matter or that a kind of 
balance of terror would be established; however, in the Middle East itself, a nuclear 
era would be understood as a dramatic shift in the balance of power away from the 
United States, Israel, and Arab regimes and towards the Islamist coalition. It would 
strengthen Hezbollah and could draw in Hamas and other Sunni movements. 
 
   It is conventional wisdom that the root problem of the Middle East is the Arab-
Israeli conflict. If only it were resolved, the Middle East could be turned around. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict entered on a track toward resolution in the mid-1970s. It 
made remarkable if fitful progress through a series of formal and tacit agreements, 
beginning with the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords and continuing through Oslo.  
   Besides Israel’s own reluctance to conclude peace due to its militarily-defined 
security policy, what also derailed the peace process at crucial moments at the Arab 
end of the spectrum, was religious extremism inspired partly by Iran’s revolution. 
Hence, besides the Arab-Israeli conflict, there has also emerged the problem of 
radical Islamism and the power accrued to its champion, Iran, and in the case of 
Iran’s nuclearization, this problem is certain to become more intractable.   
   Iran uses its need to counter Israeli nuclear capabilities as its primary reason for 
acquiring a nuclear option. Not only is it a popular rallying cry for domestic and 
foreign consumption, but it also helps boost Iranian claims to lead the Arab and 
Muslim cause against Israel, the peace process, and the new imperialism that Israel 
and the United States represent in the Middle East. Iranian leaders remember the 
preemptive Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981, and they 
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must sense threats to their missile and weapon infrastructure in public statements by 
Israeli leaders and politicians warning of Iranian nuclear intentions. 
   Israeli civilian and military leaders generally have assumed for some time that Iran 
poses a serious, if existential, threat to Israel. This belief represents a broad but not 
a total consensus. All agree that Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and/or 
ballistic missiles armed with NBC warheads will fundamentally transform Israeli 
national security. The disagreement stems from the reluctance of some Israeli 
civilian and military leaders to see Iranian NBC weapon acquisition as a fait 
accompli and from their refusal to see Israel as Iran’s primary target. Civilian 
advisors in the government and in think tanks are less alarmist than are defense and 
military officials about Iranian capabilities, and they caution against overreacting. 
For instance, Kam145  is not as certain as Israeli military security analysts that Iran 
will soon have nuclear weapons with which to threaten Israel. He acknowledges 
that Iran’s test firing of the Shahab-3 missile eventually will give Iran the capability 
to strike Israel with non-conventional weapons. Russian termination of aid (which 
will not happen), US efforts to prevent Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear technology 
and materials (which cannot be done), and Iranian commitments to international 
inspections will delay but cannot stop Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Kam 
believes Iran would attack Israel with non-conventional weapons only under 
exceptional circumstances, such as an extensive US attack on Iran or in the event of 
a Syrian-Israeli war. He believes the likelihood of such an attack is low; Iran is not 
particularly worried about an Israeli nuclear attack and views Israel as less a threat 
than Iraq or the United States. Kam’s cautious optimism assumes Iran bases its 
strategic decisions on logic and reason, although he admits that Iranian leaders may 
not be as deterrence-minded as he thinks they are. Israel can contain the threat from 
Iran by concluding a peace agreement with Syria and hoping the reformists come to 
power in Iran. To this latter end, Kam proposes supporting a US-Iranian dialogue in 
which the United States would insist Iran suspend its nuclear programs, its support 
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Studies, Strategies Assessment 1, no. 3, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, November 1998, pp. 1, 3-7 
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for terrorism, and its opposition to the Middle East peace process. He also proposes 
reducing Iran’s perception of an Israeli threat by moderating its anti-Iranian 
statements and increasing its non-conventional capacity to deter Iran. Israel, he 
concludes, may have to live in the shadow of a nuclear-armed and antagonistic Iran, 
but it need not panic. Israel can counter the threat, it is not alone in the 
confrontation, and Iran is not omnipotent. The Israeli officials argue that certain 
factors will constrain if not delay the time when Iran achieves a nuclear arms 
capability. These factors include Iran’s lack of fissile material, its dependence on 
foreign experts and technology, and the possibility that an increasingly moderate 
and democratic government would change national priorities. The civilian advisors 
argue that the US arms embargo on Iran was misguided in that it placed sanctions 
on conventional weapon purchases and thereby encouraged Iran to acquire non-
conventional weapon systems. 
   Israeli defense and military officials are more pessimistic than their civilian 
counterparts, seeing a nuclear Iran with Israel as the prime target. They worry, too, 
about what Egypt and Syria will do if Iran acquires nuclear weapons.146 They 
caution that a new arms race will begin, with Cairo, Damascus, and even Ankara 
seeking non-conventional weapon systems. 
   For the first time in its history, conventional Israeli military capabilities will be 
inadequate to meet a threat to the very existence of the Jewish state.147 Israeli 
leaders have long warned the West, particularly the United States, about Iran’s 
nuclear weapon agenda and the great risk Iranian ambitions and hostility pose for 
Israel. Military and political leaders in the government and the security 
                                                 
146 Pollack, Kenneth M., unpublished paper presented at the National Defense University, 
Washington DC, January 1999. 
147 Partial nuclear opacity describes the Israeli policy of refusing to declare or openly test its nuclear 
capability while signaling potential adversaries that it does possess the weapons. 
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establishment, including the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Former 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak, have conceived of peace with Israel’s neighbors as a 
pragmatic measure intended in part to isolate an increasingly threatening Iran. Israel 
seems to fear Iran’s ideological drive as much as, if not more than, its emerging 
technical capabilities. They accept official Islamic Republic policy statements that 
concede no legitimacy to the Jewish state. Israelis appear to take no comfort from 
the fact that Iran’s primary target may be Iraq. Once armed, they argue, Iran would 
pose a direct threat to Israel in Tehran’s assumed willingness to support Hezbollah 
and extremist Palestinians to destroy Israel. Others counter this argument by noting 
that Iran has no substantial strategic motive for conflict with Israel and, in the 
absence of any perceived threat to its vital national interests, would not seek direct, 
nuclear warfare with Israel. 
   A nuclear-armed Iran would present Israel with several options, each of which 
carries its own risks. Since the time of Prime Minister Ben Gurion, a pillar of Israeli 
national security philosophy has been that the size and vulnerability of the state 
necessitated an aggressive military posture—striking first when necessary, 
defending by attacking, and carrying the fight to the enemy. Whether Israel chooses 
to pursue an offensive or a defensive response, or a combination of both, will 
depend on how Iran crosses the nuclear threshold and the sense of urgency Israeli 
leaders feel regarding the risk to the country’s security. Unlike the Gulf Arab States, 
Israel could not ignore an Iran that has openly tested a nuclear device or that boasts 
of possessing nuclear warheads capable of striking Israel. Israel would certainly 
consider the merits of: 
_ Testing its own nuclear device. An Iranian test could force Israel to review its 
own policy of partial nuclear opacity. Israel may believe that it can deter Iran only 
by making clear that it could do far more damage to Iran than Iran could do to 
Israel. An Israeli test, however, could trigger US laws suspending aid and arms 
sales. Israel is not likely to garner international support to isolate Iran when similar 
efforts against India and Pakistan have failed and Israel is the unacknowledged 
possessor of similar capabilities. 
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_ Launching a preemptive military strike. This tactic worked in June 1981 when 
Israel attacked Iraq’s sole nuclear facility at Tuwaitha, but Iran and Iraq have 
learned the lesson of concentrating programs and equipment in one place. Both 
have dispersed and concealed the locations of their nuclear-related facilities. 
Although Israeli military leaders deny it, they lack the data and the capability to 
forestall Iranian development of nuclear arms by force.148 A mission to Iran would 
be against a larger, better prepared opponent with multiple, dispersed, and well-
hidden targets. The demands for real time intelligence, logistics, and long-distance 
strike capability almost certainly exceed the current capabilities of the Israel 
Defense Forces. Israel probably could degrade or delay parts of Iran’s nuclear 
programs, but it could not eliminate them. Attacking through Turkey, with whom 
Israel has expanding military cooperation, might resolve these problems, but 
Ankara may not feel that allowing Israel to use Turkish territory to collect 
intelligence on and stage operations against Iran is in its interests. 
_ Using covert operations to eliminate Iranian technical programs and 
specialists, as it did with Iraq. Israeli covert operations in the 1970s and 1980s 
aimed at eliminating European, Arab, and Iraqi scientists and interdicting 
equipment bound for Iraq were dramatic but comparatively ineffective means to 
halt or delay Iraq’s non-conventional weapon programs.149 No information suggests 
that Israel has attempted similar operations against Iran, although Israel has tried 
unsuccessfully to influence Russia to stop assisting Iran in constructing its nuclear 
facility at Bushehr or providing training at Russian facilities for Iranian scientists. 
                                                 
148 Ibid. 
149 Israeli intelligence operatives have been accused of killing Gerald Bull, the inventor of the so-
called Big Gun, and an Egyptian scientist working for Iraq and intercepting shipping in French ports 
bound for Baghdad. For a list of Iraqi nuclear programs and Israeli efforts to obstruct them, see Ian 
Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (London, 
Grove Press, 1992), 99, 517–18; and Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions. 
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_ Opening back-channel communications with Tehran. This approach would not 
be without precedent. Israel had back-channel links to Tehran during the mid-
1980s.150 If Israelis believed that Iran could be deterred from using its strategic 
arsenal against Israel, they might conclude that Tehran understands and appreciates 
the logic of deterrence. Back-channel talks probably would be intended to establish 
a hot line regarding nuclear tests or usage. The obstacle to this initiative is a lack of 
willingness not in Israel but in Tehran. 
_ Seeking broader security cooperation with the United States. Israel almost 
certainly would turn to the United States for additional military support by 
increasing military aid and new technologies for Israel, by allowing Israel to use US 
military aid to buy foreign made weapons (along the lines of the deals for the 
Dolphin-type submarines Israel is buying from Germany with US military funding), 
or by pressuring the United States to purchase additional Israeli-made weapons or 
to stockpile additional war reserves in Israel. Israel will use all the channels at its 
disposal to obtain US assistance in preventing, delaying, or countering Iranian 
acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. Israel would also seek US 
technical help in developing its own next generation of advanced missile defense 
systems. Israel is not likely to be satisfied with its Arrow missile system and 
probably would push to develop and deploy an airborne boost-phase intercept 
system, keeping with the Israeli military philosophy of taking the fight to the 
enemy. Israel also might seek greater joint military training and operational 
planning with the United States as a way to forge a joint response to an Iranian 
nuclear threat. Finally, Israel might request a US declaration of the perilous 
consequences for Iran should it openly cross the nuclear threshold and use WMDs. 
This kind of declaration, similar to the warning the United States issued to Iraq on 
                                                 
150 The Israeli-Iranian connection involved supplying Western arms for Iran in its war with Iraq, 
freeing Western hostages held by pro-Iranian terrorist factions in Lebanon, and funding the 
Nicaraguan contras. 
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the eve of the Gulf War, could allow Israel to maintain its own nuclear opaqueness 
without issuing warnings of its own. 
   In addition to seeking expanded US military guarantees, Israel might decide that the 
only solution to the new Iranian threat is to make clear that the Jewish state is 
protected by the US nuclear arsenal and that it might press for a formal alliance 
with Washington. Short of that, Israel would probably seek secret clarifications or 
guarantees serving the same purpose that they could then leak as a warning to 
Tehran. Israel and the United States already have extensive channels of cooperation, 
including the recently established Joint Strategic Planning Committee, to improve 
coordination on strategic issues such as Iran’s nuclear programs. Because the US-
Israeli relationship is so broad and deep and because Israel will perceive a threat 
from a nuclear-armed Iran, Washington will have to anticipate Israeli requests for 
support, cooperation, and assistance. An Israeli attack on Iran—successful or not—
could sow the seeds for a great asymmetrical threat to Israeli and Jewish well being 
worldwide. If recent history was a guide, Iran would feel obligated to respond to the 
Israeli attack either with a retaliatory missile strike or with terrorism. 
   Iran could increase support to Syria, Hezbollah, and other anti-Israel countries and 
groups to launch terrorist attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide. Israeli 
efforts to retaliate by striking Iranian economic targets in the Gulf (oil processing 
facilities or export infrastructure) would have significant political but little 
economic impact; they also would seriously exacerbate U.S. relations with the Gulf 
Arabs. 
   Recent acquisitions and alliances enhance the Israeli ability to reach Iran should it 
choose the confrontational or preemptive route. Israel is acquiring F-15I strike 
aircraft, cruise-missile-capable submarines, and extended-range Jericho missiles. 
Moreover, its growing military cooperation with Turkey could give Israel the site 
from which to conduct flight training and operate intelligence-collection facilities 
for possible operations against Iran. Most specialists believe Israel would not want 
to rely on an untested Arrow II antimissile system to shield the country from a 
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retaliatory missile attack, and most also agree that a even a single NBC-tipped 
missile striking Tel Aviv would constitute an unacceptable, even fatal, outcome for 
Israel. Most Israeli senior military leaders are reluctant to place their faith in TMD 
as an effective shield for populations against ballistic missile attack. They still 
prefer counterforce operations to destroy weapons in their country of origin.151 
 
   GCC SECURITY OPTIONS:  
 
How Gulf Cooperation Council states react to news of a nuclear armed Iran depends 
primarily on how Iran reveals it has crossed the threshold. They are less likely to 
acknowledge public agreement with US claims that Iran intends to or is capable of 
attacking them with nuclear-armed missiles. Nor are they likely to respond to veiled 
suggestions from Iran that it has acquired the capability. In neither case would they 
acknowledge concern about Iranian intentions or perceive that they could be the 
intended targets for an attack, believing that such behavior would only provoke Tehran. 
Open Iranian testing, however, would force GCC states into public debate on how to 
protect themselves. It probably would lead to one of at least three options on how best 
to do so. 
_ Option 1: Do nothing. Saudi Arabia, speaking for the smaller GCC states, could 
decide that the best course to follow would be to do nothing that would arouse the ire 
or attract the attention of Iran or Iraq. The tactic failed to mollify Iraq in late July 1990, 
but hopes might be high that the strategy would now succeed. The Gulf Arabs would 
try to use détente and engagement of Iran— symbolized by improved bilateral 
diplomatic ties backed by investment in Iran, increased trade, and coordination on 
issues of common concern such as oil production and pricing and regional security 
issues—rather than risk the dangers of pursuing policies of isolation or containment. 
                                                 
151 This was evidenced in the case of Israeli strike on Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981.  
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_ Option 2: Join a nuclear umbrella. The Gulf Arabs could seek shelter under an 
expanded NATO umbrella or expanded security guarantees under a US nuclear 
umbrella. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, in particular, may prefer a NATO-style alliance 
with the United States as lead participant. In exchange for guarantees of protection, the 
Gulf governments would have to allow upgrades in the kinds of military planning and 
equipment necessary to defend them from the enhanced Iranian threat. For example, 
they might have to agree to higher levels of deployment and the addition of nuclear 
weapons intended to deter or defeat an Iranian threat. They might insist on sharing the 
keys to such facilities, meaning they would have a vote on when, where, and under 
what conditions such equipment could be used. 
_ Option 3: Acquire their own nuclear-armed weapon systems. The Gulf States have 
spent large sums of money in the past decade on conventional aircraft and weapon 
packages. In addition, Saudi Arabia has aging Chinese-manufactured CSS–2 missiles 
acquired more than 10 years ago and probably in need of replacement or upgrade. The 
UAE has Scud-Bs, but they apparently are inoperable. The Gulf States, individually or 
collectively, are highly unlikely to have the incentive, talent, and capability to build 
indigenous nuclear programs, as Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan have done. At a minimum, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE probably will look to purchase new weapon systems and 
very likely could insist on receiving nuclear-ready warheads. They are not likely to 
listen to US admonishments regarding the dangers of becoming a proliferator. 
 
IMPACT OF GCC OPTIONS ON 
US AND MIDDLE EAST: 
 
The first two options—doing nothing or seeking to sit under someone else’s nuclear 
umbrella—will have little impact on GCC states or the region. These states will remain 
consumers of security, vulnerable to attack and to threats from Iran if Iran perceives 
itself spurned by the Gulf Arabs in favor of the United States or another Western Big 
Brother. Tehran will not appreciate rejection by its Gulf Muslim brothers of an 
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Islamically-correct security blanket, but it also may want to allay their concerns about 
hostile intent to keep the Arabs from too close a Western-US embrace. 
   The third option—Gulf Arab acquisition of new weapon systems—is certain to raise 
the anxiety level in Israel. As it has with previous Saudi requests for airborne warning 
and control systems and other advanced fighter aircraft, Israel will oppose any US or 
European assistance to Gulf Arab acquisition of new weapons, believing—
incorrectly—that any new systems would be targeted toward Israel, turned over to the 
Palestinians or Syrians for use against Israel, or both. Thus far, the Gulf States have 
used their acquisitions of aircraft systems for internal purposes; Qatar and Bahrain, for 
example, have threatened each other over mutual claims to Hawar Island rather than 
expressing military solidarity with the Palestinians. The Gulf Arabs are not likely to 
turn to Syria or Egypt for additional levels of protection. Syria under the late Hafiz al-
Asad was perceived as too close to Iran and too ideological; Gulf leaders will wait to 
see if his son and successor, Bashar, toes the same hard line. Cairo would be mistrusted 
because of its past support for radical anti-regime movements on the Peninsula. 
   Should the Gulf States opt for more advanced weapon systems, several factors could 
constrain them. The primary one probably is cost. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, 
in particular, have invested heavily over the past decade in new aircraft and weapons 
purchased at a time when oil revenues were falling, budgets shortfalls soaring, and 
domestic debt increasing. If there has been public criticism of expensive weapon 
purchases, it has been that the governments still are unable to defend their countries 
despite the new acquisitions and that much of the spending has been made under 
pressure from the United States.152 
   These criticisms have been heard in Saudi Arabia and echoed even in Kuwait, where 
most Kuwaitis worry at the same time that the United States will not stay the course. 
                                                 
152 The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was re-designated U.S. Central Command in 1983; its 
mission was to “deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further expansion and, if necessary, defend 
against it.” See Rachel Bronson’s draft paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States 
Military in the Persian Gulf: Postured for Success? January 2000. 
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Scholars agree that public opinion in Saudi Arabia, for example, would not be a 
constraint on government efforts to proliferate by acquiring nuclear weapons.153 Public 
opinion does not have a significant impact on Saudi defense policy decision making. 
   Moreover, the Gulf Arabs, especially those in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, know they 
live in a dangerous neighborhood in which WMDs have been developed, deployed, and 
used. The Islamists—the most strident critics of the Saudi ruling family in the 1990s—
in their 1992 Memorandum of Advice to King Fahd accused the government of military 
weakness and of relying on the United States to defend the homeland of Islam. They 
called for the development of a domestic arms industry, more cooperation with other 
Muslim countries in weapon development, and a more independent and self-reliant 
defense strategy.154 The additional risk in the Gulf States acquiring nuclear weapons 
lies in the lack of an indigenous manpower base to construct, monitor, deploy, or 
protect the systems. Any advanced weapon system would require foreign expertise in 
developing a domestic program or constructing a turnkey project. It also probably 
would need foreign assistance in maintaining that capability once deployed. According 
to Muhammad al-Khilewi, the Saudi diplomat who sought political asylum in the 
United States in 1994, Riyadh tried to obtain nuclear research reactors from China and 
a US firm.155 No evidence indicates that the Chinese provided nuclear warheads when 
they sold the Saudis the CSS–2 missiles in the 1980s or that any state is considering 
such a deal now. Saudi Arabia has signed the NPT, but it has not signed the 
comprehensive safeguard agreement with the IAEA as required by the treaty. The 
Saudis have, over the years, provided Pakistan financial assistance in its development 
of nuclear technology and capability and might look to Pakistan as a source of 
protection or turnkey technology. Saudi Defense Minister Sultan visited Pakistan late 
last year and included a stop at Pakistani nuclear facilities. 
                                                 
153 This has been a favorite suggestion of Oman, with no further specifications known. 
154 Interviews conducted with current and former government officials and senior military officers, 
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155 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Preliminary ‘Lessons’ of the Israeli-Hezbollah War”, Working Paper, CSIS, 
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   Pakistan—faced with economic sanctions, grinding poverty, and growing Islamist 
extremism—may see little to gain by selling its one coveted technology and asset in the 
threatened battle with India. Finally, where the authority rests within the Saudi Arabian 
government and ruling family to determine deployment and usage is unclear. As the 
transition to power under King Abdullah continues, the family is likely to mute the old 
defense arguments between him and his rival and successor, Prince Sultan, in 
preference for consensus and a common front. 
   None of the options will have a significant effect on the foreign or commercial policies 
of GCC states. Their primary concern will be to mesh their diplomatic and economic 
interests with those of Iran (and eventually Iraq) and not to appear to threaten or be 
threatened by anyone. If the third security option is chosen, the Gulf Arabs would still 
act as discreetly as they did when they acquired the CSS–2s, letting their acquisition be 
known but not discussing it. Pursuing this option would not make the Gulf Arabs more 
aggressive toward Iran, although it could raise the risk to their own internal security 
should terrorists or extremists secure any parts of the new systems. The Gulf Arabs 
will not change oil pricing or production policies only to satisfy a nuclear Iran, and Iran 
is not likely to threaten use of these weapons to enforce its economic ambitions. Iran 
has made its points on oil pricing and production in bilateral talks and in Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries negotiations. Nonetheless, Iran’s aggressive nuclear 
posture could change all that. Heightened threat perceptions amongst the Arab states 
could compel them to opt for balancing options (arms races and alliances to counter 
Iranian hegemony) instead of bandwagoning with Iran.  
 
  CONCLUSION: 
 
   The centrality of détente to a stable deterrence can be verified with reference to Karl’s 
Popper’s test of falsifiability. Since the converse would clearly threaten stability, by 
investigating the relationship between deterrence and détente, this study has thrown 
light on the threats posed by absence of détente to deterrence stability. A look at the 
deterrence model in place in South Asia reveals that periods of stability were marked 
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by arms reduction talks, nuclear safety regimes, and moves to resolve political 
differences. Throughout the five decades of Cold War competition, Washington and 
Moscow struggled to attain strategic stability. For a deterrent to be stabilizing, it must 
be credible. In the Cold War, attaining this credibility—necessary for attaining long-
term stability— often generated short- and medium-term instabilities. Both parties 
performed elaborate rituals (nuclear testing, missile flight tests, command post 
exercises) to demonstrate the credibility of their nuclear threats. Concerns over the 
delicacy of deterrence meant that technological evolutions (ballistic missiles, 
MIRVing, improved accuracy, and missile defenses) could trigger destabilizing 
iterations of reactions and counter-reactions. Ascertaining the source of each 
superpower’s nuclear policy was difficult, complicating the analysis of the choices 
the adversary would make. Nuclear policy, doctrine, and operations during the Cold 
War were the product of a lively and convoluted process involving thousands of 
players over the fifty year of conflict, many of which held quite different views on 
what stability meant. As former US government official Michael Wheeler observes, 
even the last decade of the Cold War produced grave concerns on both sides about 
the adversary attempting some sort of nuclear first use. Arms control restrained 
arms races, but strategic planners s t i l l  sought qualitative and quantitative 
improvements that might allow them to “escape” from deterrence. In the end, the 
superpowers avoided conflict, but they never quite achieved a condition of static 
stability. Moscow could only keep pace by expending massive resources—an effort 
that would bankrupt its economy and ultimately cause its collapse. 
The principal lesson of the Cold War was the necessity of a two-track stability 
process. One track involved the patient pursuit of the settlement of fundamental 
political differences. Simultaneously, negotiations were held to stabilize nuclear arms 
races and lower the risk of inadvertent or accidental triggers to nuclear war.    
 
   However, in the case of the evolving situation in the Middle East, the countries of the 
region note that if there is an Iranian nuclear umbrella, they are the ones who will be 
subject to pressure and blackmail difficult for them to resist. The clear result of this 
situation is that the United States and Israel would fear responding in order to avoid a 
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nuclear threat against their interests or existence. Hezbollah, Hamas, and other clients 
of Iran will have much more courage to act knowing that Israel is limited in its ability 
to respond. This is due to the fact that there would be an immediate warning from 
Iran, and Tel Aviv would need to take into account Iranian missiles when taking 
actions that the Iranians may view as harmful to their interests. Only the Iranians 
would be the judge of what is harmful to their interests. 
 
   Therefore, this study posits that the Arab-Israeli dispute must be resolved with increased 
urgency in order to bring stability to the crisis-prone region. Further, the security/nuclear 
doctrine of Israel as the existing nuclear power, and those of other aspirants, must 
reaffirm self-defense for mutual trust-building and regional risk-reduction. It has been 
noted the stability of a nuclear deterrence model is predicated upon discernable progress 
made in the areas of doctrinal clarity and dispute resolution. While in South Asia some 
progress has been made as a result of lessons learnt since overt nuclearization, the 
situation in the Middle East remains unpredictable.  
 
The major disputes like Kashmir and Palestine have the potential to emerge as 
nuclear ‘flashpoints’ in crisis situations. This coupled with existing security dilemmas 
of states makes for a lethal combination. In South Asia, in the overall regional 
framework, where China and Russia are also included as the neighboring countries, the 
Indian threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity has remained grave. Neither of the two 
larger neighbors to the North has a direct border dispute with Pakistan. On the 
other hand, India which has a long border with Pakistan has done nothing to assure 
Pakistan of its peaceful intentions. Pakistan’s early policy to cultivate friendship 
with the US and seek military and economic assistance from it by entering into 
various alliances was an attempt to minimize the Indian threat. However, Pakistani 
efforts to increase its security proved unsuccessful, since in the occasion of wars with 
India and on the issue of Kashmir, its Western allies, especially the US, let it down. So 
the ini t ial  Indian threat to Pakistan’s security became increasingly entrenched in its 
foreign policy. This explains why the students and the scholars generally assume 
that the foreign policy of Pakistan has been shaped as a direct response to what India 
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did in pursuit of its own foreign or domestic policies. In the Middle East, the 
resolution of the Palestinian issue could curb terrorism and stimulate progress. The 
destabilizing regional role of Iran could best be countered by an Arab-Israeli peace. 
That would explain the Arab League’s wholehearted support of the Saudi-led 
initiative in 2002 to conclude peace with Israel.  
    
   It has been noted that the dispute over Kashmir and the other issues propel India and 
Pakistan into a never-ending cycle of arms race and violence. Their social 
development and poverty alleviation programs are often severely curtailed due to the 
expensive and vicious arms race. No compromise could yet be reached over Kashmir, 
as both the powers either claim jurisdiction over it or call it a right of self-
determination of the Kashmiri people, Centering this issue, mistrust and hatred keep 
on spiraling, manifestation of which is found in a long drawn out low intensity 
conflict. Pakistan says it is the indigenous struggle by the Kashmiris, while India 
blames that it is fuelled and abetted by the Pakistanis. Such a state of relationship is 
bound to affect the rational decision making by the leaderships of both the countries. 
It maybe recalled that Clausewitz had cautioned that emotions must be taken into 
consideration while analyzing a tense or sensitive relationship, like the one that exists 
between India and Pakistan. 
 
It was a welcome initiative taken by the last Indian BJP-led government that there is a 
thaw in the strained relations between India and Pakistan. Pakistani government also 
seems sincere in normalizing relations with India, given many positive steps already 
taken to prepare the stage for dialogue. It is also hoped that the Congress-led would 
be more forthcoming to engage in dialogues. One could also take lessons from 
history; Thucydides regretted that the leaders of the warring Greek city states did not 
engage in prolonged debates, which created confusing signals, resulting in 
devastating Peloponnesian War. American geopolitics is also likely to put pressure on 
New Delhi and Islamabad to engage in serious dialogues at least to settle many other 
outstanding issues even if the Kashmir issue is set aside for the time being. Pakistan, 
on the dictates of the US, would have to control the cross-border terrorism, as the 
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Indians and Americans call it; otherwise American campaign of fighting terrorism 
worldwide would be considered greatly unjustified. Pakistan cannot afford to go 
beyond the dictates of the Americans mainly because of the al Qaeda factor, although 
there are opposite internal dynamics in the Pakistani politics as well. There is 
apparently a win-win situation for both Pakistan and India in the process of 
rapprochement. Linked to this, the nuclear network may take the shape that could also 
be tackled in the manner as visualized in the following paragraphs.  
 
In the present context of overt nuclear development and complex security 
environment in South Asia, complete disarmament that could be the idealistic goal for 
both India and Pakistan is rather a far-fetched or a utopian talk. It would be even 
difficult to go back to the 1990 situation where there was some doubt about the 
nuclear capability of both the nations. India’s nuclear doctrine calls for an 
international treat banning first use of nuclear weapons to which Pakistan would not 
agree for obvious reasons as already explained. Although there is an agreement 
between the two countries not to attack each other’s nuclear installations, ‘no war 
pact’, as proposed by Pakistan, ‘no first use pact’, as proposed by India, is unlikely to 
see the light of day. However, the spectrum of certain CBMs could be widened. Cases 
in point could be: till the CTBT comes into force, Pakistan and India could formalize 
their unilateral moratorium into a binding bilateral arrangement and both the parties 
could pledge they would not operationally deploy their nuclear weapons and keep 
them in a non-deployed mode. Both the parties could even pledge not to carry out 
further test flight of the missiles; this is, however, an almost unachievable objective. 
It would be well nigh difficult for India to enter the nuclear club that has been one of 
the prime objectives for India to earn the status of a global power. Again, the non-
proliferation regime (other than basically the P-5) would not accept either India or 
Pakistan. Countries like Japan, Germany and other non-nuclear EU countries would 
handle both Pakistan and India with suspicion and caution. However, realpolitik in 
South Asia, which involves the US, Russia, China etc. may not make much difference 
to that.  
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The stability-instability paradox would continue to operate in the South Asian 
environment. However, with the resolution of the Kashmir issue, which seems to be 
an intractable one, nuclear related tensions may subside greatly. Pakistan’s nuclear 
program is India-specific and if the Kashmir issue were resolved, Pakistan might 
support the nuclear-free South Asia at least to gain diplomatic advantage. However, 
the burgeoning Chinese nuclear capability would not totally eliminate nuclear race or 
the tensions in South Asia. Given such scenario, even the smaller South Asian nations 
have reasons to feel insecure and vulnerable to nuclear fall-outs, in case there is 
nuclear exchange.  
 
However, since the Kashmir issue is almost an intractable one and as power politics is 
very much at play in that part of the world, which also has the American and Chinese 
and involvement, there is remote possibility that there would be a nuclear-free South 
Asia. Although the situation involving India and Pakistan is problematic, nuclear 
competition offers hope for stability. There is remote possibility that India would 
pursue any military option that would compel Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons. 
This is also substantiated by Waltz who also concludes that ‘the possibility of major 
war among states, having nuclear weapons approaches zero’. He even goes to the 
extent of commenting that ‘the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be 
welcomed than feared’. 
 
There is a school of thought that advocates that, since India’s emerging nuclear 
doctrine is meant primarily for deterrence and secondarily for retribution, in case 
deterrence fails it might dampen rather than accelerate strategic competition in South 
Asia. Deterrence, as highlighted in this study, is very much at work. But it is 
debatable whether it will decelerate the nuclear competition, refinement and progress 
of nuclear weapons. Arms race would continue unabated without any possibility of 
going total denuclearized in the region that includes China also. Realpolitik would not 
allow it to happen. Another school of thought claims nuclear weapons are political 
instruments of deterrence rather than military tools of warfighting. This probability 
does not hold good in South Asian environment, especially between India and 
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Pakistan. Geographical realities for Pakistan and historical animosities existing 
between India and Pakistan, centering especially around Kashmir and emotional 
components ingrained in the psyche of the leaders and population of both the 
countries, make the environment a real nuclear flashpoint.  
 
Both India and Pakistan are now nuclear powers. They are in the process of evolving 
doctrines and command and control mechanisms. There are definite ambiguities in 
the doctrines and the command and control mechanisms lack adequate full proof, fail-
safe systems and certain other parameters. Doctrines of both the countries aim for 
continued improvement in terms of range, yield, and better penetration of warheads of 
their nuclear arsenal. However, leaderships in both the countries appear to be coming 
forward, at the moment, to peacefully settle the scores between them. This is a 
welcome gesture but how far it can go is a poignant question. Because there are many 
outstanding and intractable issues, both major and minor, which, time and again, 
fluctuate the stability-instability paradox. A cautious and deliberate approach and 
restraint on the part of both the parties are need of the day. 
 
De-nuclearized South Asian Zone concept is much harder to achieve because of 
China’s proximity to the region. Efforts should be on to keep both the belligerents 
engaged in dialogue, which can take care of the wrong signals that usually emanate in 
the South Asian culture and environment. This can be initiated regionally or injected 
by outside powers like the UN, the US, Russia, the EU, Japan etc. It is also expected 
that a mixture of deterrence and cost-benefit analysis would induce good sense to 
prevail on the leaderships of both the countries to avoid a nuclear stand-off in the 
region. Matured and rational decision making to resolve the outstanding issues is not 
to be ruled out, since there are moves towards rapprochement due to internal national 
compulsions or international pressures being exerted especially by the United States. 
The process can get momentum by further widening the ambit of the CBMs, slowly 
and gradually, in political, diplomatic and military spheres and, by keeping the 
seemingly intractable Kashmir problem at status quo for sometime. 
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In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli enjoys the same dubious distinction of 
intractability as Kashmir in South Asia. However, Iran’s regional importance entails 
that most that goes on in the region or in response to the Sunni countries refers to 
Iran’s potential power in the region. The common denominators of all of the Sunni 
countries are:  
 1. The perception of the threat posed by Iran and its allies, whether the threat is real or 
perceived.  
  
 2. The importance each country attributes to the Iranian nuclear issue; viewing the 
Iranian nuclear campaign as a way to achieve hegemony, involvement, and security in 
the region.  
  
 3. Calling together the countries defending themselves against the challenge of a new 
representation of the regional narrative. This does not only refer to events, but also to 
the perception of the region and its future.  
   Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan regard the Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah triangle (as 
voiced through the press, and not from the regimes themselves) as a radical axis. Such 
terms were being applied to this axis even before the Lebanon War of the summer of 
2006. The Arab countries were aware of Iran, the ambitious giant that rose up from the 
East, at least since Ahmadinejad’s election as president, but they consciously chose to 
ignore this. In the accord from the March 2006 Arab summit in Khartoum, the only 
reference to Iran was, as in the past, the demand to return the three islands over which 
there is dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates.  
   It appears there was a conscious decision not to deal with the threats of the Shi’a axis 
and to avoid confrontation with Iran. The Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian axis, which once 
determined the decisions of the Arab summit by concluding matters ahead of time and 
thus preventing disagreement, simply broke down and slowly dissipated. It appeared 
that a vacuum was created, but this was not really the case.  
 211
   This vacuum was filled by other forces, forces that in the eyes of the leading Arab 
countries in the world were external: The United States with its invasion of 
Afghanistan and then the coalition in Iraq is one; Turkey, with its eyes on Europe, but 
also seeing itself as a mediator in the region clearly has interests in northern Iraq and 
its border with Syria; Israel succeeded unilaterally to dictate matters in the region, for 
example, the disengagement plan, which the Arab states did not like; and of course Iran 
— which is also not part of the Arab world — under Ahmadinejad, who since his 
election has voiced revolutionary rhetoric, which is perceived by some leading Arab 
countries as the revival of the export of the Islamic Revolution. 
   When Iran develops a nuclear capability for its missiles, what will the Gulf Arabs want 
of the United States, considering the costs, domestic criticism, and risks? They 
probably will want guarantees of enhanced protection and promises to defend them 
before Iran can make good on any threats. However, the Gulf Arabs are not likely to 
support a policy of preemptive strikes to lessen their Iran problem. As they have argued 
against using the military option against Saddam Hussain (unless his departure could 
be guaranteed), they will argue for engagement over isolation and negotiations rather 
than military operations. On the other hand, they probably will not accept Iranian 
invitations to enter an Islamic nuclear blanket and engage in anti-US alliance building.  
   The Gulf Arab states will continue to rely on US protection to some degree, especially 
if a nuclear arms race increases the threat. If American actions or statements suggested 
that Washington would feel constrained militarily by a nuclear-armed Iran, then the 
Gulf Arabs will move closer to Iran, and at least the lower Gulf States will seek Iraq’s 
return. 
   In this context, the 2002 Arab League offer of peace was an effort to seize the political 
initiative from Iran. This makes ample sense given earlier efforts by Iran to maintain 
influence over the dynamics of the peace process. Further, the resolution of Arab-
Israeli dispute and peace between moderate Arab states and Israel would put pressure 
on hawkish elements within the Iranian regime. Pragmatists in Iran who see greater 
hope in regional stability and economic progress would be able to point to the need for 
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joining hands with the Arabs and Israel against the common threat of Sunni extremism 
posed by organizations like al Qaeda et al. At the same time, in exchange for 
normalization of relations with the US, Tehran could be asked to accept verifiable 
safeguards on all its enrichment operations; permit throughout the country the more 
intrusive type of inspections required by the Additional Protocol of the IAEA; supply 
the IAEA with full documentation about suspected past violations, and freeze the 
construction of more centrifuges and heavy water reactors that could produce 
plutonium. Whatever the modalities of a final agreement amongst stakeholders in the 
Middle Eastern strategic environment, keeping in view the relationship between 
deterrence and détente, this study prescribes: pro-active international engagement with 
Iran; and early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, for nuclear stability in the Middle 
East.      
This study has examined the evolving nuclear postures of India, Pakistan, the US, 
Israel, Iran, and the Arab states. In the case of South Asia, ambiguities in the doctrines 
and the command and control mechanisms of both India and Pakistan have been 
identified as areas that need to be given due consideration for regional and global 
security. The doctrine leads to the development, refinement, lethality, penetrability 
etc. of the different components of nuclear arsenals. A step by step comparison of 
both doctrines has been made to explain the security implications for the region, and 
also to identify the doctrines’ shortcomings. Since a de-nuclearized South Asia is 
almost impossible due to China’s proximity to the region, therefore efforts should be 
made keep both the belligerents engaged in dialogue. Internal national pressure, 
matured and rational decision-making by the leaders, international pressure, a mixture 
of deterrence and cost-benefit analysis are some suggested moves towards 
rapprochement between India and Pakistan. That could be the suitable model to be 
replicated in the Middle East, although, as mentioned earlier the Middle East is a 
complicated region by many standards. The strategic environment in the Middle East 
is marked by multiple ‘security complexes’. There is the long-standing Arab-Israeli 
dispute, the Persian-Arab divide, and also the role of the extra-regional actors i.e. the 
US, EU and Russia. 
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